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Abstract 
The Lisbon strategy could reinvigorate Europe’s economy and boost employment. In 2000 the 
European leaders agreed to stimulate economic growth and employment and make Europe’s 
economy the most competitive in the world. If Europe would really reach the goals they set, 
Europe’s Gross Domestic Product could increase by 12% to 23% and employment by about 
11%. This paper draws this conclusion after having analysed five of the most important Lisbon 
goals: the internal market for services, the reduction of administrative burdens, goals on 
improving human capital, the 3% target on research and development expenditures, and 70% 
target on the employment rate. Using CPB’s general equilibrium model for the world economy 
we have simulated the consequences for Europe of reaching the Lisbon targets in these fields.  
 
Key words: Jobs creation and economic growth, Lisbon agenda, general equilibrium model  
 
JEL code: E20, E61, D58, O52 
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Preface 
A stronger emphasis on job creation and economic growth is the one of the main conclusions of 
the midterm review of the Lisbon strategy. It is one of the top priorities of the Barroso’s 
presidency of the European Commission together with more emphasis on implementation of 
Lisbon through national action plans. The Sapir (2003) and Kok (2004) reports constitute 
important analytical building blocks underlying the mid-term review. Nevertheless, several 
questions remain unanswered, of which not one of the least is to quantify what benefits the 
Lisbon strategy will provide for the European economy. 
 
This study quantifies some of the main elements of the Lisbon strategy using our applied 
general equilibrium model WorldScan. The project was initiated and commissioned by 
Directorate General Enterprise & Industry of the European Commission as background material 
for the Competitiveness Report. The authors want to thank Hannes Leo of WIFO for the 
collaboration and management of the project. 
 
A large part of the statistical and technical work for this project has been carried out by Nico 
van Leeuwen and Gerard Verweij. Bas Jacobs contributed heavily to the skill model, and Henk 
Kox contributed to the data on administrative burdens. The authors thank Isabel Grilo and 
Josefina Monteagudo of DG Enterprise, and the participants of the workshops in Vienna at the 
WIFO institute for fruitful discussions and comments. Moreover the authors appreciate the 
constructive comments of their CPB colleagues Eric Canton, Maarten Cornet, Sjef Ederveen, 
Rob Euwals, Albert van der Horst, Egbert Jongen, Richard Nahuis, Marc Pomp, Bert Smid, 
Paul Veenendaal, and Dinand Webbink. 
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Summary 
The Lisbon strategy could reinvigorate Europe’s economy and boost employment. In 2000 the 
European leaders agreed to stimulate economic growth and employment and make Europe’s 
economy the most competitive in the world. If Europe would really reach the goals they set, 
Europe’s GDP could increase by 12% to 23% and employment by about 11%. For more than a 
decade economic and employment growth would be at least 0.8% higher than without these 
goals. However, to reach these goals important efforts to develop the policy measures will be 
necessary in most countries, the costs of which could not be entirely integrated in this analysis.   
 
This conclusion is drawn after having analysed five of the most important Lisbon goals. Using a 
general equilibrium model for the world economy we have analysed the opening up of the 
services market, reduction of administrative burdens, goals on improving human capital, the 3% 
target on R&D expenditures, and the goals on employment. All these goals together could 
revive European’s economy and its labour market.   
 
Simulations are used to quantify the consequences of Europe reaching the Lisbon targets in 
these fields for Europe as a whole, for individual countries and for sectors in Europe. The 
simulations answer the question: ‘What if Europe reaches the Lisbon targets?’ They do not take 
into account all costs of policy measures needed to get to the targets. Moreover the economic 
effects of the policies are sometimes uncertain. To incorporate this uncertainty we analysed a 
lower bound and an upper bound scenario for the two most effective targets in terms of 
economic growth, employment and R&D. 
 
Jobs creation associated with reaching the 70% employment target, manifests itself in a 
considerable increase of GDP by 6.3 to 9.2%, depending on the scenario. Reaching these targets 
may require a substantial cut in taxes and social security benefits. The impact of several skills 
targets (less early school leavers, more graduates from secondary education, increased reading 
literacy and more lifelong learning) takes a long time to materialise and appears highly 
dependent on the initial position of countries. In the long run the increase in labour efficiency 
ranges from about 0.5% for countries with a high skilled labour force to 3% for countries with 
much less human capital and hence with much potential for catching up.  
 
Also R&D contributes considerably to economic growth. The direct consequences and 
associated knowledge spillovers of spending 3% on R&D in 2010 and sustaining it until 2020 
amount to 3.5 to 11.6% of GDP, in the two scenarios. In the upper bound scenario the GDP 
gains range from 3% for countries which already have reached the target to 30% for those 
countries which currently spend hardly any money on R&D.  
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The opening up of the services markets yields a modest increase of GDP of about 0.2% through 
expansion of services trade. This constitutes a lower limit since effects on FDI could not be 
taken into account in the current version of WorldScan. A lower administrative burden on 
companies completes the set of simulations. Reducing red tape by 25% pays off in a 1.4% 
increase of GDP. 
 
This range of applications covers the main fields of the Lisbon strategy. Moreover, a simulation 
of the five policy fields combined provides a rough estimate that the total economic benefits of 
reaching these Lisbon targets amount to 12 to 23% of Europe’s GDP. These benefits reveal the 
potential that the Lisbon strategy has to stimulate growth and create new jobs. But it also shows 
how ambitious the goals the EU has set itself are. The lesson to be drawn here is that resolute 
commitments to implement the reforms necessary to reach the Lisbon goals will in the end 
determine whether or not Lisbon will deliver. 
 
 
 
1 Highlights of Lisbon: an overview 
1.1 Introduction 
A stronger emphasis on job creation and economic growth is one of the main conclusions of the 
midterm review of the Lisbon strategy. It is one of the top priorities of the Barroso’s presidency 
of the European Commission together with more emphasis on implementation of Lisbon 
through national action plans. The Sapir (2003) and Kok (2004) reports constitute important 
analytical building blocks underlying the mid-term review. Nevertheless, several questions 
remain unanswered, of which not one of the least is to quantify what benefits the Lisbon 
strategy will provide for the European economy.  
 
Despite an impressive amount of research the task remains arduous to asses the benefits of 
the Lisbon strategy for Europe. In a survey on the costs of non-Lisbon the Commission (DG 
ECFIN, 2005) states: ‘However, it is extremely difficult to quantify the impact of the reforms as 
the heterogeneity of individual reform measures, the time lags in their implementation, the 
complementarities and trade-offs between reforms in different domains, and the influence of 
short- to medium-term developments make it difficult to separate the effects of reforms 
undertaken from other determinants of performance.’ For this reason this paper focuses on five 
highlights that cover the most important elements of the Lisbon strategy. For each of these 
policies we analyse the economic effects of reaching the targets. 
 
A general equilibrium model for the world economy (WorldScan) is used to quantify the 
consequences of reaching the Lisbon targets. The model is linked to specific ‘satellite’ sub 
models, accounting schemes or empirical background research. In such a way, specific Lisbon 
policies are translated to the economic model. The model quantifies the policy effects by taking 
various kinds of feedback into account. It includes behavioural feedbacks in the domestic 
economy for the EU member states (for instance the impact of higher employment on wages) 
and international feedbacks (such as effects on trade). Moreover, because the economic model 
is rich in sectoral detail, the method adds insights into the impact of Lisbon policies on sectoral 
competitiveness.1 
 
 
1 We distinguish ten sectors: agriculture, energy, four manufacturing sectors with various technology levels, four services 
sectors: transport, other commercial, R&D and other services. We treat nearly all EU member states, separately. Belgium 
and Luxembourg are combined in one region. The Baltic States, Malta and Cyprus are also combined in one region. 
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Applied general equilibrium model WorldScan 
Applied general equilibrium models are based on microeconomic behaviour of all economic agents. Producers maximise 
their profits and consumers maximise their utility. Production technologies relate output to inputs, such that potential 
increase in the output of a sector leads to extra demand for inputs. This links output to input markets. Moreover, trade 
flows between countries, and in particular two-way intra-industry trade, are well modelled. The integration of national 
goods and services markets and of capital markets creates the possibility to analyse spillovers between countries. Another 
advantage is that these models distinguish several sectors in the economy. Because WorldScan is a dynamic model, it is 
well suited to simulate long-term developments in demography, technology, energy and globalisation. The model 
consists of several types of equations: behavioural equations which describe the behaviour of firms and consumers, 
identities and accounting relations. These accounting relations are necessary to represent the framework of the national 
accounts of an economy. This version of the model will be documented in Lejour et al. (2006). 
 
The analysis concerns five objectives of the Lisbon strategy: employment, human capital, 
research and development (R&D), the internal market for services and the administrative 
burden. Simulations quantify the consequences for Europe of reaching the 70% employment 
target, several skills targets (less early school leavers, more graduates from secondary 
education, increased reading literacy and more lifelong learning), the 3% R&D target, the trade 
effects of opening up the services market and less administrative burdens on companies. The 
employment target appears a natural candidate for inclusion, because it represents the jobs pillar 
of the strategy. On the productivity growth pillar, R&D comes to the fore, because it is an 
important input in innovation and it has high social returns. The third highlight, human capital, 
as a factor of production directly contributes to productivity growth. In the field of competition 
and the functioning of markets, the internal market for services and administrative costs are 
areas for further analysis, mainly because empirical research is available on the direct effects on 
trade and productivity, respectively. Hence, this range of applications covers the main fields of 
the Lisbon strategy. Moreover, a simulation of the five policy fields combined provides a rough 
estimate of the total economic benefits of reaching the Lisbon targets. 
 
From the start the scope of the analysis should be emphasised. The simulations have a ‘what if’ 
character, in the sense that they calculate the effects on the economy of reaching the Lisbon 
targets. They do not assess the possibility of really reaching the targets in 2010. Moreover, they 
do not always analyse the costs of the policy measures that may be needed to achieve the 
targets. For example, to arrive at the employment target, lower marginal income tax rates may 
stimulate labour market participation, but they also cut into the government budget. That may 
result in a decline of the provision of public goods, which also benefit society or the economy. 
The analysis of the employment target only takes these costs into account ex-post in a rather 
rudimentary way. In so far as costs of policies are excluded from the simulations, we 
overestimate the benefits of the Lisbon strategy. A downward bias in the results originates from 
the fact that we do not incorporate all policy measures of the Lisbon strategy. Hence, this 
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exercise can be extended and deepened in various ways, both by delving deeper into policy 
design and policy costs and by extending the range of policy measures.  
 
To some extent the economic effects of reaching the Lisbon targets remain uncertain. 
Uncertainty most strongly applies to investments in R&D: empirical research yields social 
returns to R&D in the range of 30 to 100%. To bear this uncertainty we introduced a bandwidth 
by simulating a lower bound scenario and an upper bound scenario. Also for the employment 
target we dealt with uncertainty by varying assumptions on labour participation of women and 
on the productivity distribution of people who become employed. No bandwidth exists for the 
other three Lisbon objectives (skills, internal market for services and administrative burden). 
The main reason is that the economic effects of reaching these targets appear smaller compared 
to the unemployment and the R&D targets, therefore making a distinction would only change 
the quantitative results moderately. The presentation in this paper follows the lower bound 
scenario.  
 
This chapter contains a broad overview of the main results of the simulations. Its structure is as 
follows. Section 1.2 briefly explains the main characteristics of each of the Lisbon targets and 
their effects on job creation and economic growth. Section 1.3 reviews the results on 
consumption, trade and the labour market. Section 1.4 presents the sectoral characteristics of the 
simulations. Finally, section 1.5 contrasts these outcomes of the lower bound scenario with 
those of the upper bound scenario. 
 
Chapter 2 to 8 provide more background and details. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the linkage 
between the Lisbon strategy and jobs and growth in Europe, Chapter 3 presents the analytical 
framework, in which the WorldScan model features prominently. Subsequently the various 
highlights of the Lisbon strategy pass in review: employment in Chapter 4, human capital in 
Chapter 5, R&D in Chapter 6, the internal market for services in Chapter 7 and administrative 
burden in Chapter 8.  
1.2 Jobs creation and economic growth 
This section presents the impact of the Lisbon scenarios on jobs and growth in the lower bound 
scenario. The impact of the various Lisbon goals are analysed as deviations from a baseline 
scenario, simulated in WorldScan. Given the baseline we implement the Lisbon goals one by 
one in order to analyse the difference in outcomes with the baseline. The baseline is described 
in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 1.1 decomposes the growth effect of the combined simulation into the contributions of 
the specific Lisbon policies. For the first simulation on the employment target, the table 
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contains the relative change compared to the baseline. For the other Lisbon goals the changes in 
GDP are relative to the previous simulations. We have simulated subsequently the employment 
target, the skills target, the opening up of the services markets, the reduction in administrative 
burdens, and the R&D target. Hence, column (2) of Table 1.1 compares the effects of reaching 
the skills target to the simulation in which Europe reaches the employment target. Column (3) 
shows the effect of opening up the services market compared to the skills targets and so on. The 
last column (6) shows the effects of the five policies combined relative to the baseline. 
1.2.1 Employment 
A very important goal in the “jobs and growth” strategy is the employment target. It is set at 
70% in 2010, which implies that 70% of the population between 15 and 64 aged should have at 
least a part-time job.  
 
We have simulated two employment scenarios, a lower bound and an upper bound scenario. 
The economic effects of reaching the employment target are smaller in the lower bound 
scenario compared to the upper bound scenario. The reason is that in the lower bound scenario 
we apply a baseline with increasing participation rates for women until 2010. The last decades 
we have seen an increase in labour-market participation of women. Nowadays more women in 
younger age cohorts participate in the labour market than say 20 years ago. Because these 
women are accustomed to be active in the formal labour market, it is likely that they will remain 
employed at an older age. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the participation rates of 
these women will be higher when they are older than the current cohort of that older age. This 
implies that the difference with the 70% target is smaller than in the upper bound baseline, 
where we keep participation rates constant after 2003 for all age-cohorts. 
 
Besides this participation effect, we add a second component to the lower bound scenario. It 
is often said that extra employment is not as productive as existing employment. According to 
this view the unemployed and people who do not participate on the labour market are on 
average less educated than the average worker. Extra employment comes from two sources in 
WorldScan: unemployment falls and participation rates increase. Taking an extreme position, in 
the lower bound scenario we assume that all extra employment is low-skilled. This contrasts 
with the upper bound scenario where the supply of skills of the labour inflow is the same as for 
the existing labour force. By consequence, the increase in employment contributes less to 
productivity and GDP in the lower bound scenario. 
 
The 70% employment target has to be reached on average in the EU. To derive country-
specific targets, which are presented extensively in Chapter 4, we set an upper limit for the 
employment rate of 75%. Each country will proportionally reduce the gap between the 
maximum of 75% and the 2003 rate. This implies that a country with a low employment rate, 
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such as Poland, still faces a very ambitious target, but it will be lower than 70%. Countries that 
already have met the 70% target also increase employment to some extent. For the years after 
2010 we assume that the unemployment rates and the age-specific labour-market participation 
rates stay constant. 
 
Table 1.1 GDP effects of five Lisbon goals in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Employment 
 
Human 
capital Services 
Administrative 
Burden
R&D 
 
Total
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU 6.3 0.5 0.2 1.4 3.5 11.9
Germany 4.9 0.5 0.2 1.5 3.1 10.3
France 7.9 0.4 0.2 1.5 3.2 13.1
United Kingdom 2.3 0.7 0.1 1.1 2.8 7.0
Italy 11.8 0.5 0.2 1.3 4.5 18.4
Spain 8.8 0.7 0.1 1.4 4.7 15.7
The Netherlands 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.5 3.5 6.1
Belgium and Luxembourg 12.3 0.6 0.3 1.5 3.9 18.6
Denmark 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.2 2.2 4.8
Sweden 1.9 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.7 4.5
Finland 5.1 0.1 0.4 1.4 2.0 9.0
Ireland 4.2 0.4 0.2 1.3 4.5 10.7
Austria 2.3 0.2 0.4 1.5 3.4 7.8
Greece 10.9 0.9 0.2 1.7 4.3 18.0
Portugal 2.5 2.4 0.1 1.3 4.5 10.9
Poland 17.2 0.6 0.2 2.0 5.7 25.7
Czech Republic 6.4 0.3 0.4 1.7 5.1 13.9
Hungary 10.4 0.4 0.7 2.0 5.9 19.4
Slovakia 11.9 0.3 0.9 1.8 8.1 22.9
Slovenia 9.9 0.4 0.4 1.9 5.1 17.8
Rest EU 6.5 0.2 0.3 1.9 6.3 15.2
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous columns in the year 
2525. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
 
 Reaching the employment target implies that employment rises by nearly 11% in the EU in the 
lower bound scenario. This translates into a growth impulse of 6.3% (see column 1 of Table 
1.1). The increase in jobs outpaces economic growth because productivity falls due to the 
inflow of low-skilled and the large increase in employment.  
 
The variation within the EU is large. In Austria, Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Portugal, and 
the Netherlands GDP changes moderately. These countries are relatively close to the 
employment target. In contrast, the distance from the target is large in Italy, Belgium, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. GDP increases by more than 10% in these countries. 
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These ‘what if’ simulations abstract from policy measures to increase participation and 
reduce unemployment. Yet, it is possible to get a rough idea of policies that may be used to 
reach the targets. For Europe as a whole we estimate that an 8 percentage point decrease in the 
income tax rate could lead to the targeted increase in labour market participation by women. In 
addition, a decrease in social security benefits of 10% to 22%2 relative to wages could induce 
the fall in unemployment incorporated in the lower bound scenario.  
1.2.2 Skills 
As part of the Lisbon process, the Barcelona summit of 2002 endorsed common objectives for 
education and training in Europe. The May 2003 Council agreed on five targets (European 
Commission, 2004b) by 2010:  
 
1. An EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers should be achieved.3 
2. At least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper 
secondary education or higher. 
3. The percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European Union 
should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000.  
4. The European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning should be at least 
12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group). 
5. The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) in the 
European Union should increase by at least 15% by 2010 while at the same time the level 
of gender imbalance should decrease. 
 
To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and training Jacobs (2005) 
developed a small, independent ‘satellite model’ to WorldScan, which incorporates various 
aspects of skill-formation needed to simulate the targets. The satellite model also contains a 
stylised cohort model to compute the impact of reaching the targets in 2010 on the skill 
structure of the labour force in the period 2010-2040. The cohort model takes into account that 
it takes many years before the skill structure of the labour force has adjusted to the higher 
educated cohorts that leave formal education. The satellite model calculates a time path of the 
increase of labour efficiency that originates from Europe reaching the skill targets in 2010. This 
increase in labour efficiency is subsequently inserted in the WorldScan model, which computes 
the general equilibrium effects of the education and training policies.  
 
 
2 The range results from different elasticities found in the literature, see Chapter 4 for details. 
3 It was not possible to implement this target separately in the analysis, see Chapter 5.  
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European Commission (2004b) emphasizes that the targets apply to the EU as a whole and 
not to individual countries. In accordance with the other Lisbon simulations we follow the 
general rule to compute country specific targets that has also been applied in other simulations. 
We set an upper limit above the target and above the highest base level value (sometimes 
countries already in the base data exceed the targets). We then set the target for a country 
proportional to the distance of the base level value of that country and the upper limit. In this 
way countries that are at the largest distance from the target have to make the largest effort. At 
the same time, because the upper limit exceeds the target, countries that have reached or 
exceeded the target are still assumed to make some (although generally small) effort. 
 
The what-if character of the simulations implies that we do not explicitly deal with the 
policies required to reach the targets. Nevertheless, some simulations still capture the most 
important costs of achieving the skills targets, namely the opportunity costs of increasing levels 
of education and the opportunity costs of acquiring more skills on the job. In particular, raising 
the number of better skilled workers in the population automatically implies that there are less 
low skilled workers available. Moreover, if skills upgrading requires more time in education, 
less labour time is available and earnings are lower. Also, increasing training efforts will imply 
lower labour earnings in the short run as workers spend less time being productive when they 
spent their time accumulating human capital.  
 
Column (2) of Table 1.1 presents the growth effects in 2025 of reaching the skills targets. This 
comes down to 0.5% increase in GDP in the EU. The 2025 outcomes depend on two main 
components, the level of skills in a particular country and the relative importance of the lifelong 
learning target. The level of skills determines the overall size of the skills effect. For instance, 
Portugal benefits most, because the initial skill level is low compared to the target. Benefits for 
Finland are small because it already scores well on all of the skills targets.  
 
More training effort has two contrasting effects. Firstly, participation in training demands 
time that without training would have been used for working. Because working time has to be 
invested up front in training, the initial labour efficiency effects are negative. Secondly, 
increasing training time raises the growth rate of on-the-job training. These positive effects 
from human capital accumulation gradually build up and after a number of years dominate the 
results. This relevance of this effect follows from comparing Austria to the United Kingdom. 
For Austria lifelong learning yields a major contribution. By consequence, the effects of the 
initial setback outweigh the positive effects of training: the GDP effects in 2025 are relatively 
small. In the United Kingdom the initial setback is smaller and the other targets add to relatively 
larger effects in 2025. 
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On the longer run the positive effects of lifelong learning kick in. In 2040 the GDP gains4 
are much larger than in 2025, because it takes several decades before the skills targets have 
affected the human capital of all age cohorts of the labour force. In 2040 Austria outperforms 
the United Kingdom.  
1.2.3 The internal market for services 
A cornerstone of the European Union is the principle that goods, services, capital and labour 
can move freely between the member states. The internal market for goods seems to function 
well, after the implementation of the Single Market programme in 1992. That is however not 
the case for the internal market in services. Service providers often experience obstacles if they 
want to export their services to other EU member states, or when they want to start a subsidiary 
company in other EU member states. The EC (2004a) has proposed a directive to reduce the 
impediments for trade in commercial services. A key element of this directive is the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. A service provider who complied with the national regulation of the country 
of origin should no longer be hampered by regulation in the destination country. 
  
The main economic implication of the proposed measures is a substantial reduction of 
regulation heterogeneity . Taking into account the empirical uncertainties of this impact on 
regulation heterogeneity and of the heterogeneity indicators on trade and investment, Kox et al. 
(2004a) estimate that commercial services trade (excluding transport services) could increase by 
30 to 60 per cent in the EU, while foreign direct investment stocks in services might increase by 
20 to 35 per cent due to the directive.  
 
Following up on Kox et al. (2004a) we estimate the welfare effects of the increase in 
commercial services trade using WorldScan. This is not a complete welfare analysis of the 
proposed measures, because the current version of the model does not include FDI flows and 
lacks economies to scale. Economies of scale can trigger additional welfare effects of more 
open services markets in the EU. By consequence, the outcomes of the present analysis of extra 
trade have to be considered as a lower bound.  
 
Ex ante, the measures meant to open up the services market will increase other commercial 
services trade by about 30% (the lower bound of the Kox et al. estimates). This is substantial 
for the sector itself; however at a macro-economic level this increase is modest. Kox et al. 
(2004b) show that other commercial services trade makes up only about 10% of total EU trade. 
Moreover, about half of other commercial services trade is directed to countries outside the EU. 
So, only about 5% of EU trade is affected by the services directive. By consequence, the 30% 
 
4 The effects for 2040 are presented in the Annex. All together, GDP in Europe rises by 1.7% in 2040 if Europe reaches the 
skills targets in 2010. This 2040 GDP effect is more than three times the effect in 2025, which illustrates the long lags 
involved in the process of skill upgrading. 
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increase in increase other commercial services trade would lead to a total trade increase in the 
EU of about 1.5%. Given the small effects on total trade and the constant returns to scale 
assumption in production it is not surprising that the GDP effects are modest, on average 0.2% 
in the EU (see column (3) of Table 1.1). 
 
The country specific effects differ depending on the reduction in regulatory heterogeneity 
between the countries and their most important trading partners in other commercial services 
trade. E.g. the trade effects for France, United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal are modest. From 
the data we know that these countries trade relatively much with each other and that the 
regulatory heterogeneity between these countries is small. For countries like Austria, Denmark, 
Hungary and Slovakia the regulatory heterogeneity with their most important trading partners is 
much larger and so is the effect of less heterogeneity.  
1.2.4 Less red tape in Europe 
Firms often complain about the time and costs involved to deal with administrative activities. 
To implement the reduction of administrative cost in WorldScan we assume that these costs 
largely consist of wages for workers that firms need to hire to comply with government 
regulations and to provide the government with information. Reducing the administrative 
burden implies that some of these workers can contribute directly to production. The reduction 
therefore takes the form of an increase in labour efficiency: fewer workers are needed, while 
production is not affected directly. Furthermore, we assume that the cost reduction is achieved 
by making the administrative process more efficient; it does not undermine government 
regulations. 
 
The Netherlands is one of the very few countries, which currently has detailed information 
on the administrative burden of government regulations. For 2002, the administrative burden in 
the Netherlands is equivalent to 3.7% of GDP and is projected to fall with 25%, e.g. with 0.9% 
of GDP. Therefore, we use the key figures for the Netherlands as a benchmark for the other 
member states of the European Union. To arrive at a meaningful international comparison Kox 
(2005) combined the Dutch data on the total administrative burden with the Djankov et al. 
(2002) data on inter-country differences in firm-start-up costs to obtain estimates of the 
administrative burden per country. 
  
In the WorldScan simulation all countries experience a reduction in the administrative costs 
as a percentage of GDP by a quarter. Using country specific labour income shares we translate 
these into an increase in labour efficiency. On average, labour efficiency rises by 1.3% in 
Europe in 2025. Without R&D spillovers the long term change in GDP volume will equal the 
initial shock of 1.3%. R&D spillovers slightly magnify this outcome to 1.4% (see column (4) of 
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Table 1.1). Country specific effects mirror the distribution of administrative costs over 
countries. These effects are relatively small. 
1.2.5 Research and Development  
Research and Development (R&D) is a key factor for technological change, and consequently 
economic growth. New technologies can boost productivity and raise incomes. Amounting to 
2% of GDP in 2003, public and private R&D expenditures are lagging behind in Europe 
compared to the United States (2.8%) and the rest of the OECD (3.1%). The European Council 
agreed to raise these expenditures to 3% of GDP in 2010. In the WorldScan simulations we 
assume that the targets are reached in 2010. We do not claim that this assumption is realistic. In 
particular in the new member states, current R&D expenditures are less than 1% percent. It is 
very difficult to increase these expenditures substantially within a few years and to attract or 
train sufficient researchers in such a relatively short period of time.  
 
New technologies and better products boost productivity, not only in the innovating sector 
itself, but also in other sectors. In addition, since the influential paper by Coe and Helpman 
(1995) it is well established that investment in R&D generates international spillovers: R&D in 
one country has an external effect on productivity in the country itself as well as for its trading 
partners. Therefore, we incorporate an empirical relation between total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth and the growth of R&D stocks in WorldScan. We distinguish three types of R&D 
stocks: the R&D stocks of the own sector, of other sectors in the economy to reflect domestic 
spillovers, and of foreign sectors to reflect international spillovers. In addition, we have 
incorporated the R&D decision of firms in our model based on profit maximisation.  
 
The estimated TFP equation in WorldScan expresses the impact of a marginal increase in 
R&D. The 50% increase to meet the Lisbon target is not a marginal increase at all. Hence, we 
may doubt whether the extra R&D is as productive as current R&D. The estimated social return 
on R&D is in the top range of the results in the literature and the most interesting R&D projects 
may already have been conducted. Therefore we consider the estimated elasticities and the 
calculated returns on R&D as an upper bound. In the lower bound scenario we substantially 
reduce the coefficients for the national and international R&D spillovers such that the social 
rate of return on R&D equals the lower bound of the estimates in the literature. 
 
We take account of some of the policy costs of achieving the R&D target by using a national 
R&D subsidy to reduce the investment price for R&D. This probably underestimates the costs 
for two reasons. First, we assume that the subsidy is spent effectively leading to more R&D 
expenditure. The literature suggests this is not the case, a part of the subsidies carry a 
deadweight loss. Second, the subsidy is paid by a lump-sum transfer from the domestic 
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households. In practice, most taxes are proportional such as the income tax, so we abstract from 
the excess-burden of proportional taxes. 
 
To take country differences into account, we cover proportionally the gap between current 
R&D spending and an artificial target by increasing R&D expenditure between 2005 and 2010. 
The artificial target is set at 4.5%. For each country the gap between current spending and the 
limit of 4.5% is proportionally decreased, in such a way that the 3% level for the EU is reached 
in 2010. Countries with initially less spending on R&D have to increase their R&D effort 
substantially, while countries with initially high R&D spending face less ambitious targets.  
 
Column (5) of Table 1.1 presents the growth effects of the scenario where the R&D spillovers 
are modest. The R&D stock in the EU is increased by about 66%. This leads to a GDP gain of 
about 3.5%. The effects for the individual countries depend to a large extent on the distance 
between 3% and their current levels of R&D spending. For the Scandinavian countries the GDP 
effects are the smallest because they have already reached the 3% level (except Denmark). 
Productivity in these countries increases slightly because they benefit from the spillovers of 
higher R&D stocks in other countries. For Germany and France the effects are about equal to 
the EU average. Although they have to increase their R&D spending, the gap to the target is not 
as large as for other countries. For other large countries, such as Italy and Spain, the effects are 
much larger. Their R&D stocks increase by about 160%, leading to GDP gains of over 4%. For 
most new member states the effects are even larger. GDP gains are 5% or higher in these 
countries. Their R&D stocks double at least.  
1.2.6 Combined effects 
Column (6) of Table 1.1 contains the effects on economic growth of all Lisbon targets 
combined. GDP in the EU could increase by 12% in 2025 if all goals are met, which is quite 
large. Economic growth would step up by about three quarters of a percentage point until 2025. 
This is mainly caused by a large employment increase due to the 70% employment target and a 
large increase in labour productivity due to the expanding R&D stock. The skills target, the 
trade effects of opening up the services market and the reduction in administrative barriers 
contribute much less to the GDP increase.  
 
This conclusion also holds for the individual countries. The GDP increase varies from 4.5% 
for Sweden to 26% for Poland. In general the effects of the Lisbon goals for the new member 
states are much larger than for most of the older member states, in particular the non-
Mediterranean countries. These large differences are mainly due to the variation in efforts 
needed to reach the employment and R&D target. The new member states and most of the 
Mediterranean countries are far away from the Lisbon goals on employment and R&D in 2003. 
As a consequence the economies of these countries are most affected if the targets are reached. 
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1.3 Consumption, trade and the labour market 
1.3.1 Consumption 
The effects on consumption per capita are smaller than those on GDP (see Table 1.2). Overall 
consumption per capita increases by about 9% until 2025 instead of 12% for GDP. This is 
caused by negative terms-of-trade effects for most of the Lisbon policies. The terms-of-trade 
effect is the largest for the R&D targets. The productivity increases exert a downward pressure 
on producer prices. Therefore export prices decrease while import prices do not change 
substantially, in particular for the imports from outside the EU.  
 
For nearly all member states, the increase in employment contributes more to consumption 
growth than the increase in R&D spending. The variation in consumption effects over countries 
and policies is similar to the GDP effects.5  
Table 1.2 Consumption effects of five Lisbon goals in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Employment 
 
Human 
capital
Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU 5.6 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 9.1
Germany 4.7 0.5 0.5 1.4 1.1 8.1
France 6.9 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.1 9.9
United Kingdom 2.2 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.8 5.0
Italy 10.2 0.5 0.4 1.2 1.5 13.8
Spain 7.3 0.6 0.3 1.2 1.8 11.3
The Netherlands 0.9 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.3 4.5
Belgium and Luxembourg 10.3 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.6 15.1
Denmark 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.9 3.8
Sweden 2.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 0.9 5.2
Finland 5.0 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.9 7.9
Ireland 3.9 0.4 1.6 1.2 1.3 8.4
Austria 2.3 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 6.1
Greece 8.8 0.7 0.3 1.4 1.9 13.2
Portugal 2.4 2.0 0.3 1.1 2.1 7.8
Poland 14.7 0.5 0.4 1.8 2.6 19.8
Czech Republic 5.7 0.2 0.7 1.5 2.5 10.7
Hungary 9.1 0.3 1.0 1.8 2.6 14.8
Slovakia 10.0 0.3 1.2 1.6 4.8 17.9
Slovenia 8.9 0.4 0.6 1.7 2.6 14.2
Rest EU 5.3 0.2 0.8 1.6 2.9 10.7
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
5 The only exception is Sweden. Sweden already is close to most Lisbon targets so it benefits least from reaching the 
targets. Hence, the fall in Swedish export prices is relatively small, while Sweden benefits from falling import prices, because 
other EU countries lower their export prices. By consequence, terms-of-trade effects are positive in Sweden.   
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1.3.2 Trade 
EU exports increase by 17% in 2025 (Table 1.3). These include intra and extra EU-exports. At 
least half of the export increase, and for some countries slightly more, results from the R&D 
component. The increase in employment also stimulates trade substantially, while the opening 
of the services market have only an effect on trade in other commercial services. 
 
By comparing Table 1.3 to Table 1.1 it is evident that the total exports effects are larger than 
the GDP effects. For the Lisbon policies on employment, skills and the reduction in 
administrative burden the trade effects are similar to those on GDP. The differences originate 
from the simulations on R&D and the opening up of services market, which clearly have a trade 
stimulating effect. The increase in R&D stimulates productivity in the high technology sectors, 
in particular. These sectors are also the most tradable sectors. Their share in trade is much 
higher than it is in value added. Consequently, the trade effect of R&D policy is larger than the 
effect on GDP. The services directive aims at integrating the national services markets in the 
EU. It stimulates trade openness of countries by reducing barriers to trade in other commercial 
services. 
Table 1.3 Export effects of the five Lisbon policies in 2025: lower bound scenario 
 
Employment 
 
Human 
capital
Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU 6.7 0.6 1.9 1.5 6.4 17.1
Germany 5.3 0.5 1.8 1.5 5.8 14.9
France 8.3 0.5 1.4 1.6 6.3 18.1
United Kingdom 3.0 0.6 1.7 1.2 6.2 12.7
Italy 11.3 0.6 2.2 1.4 7.8 23.2
Spain 9.6 0.9 1.5 1.5 8.9 22.4
The Netherlands 1.4 0.3 2.3 1.4 5.8 11.3
Belgium and Luxembourg 12.3 0.6 2.0 1.6 6.5 23.0
Denmark 1.1 0.5 2.7 1.2 4.1 9.7
Sweden 2.5 0.3 2.2 1.2 1.2 7.5
Finland 4.4 0.2 2.0 1.3 5.3 13.1
Ireland 4.1 0.4 1.2 1.2 6.6 13.6
Austria 3.5 0.3 3.2 1.7 6.5 15.3
Greece 9.4 0.8 2.6 1.5 4.8 19.1
Portugal 4.5 2.4 1.6 1.5 7.7 17.5
Poland 17.6 0.7 1.5 2.2 8.4 30.5
Czech republic 7.3 0.4 1.6 1.8 7.6 18.7
Hungary 10.0 0.4 2.7 1.9 8.2 23.2
Slovakia 11.5 0.4 2.7 1.9 9.1 25.6
Slovenia 10.3 0.5 1.9 1.9 7.7 22.3
Rest EU 7.3 0.3 2.1 1.9 9.7 21.2
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
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1.3.3 Labour market 
The Lisbon policies also affect the labour market, directly and indirectly: directly, because the 
employment simulation stimulates labour supply; indirectly, because some policies affect 
(labour) productivity, which feeds forward into wages. Note that in WorldScan unemployment 
and labour-market participation are exogenous (see Section 0). In case of the employment target 
employment rises in line with the increase in participation and the fall in unemployment. In the 
other simulations total employment does not change. 
Table 1.4 Development of real wages after implementing five Lisbon policies in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Employment 
 
Human 
capital
Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU − 4.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 3.0 0.8
Germany − 2.5 0.4 0.5 1.3 2.6 2.3
France − 4.2 0.3 0.3 1.2 2.9 0.5
United Kingdom − 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.0 2.6 3.6
Italy − 7.8 0.4 0.4 1.0 3.6 − 2.3
Spain − 4.5 0.6 0.2 1.1 4.0 1.5
The Netherlands 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.4 3.1 5.7
Belgium and Luxembourg − 6.6 0.4 1.3 1.1 2.8 − 0.9
Denmark 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 2.2 4.7
Sweden − 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.8 2.4
Finland − 2.5 0.1 0.4 1.2 1.7 0.9
Ireland − 2.0 0.4 1.7 1.2 3.5 4.7
Austria − 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.3 3.3 5.0
Greece − 4.5 0.7 0.3 1.3 4.6 2.5
Portugal − 0.5 2.1 0.3 1.2 4.6 7.8
Poland − 7.4 0.4 0.3 1.5 4.6 − 0.7
Czech Republic − 2.8 0.2 0.6 1.4 4.9 4.3
Hungary − 6.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 4.9 1.3
Slovakia − 5.6 0.2 1.0 1.3 6.8 3.7
Slovenia − 3.3 0.4 0.6 1.5 4.0 3.2
Rest EU − 2.9 0.2 0.8 1.5 5.4 5.0
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
Table 1.4 presents the wage outcomes for the five policies. Overall real wages hardly change in 
the EU. Effects for individual countries vary from −2.3% in Italy to 7.8% in Portugal. The 
increase in real wages mainly follows from higher productivity, induced by the enlarged R&D 
stocks, see column (5). The policies for improving skills (Portugal is an exception), the trade 
effects of opening up the services market and the reduction in administrative burden contribute 
moderately to labour productivity and thereby to higher wages. In general the modest, positive 
effects of these three policies on real wages are offset by the reduction in real wages induced by 
the increase in employment. The increase in employment has a negative effect on labour 
productivity, partly because the lower bound scenario assumes that the additional inflow of 
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labour is low skilled. The total wage outcome for a country depends on the difference between 
the negative effect of the employment simulation and the sum of the positive effects of the other 
simulations. 
1.4 Sectoral effects 
Nearly all Lisbon policies analysed in this paper do not have a specific sectoral focus. The 
employment target, the R&D expenditure target, the skills target and the administrative burden 
are economy-wide goals. Only the measures in the area of internal market for services are 
focussed on a specific sector: commercial services, except for transport services. This does not 
imply that reaching the Lisbon targets has a neutral impact on the sectoral structure in the EU 
economy. For two reasons this is not the case. The first is that the EU member states have 
diverse sectoral structures and that the member states are affected differently by the Lisbon 
goals. Even if these goals have a neutral impact on the sector structure per country, it will not 
have a neutral impact on the EU economy as a whole. The second reason is that sectors differ, 
also per country. Some sectors are more R&D intensive; others are more labour and/or skill 
intensive. Moreover, the sectors require different amounts of inputs.  
 
Table 1.5 shows the changes in sectoral production for the separate Lisbon targets and for 
all targets combined. Production in the R&D sector surges by nearly 80%, due to the ambitious 
R&D targets. Because R&D is heavily subsidized, the R&D intensive sectors (high tech 
manufacturing and medium-high tech manufacturing) benefit most. The R&D extensive sectors, 
other commercial services and other services, do not expand as much as the R&D intensive 
sectors. Also the employment target stimulates production, while the other targets do not 
contribute that much to extra production. For all targets, production increases most in the 
tradable sectors (the manufacturing sectors). 
  
 
26  
 
Table 1.5 Sectoral production developments in the EU: lower bound scenario 
Production volume in 2025 
 
Employment
 
Human 
capital Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agriculture 9.8 0.5 0.2 1.3 1.4 13.2
Energy 5.0 0.4 0.3 1.1 2.8 9.5
Low tech manufacturing 7.9 0.6 0.2 1.5 1.5 11.6
Medium-low tech manufacturing 9.0 0.7 0.2 1.8 5.5 17.2
Medium-high tech manufacturing 7.8 0.7 0.3 1.7 11.1 21.5
High tech manufacturing 10.5 0.8 0.4 2.1 22.0 35.8
Transport services 6.9 0.6 0.2 1.4 2.4 11.4
Other commercial services 5.8 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.7 9.6
R&D 3.6 1.1 0.3 1.5 70.9 77.5
Other services 5.0 0.5 0.2 1.3 0.8 7.9
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
The sectoral employment pattern is heavily correlated with the changes in production. Table 1.6 
shows that employment increases most in the R&D sector and in high tech manufacturing. Note 
that total employment only increases from implementing the 70% employment target. For the 
other targets the sectoral employment changes offset each other. The R&D target generates 
substantial sectoral employment changes, for the other targets the effects are fairly modest. 
Table 1.6 Sectoral employment developments in the EU: lower bound scenario 
Employment 2025 
 
Employment
 
Human 
capital Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agriculture 18.2 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 3.1 14.9
Energy 8.3 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 2.5 5.8
Low tech manufacturing 11.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 − 3.1 8.4
Medium-low tech manufacturing 12.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 12.8
High-medium tech manufacturing 10.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 − 1.0 10.3
High tech manufacturing 15.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 4.4 20.9
Transport services 10.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 1.5 8.4
Other commercial services 7.9 0.0 − 0.1 0.1 − 0.5 7.4
R&D 3.8 0.5 0.2 − 0.2 77.1 81.4
Other services 6.0 − 0.1 0.1 − 0.2 − 1.2 4.6
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
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Table 1.7 Sectoral exports in EU: lower bound scenario 
Export in 2025 
 
Employment
 
Human 
capital Services 
Administrative 
burden
R&D 
 
Total
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agriculture 8.8 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 10.5
Energy 2.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.3 4.0
Low tech manufacturing 7.4 0.5 0.2 1.4 0.4 9.9
Medium-low tech manufacturing 8.6 0.7 0.2 1.7 3.2 14.3
Medium-high tech manufacturing 7.2 0.6 0.3 1.6 11.2 20.9
High tech manufacturing 8.8 0.8 0.3 1.9 22.0 33.9
Transport services 4.8 0.4 0.1 1.1 0.0 6.4
Other commercial services 3.3 0.4 16.5 1.2 − 2.7 18.7
Other services 1.9 0.7 -0.6 1.5 − 5.2 − 1.7
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the 
year 2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
Exports increase most in the manufacturing sectors, in particular in high tech manufacturing and 
in medium-high tech manufacturing (see Table 1.7). Also trade in other commercial services 
increases substantially, due to the effect of opening up the services market. 
 
From Table 1.3 we know that overall exports increase by 17%. Exports in medium-high tech 
and high tech manufacturing increase faster. These products will form a larger part of the total 
EU exports. The shares of agriculture, energy, low tech manufacturing and services fall. 
Specialisation of the R&D intensive sectors will increase, while it decreases in other sectors. 
Due to the measures to open up the services market, specialisation in the other commercial 
services will increase. If all five policies are combined, specialisation in other commercial 
services decreases in spite of the measures addressing the services market. The reason is that the 
changes in the specialisation and export pattern are dominated by the changes from the large 
increase of R&D spending. 
1.5 Lisbon in perspective 
This paper quantifies the economic effects of reaching five highlights of Europe’s Lisbon 
strategy. The implementation of these five targets could give a boost to Europe’s economy: 
overall GDP could increase by 12% and consumption by 9%. This is a substantial effect. 
Although it has to be qualified, because we do not conduct a full welfare assessment, this effect 
is at the lower end of our bandwidth. So far we have only analysed the lower bound scenario for 
the employment and R&D expenditures target. If labour-market participation of women does 
not increase autonomously until 2010, and if a substantial share of extra employment needed to 
fulfil the target is high-skilled, the effects of the employment target on GDP could be much 
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higher. The same applies for the R&D expenditures target if the social rate of return is much 
higher. Table 1.8 presents the results of the upper bound scenario. 
Table 1.8 GDP effects of the five Lisbon goals in 2025: upper bound scenario 
 
Employment 
 
Human 
capital
R&D
 Services 
Administrative 
Burden 
Total
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU 9.2 0.5 0.2 1.5 11.6 23.0
Germany 7.2 0.5 0.3 1.5 9.6 19.1
France 10.6 0.4 0.2 1.5 10.1 22.8
United Kingdom 3.8 0.7 0.1 1.1 8.0 13.6
Italy 18.2 0.6 0.2 1.4 15.6 36.0
Spain 14.0 0.8 0.1 1.5 16.7 33.1
The Netherlands 2.7 0.3 0.2 1.5 10.0 14.8
Belgium and Luxembourg 18.2 0.6 0.3 1.6 13.8 34.5
Denmark 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.2 7.3 10.4
Sweden 2.0 0.3 0.3 1.3 3.9 7.8
Finland 6.1 0.1 0.4 1.4 6.0 14.0
Ireland 7.6 0.4 0.2 1.4 18.0 27.6
Austria 5.1 0.2 0.4 1.5 11.0 18.2
Greece 14.6 1.0 0.2 1.8 16.9 34.4
Portugal 4.8 2.5 0.2 1.3 17.4 26.1
Poland 20.0 0.6 0.2 2.1 23.1 46.0
Czech Republic 8.1 0.3 0.4 1.8 19.5 30.0
Hungary 14.6 0.4 0.7 2.1 25.4 43.2
Slovakia 15.2 0.3 0.9 1.9 35.1 53.4
Slovenia 14.5 0.5 0.4 1.9 20.1 37.3
Rest EU 8.0 0.2 0.3 1.9 25.1 35.5
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers in column (2) to (5) are relative changes from the policy simulations in the previous column in the year 
2025. In column (1) and (6) the numbers are relative changes from the baseline. 
 
Jobs creation associated with reaching the 70% employment target generates a GDP increase of 
6.3 to 9.2% (compare Table 1.1 and Table 1.8). One reason is that the lower bound scenario 
assumes that the additional labour inflow entirely consists of low-skilled (hence low-
productive) workers, whereas in the upper bound scenario the inflow represents the skill 
distribution in the labour force. The second reason is that labour-market participation of women 
does not increases autonomously. 
 
From the literature it is possible to obtain a rough indication of the policies that may bring 
about these substantial changes in employment and economic growth. For instance, we use the 
income tax rates and social security benefits as possible policy instruments. From calculations it 
follows that income tax rates have to fall by 8% points to generate the increase in labour supply 
of women in the lower bound scenario. Financing this tax reduction would require substantial 
cuts in government expenditure, i.e. in the provision of public goods. In addition, the ratio of 
social security benefits to wages (the so-called replacement ratio) would have to fall by 10 to 22 
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%-points depending on the elasticities found in the literature, which could entail substantial 
changes in the income distribution. 
 
The impact of several skills targets (less early school leavers, more graduates from secondary 
education, increased reading literacy and more lifelong learning) appears highly dependent on 
the initial position of countries. In 2025 the increase in labour efficiency ranges from a marginal 
0.1% for countries with a high skilled labour force to the order of 1% for countries with much 
less human capital and hence with much potential for catching up.6 In 2040 the range of labour 
efficiency effects amounts to 0.5% to 3%, about three times as large as the 2025 effects (see 
Annex 3). This shows that it takes a considerable amount of time before higher skills manifest 
themselves in the labour force.  
 
The measures meant to open up the services market yield a modest increase of GDP of 
about 0.2% through expansion of services trade. This constitutes a lower limit since effects on 
FDI could not be taken into account in the current version of WorldScan. A lower 
administrative burden on companies yields somewhat larger effects: reducing red tape by 25% 
pays off in a 1.4% increase of GDP. 
 
Also R&D contributes considerably to economic growth. Uncertainty about the social 
returns to R&D generates a rather large bandwidth of the consequences for economic growth. 
The direct consequences and associated knowledge spillovers of spending 3% on R&D in 2010 
and sustaining it until 2020 range from 3.5% of GDP in the lower bound scenario (Table 1.1) to 
11.6% in the upper bound scenario (Table 1.8) on average for the EU. Also the country 
variation is large, in particular in the upper bound scenario. There the GDP gains range from 
34% for countries which already have reached the target to 30% for those countries which 
currently spend hardly any money on R&D.  
 
All five policy fields combined provide a rough estimate that the highlights of Lisbon will 
increase Europe’s GDP by 12 to 23%. The associated rise of consumption amounts to 9 - 19%. 
The consumption effects are smaller than the GDP effects due to the negative terms of trade 
effect of most policies. The trade effects (17 to 32%) are larger because of the trade-promoting 
effects resulting from opening up the services market and the impact of increased R&D 
expenditures on the tradable R&D intensive sectors. These two policies also affect the sectoral 
structure of the EU economy. In particular the R&D intensive sectors benefit substantially.  
 
The large effects of these five policies give an indication of the economic potential of 
Lisbon, but do not represent a full welfare analysis as we have emphasised before. Table 1.9 
 
6 Portugal being the outlier with a potential for catching up of 2.5% of GDP.  
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shows the policy elements that we have analysed for each of the goals. These elements are 
important, but we have also excluded elements from our analysis such as leisure and inequality 
in welfare and the costs of many policy instruments. Some of these excluded elements would 
reduce the GDP and consumption effects of the Lisbon policies, some others, in particular with 
respect to the services market, could increase these benefits. This requires a more in-depth 
analysis of each of the policy fields. The contribution of this paper is an integrated ‘what if’ 
analysis of five polices, which is by its broader scope less detailed.  
Table 1.9 The analysed effects of the Lisbon policies 
Goal Analysed effects excluded effects 
Employment extra employment 
less productive extra employment 
costs of labour-market policies 
costs of labour-participation policies 
changes in leisure 
changes inequality and poverty 
Human capital increase in skills 
extra schooling time 
costs of extra education 
Research and development increase in R&D expenditures 
effects of R&D subsidy 
effectiveness of extra expenditures 
excess burden of subsidies 
Internal market for services  trade effects  competition effects 
FDI effects 
employment effects 
Administrative burden higher labour efficiency benefits of administrative rules 
 
The huge benefits of the Lisbon agenda may be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand they 
may show what potential lies ahead for Europe. In particular for the new member states, it is 
tempting to conclude that the Lisbon policies are a major element for catching up. On the other 
hand the benefits illustrate the vast ambition of the Lisbon targets. Policies to reach the targets 
entail costs which may lead to less funding for the provision of public goods and reduced 
leisure, costs which only partly could be taken into account in this analysis. Moreover, it is very 
hard to imagine that the targets really will be reached by 2010. But if large benefits indeed 
emerge on the horizon, pursuing these policies beyond 2010 may be an appealing perspective. 
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2 The European economy and the Lisbon strategy 
This chapter sets the stage by briefly reviewing several aspects of the European economy. At 
times it uses the US economy as a mirror to identify strengths and weaknesses of the European 
economy. Moreover, it connects the Lisbon strategy to determinants of employment and 
economic growth in order to assess through which channels the strategy may deliver jobs and 
growth. It also surveys some of the empirical evidence on the impact of the determinants on 
productivity.  
Table 2.1 Jobs, growth and the Lisbon strategy 
   
 Determinant of employment and growth Lisbon policies 
   
Labour Labour supply Employment target, participation 
 Matching Labour mobility 
Capital Market size  Internal Market: services, network industries  
 Cost of capital Financial services markets 
Innovation ICT Information society 
 R&D, knowledge spillovers R&D target 
Attract top-researchers 
 Knowledge infrastructure European Research Area 
Linkages between firms and research institutes 
(universities) 
Human capital Education Upper secondary education, literacy, graduates 
in mathematics, science and technology  
 Training Participation in life-long learning 
Competition Market structure  Competition policy, internal market  
 Constraints Administrative costs 
Taxation, regulation 
 
The Lisbon strategy influences job creation and economic growth both through the resources 
available for firms and through their productivity. Table 2.1 presents an overview of these 
linkages. It starts with labour and capital resources, followed by the three main determinants of 
total factor productivity (TFP): innovation, human capital and competition / functioning of 
markets. For each of these determinants Table 2.1 lists the relevant elements of the Lisbon 
strategy. As such it provides an organising framework that links Lisbon policies with jobs and 
growth. 
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2.1 Labour utilisation 
Labour utilisation to a considerable degree explains differences in GDP per capita between the 
United States and Europe. Figure 2.1 shows that the annual number of hours worked in Europe 
lags 15 to 35 percentage points behind the United States. For the EU15, the difference in 
employment rate explains one-third of the difference in total hours worked. The employment 
rate equals the number of people employed divided by the number of people in the age group 15 
- 64. It constitutes the core of the employment target in the Lisbon strategy, which has been set 
at a 70% employment rate. Additional targets pertain to a female employment rate of 60% and 
an employment rate for older workers of 50%. These targets in particular become relevant when 
in the coming decades the old age dependency ratio will rise considerably due to ageing.  
Figure 2.1 Components of GDP per capita as a percentage difference with the US, EU 15 and selected 
European countries, 2003 
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Source: Ederveen et al. (2005)  
The larger part of the difference in labour utilisation in the US and the EU follows, however, 
from the difference in hours worked per worker. The average worker in the EU15 works 1550 
hours annually. That is about 300 hours less than their colleagues in the United States.7 Yet the 
employment part of the Lisbon strategy does not take the number of hours worked into account. 
Hence, even when Europe reaches the employment targets, there remains scope for further 
mobilisation of labour resources, at least from the perspective of the US.  
 
 
7 Dekker and Ederveen (2005) discuss these differences and their causes extensively.  
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A difficult question is whether the lower employment rate and the lower number of hours 
worked in Europe can be attributed to institutional failure or to a stronger preference for equity 
or for leisure. Various studies demonstrate a negative relationship between labour supply and 
income tax rates (Nickell et al., 2005). Also income tax rates, social security contribution rates 
and replacement rates appear to raise equilibrium unemployment rates. Relatively strong 
preference for equity may induce European societies to pay the price of higher taxes and 
contributions so as to provide an adequate level of social security to their citizens. However, 
various trends have shifted the trade-off between economic growth and equity. For instance, 
internationalisation may require more flexible labour markets to shift labour to sectors in which 
Europe has a comparative advantage with respect to emerging economies. Ageing and skill 
biased technological change increase scarcity of (skilled) labour, which raises the price of 
inactivity and leisure. In that perspective, European labour market institutions and social 
security institutions may have become outdated and institutional reforms have to address 
institutional failure. 
 
European labour markets improved considerably during the 1990s. Table 2.2 shows that after 
1995 the negative employment growth of the early 1990s turned into an annual increase of 
1.1%. However, this improvement is not sufficient to reach the Lisbon targets, also because 
employment growth fell back after 2000 (DG ECFIN, 2005, p24).  
Table 2.2 Employment and components of labour productivity growth in Europe and the United States e 1991-2001 
 United States Europe 
 1991-1995 1996-2001 1991-1995 1996-2001 
     
Employment 1.2 1.7 − 0.9 1.1 
     
Labour productivity 1.2 1.9    2.4 1.4 
Non-ICT capital       0.2 0.3 1.0 0.5 
ICT capital        0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 
TFP      0.6 0.8   1.1 0.5 
 
Source: O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003, p216). 
 
2.2 Capital intensity 
Capital deepening of production contributes to labour productivity growth. Workers are more 
productive when they dispose of more capital. Table 2.2 shows that the contribution of capital 
deepening fell in Europe after 1995, from 1% to 0.5% per year, which explains about half of the 
slowdown in labour productivity growth in Europe (from 2.4 to 1.4%). This is the mirror image 
of the strong increase in employment growth in the same period: labour substituted for capital 
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in production. Ederveen et al. (2005) provide evidence of the strong impact of employment 
growth on capital deepening during 1970-2003.  
 
Two implications follow. First if employment growth returns to the (on average less than 
1.1%) rate of population growth, capital deepening and labour productivity growth will 
increase. Second, the Lisbon target of higher employment on the medium term has its price in 
terms of less capital deepening and slower productivity growth.8 
 
Investment in ICT-capital increased after 1995 in the US. Its contribution to productivity 
growth rose from 0.4 to 0.7 % per year (Table 2.2). In Europe the contribution of ICT-capital 
shows a moderate increase to 0.4%.  
 
The Lisbon strategy mainly addresses capital formation through increasing market size and 
lowering the cost of capital. European market integration enhances efficient allocation of 
equipment capital and integration may expand opportunities for investment in markets where 
economies of scale are important. Financial market integration lowers the user cost of capital, 
which also stimulates investment. According to London Economics (2002), full integration of 
financial markets in Europe would lower the cost of capital by 0.5 %-points, which would 
generate a 6% increase in investment.  
2.3 Labour productivity and total factor productivity  
2.3.1 Catching-up 
In a longer time perspective, catching up has considerably contributed to European labour 
productivity growth. Figure 2.2 shows a downward trend in European labour productivity 
growth, whereas productivity growth in the US depicts an upward trend. After the Second 
World War Europe benefited from many possibilities to copy and adapt technology from the 
US. Approaching the technological frontier, possibilities to learn from the US diminished, in 
particular for West European countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and 
the Netherlands. That raises the question how Europe has to enhance productivity growth at the 
frontier.  
 
Reaching the frontier may also have contributed to the weak productivity performance after 
1995. The growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) fell in Europe after 1995, whereas it 
accelerated in the US (Table 2.2).  
 
8 Note that except for terms of trade effects, capital labour substitution is a temporary phenomenon (Broer and Huizinga, 
2004). In a small open economy with free entry the capital stock adjusts to expanding labour supply and the capital-labour 
ratio returns to its equilibrium value. In a large economy (like the EU) expanding production in line with a larger labour stock 
can only be achieved through (modest) terms of trade losses, a lower wage rate and lower labour productivity.  
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Figure 2.2 Hourly labour productivity growth 1975-2003: five year moving averages 
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2.3.2 ICT 
From a sectoral perspective both production and use of ICT explain a considerable part of the 
post 1995 performance of the US compared to Europe. Table 2.3 decomposes the difference in 
labour productivity growth between the EU-15 and the US according to the sectoral ICT 
taxonomy of O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003). The first line of the table shows that over 1979-
1990 labour productivity in Europe grew 1% per year faster than in the US. According to the 
bottom three lines of the table, traditional non-ICT sectors explain most of this difference. The 
US only outperforms the EU in ICT producing manufacturing. The figure of -0.31 in the table 
tells that the very productive computer manufacturing industry in the US caused macro 
productivity to grow 0.31 % faster in the US than in Europe. In contrast, the efficient telecom 
sector in Europe yielded a slightly positive contribution from ICT using services. A comparable 
picture exists for the period 1990-1995.  
 
The major change after 1995 takes place in ICT using services, such as wholesale, retail, 
financial services and business services. In the US, productivity growth in these sectors 
increased from 1.6% over 1990-1995 to 5.3% over 1995-2001 (O’Mahony and Van Ark 2003, 
p78). In contrast, it equalled 1.8% in both periods in Europe. By consequence, these sectors 
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contributed 1% point (from Table 2.3 − (− 0.75 − 0.26)) to the acceleration in macro 
productivity growth in the US after 1995.  
Table 2.3 Sectoral decomposition of the difference in labour productivity growth between EU 15 and the US (%-
point per year) 
 1979-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Total economy 0.99 1.19 − 0.54
ICT producing sectors − 0.13 − 0.25 − 0.45
    Manufacturing − 0.31 − 0.29 − 0.60
    Services 0.08 0.04 0.15
ICT using sectors 0.38 0.44 − 0.61
    Manufacturing 0.19 0.18 0.14
    Services 0.19 0.26 − 0.75
ICT poor sectors 0.73 0.99 0.44
    Manufacturing 0.27 0.01 0.24
    Services 0.41 0.88 0.32
Source: O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003, p. 83). 
 
Yet, productivity growth in ICT using sectors is more than merely investing in ICT. About a 
quarter of the productivity increase in US ICT using sectors after 1995 originates from higher 
investment in ICT capital (O’Mahony and Van Ark 2003, p95). The other three quarters consist 
of TFP growth. Micro econometric and case study evidence shows that combining ICT 
investment with innovations in organisation and upgrading of worker skills contributes to 
productivity growth (Baily en Kirkegaard, 2004). In addition, firms in US service sectors are 
able to exploit economies of scale and benefit from less regulation on product and labour 
markets, which stimulates competition and experimentation (Bartelsman et al., 2003).  
 
In terms of the Lisbon agenda these developments in Europe and the US put the spotlight on 
policies that promote TFP growth through innovation, human capital formation and 
competition.  
2.3.3 Innovation 
Innovation is one of the driving forces of TFP and research and development (R&D) is a corner 
stone of innovation. Empirical research on the relationship between R&D and TFP yields very 
high social returns to R&D, conservative estimates are in the order of 30% (Canton et al., 
2005). These social returns substantially exceed the private rates of return of about 7 to 14%. 
Positive externalities explain the high social returns on R&D: investment by one firm not only 
increases the productivity of that firm but also of other firms, within or outside the same sector 
and within or outside the same country. High social returns that exceed private returns motivate 
public support for R&D.  
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Expenditure on R&D amounts to 2% of GDP in Europe and lies somewhat below 3% of 
GDP in the US. According to the empirical research this would contribute to higher TFP in the 
US. However, it is hard to explain the past 1995 productivity performance of Europe and the 
US from R&D, because R&D ratios are fairly stable over time (Ederveen et al., 2005). Neither 
the fall in the growth rate of TFP in Europe nor the increase in the US can be linked directly to 
developments in R&D. Moreover, a large role for R&D is in conflict with productivity growth 
taking place in ICT-using sectors, as the R&D-intensity of successful service sectors like 
wholesale and retail trade is quite low. 
 
What might have changed is the character of R&D in Europe. The return on R&D in Europe 
may have declined since European economies have shifted towards the technology frontier. 
R&D to absorb state-of-the-art technologies becomes less important when fewer technologies 
are left to absorb. If diffusion of R&D involves long time lags and the US was engaged in 
frontier R&D at a much earlier stage, after 1995 R&D in the US might have paid off more in 
terms of new technologies and stronger TFP growth. Until now, empirical evidence that might 
support this hypothesis is lacking.  
 
Prominent in the Lisbon strategy is the target to increase R&D spending to 3% of GDP with 
companies performing two thirds of this target. Chapter 6 analyses the economic consequences 
of reaching the 3% target. Yet, R&D is not the only determinant of innovation. The Lisbon 
strategy features a range of policy measures to enhance knowledge creation and diffusion. 
Within the European Research Area high on the agenda are research funding through the 
European Research Council and the interconnection between scientific research institutes and 
firms. The Lisbon agenda also aims at enhancing mobility of researchers within Europe and into 
Europe (Kok, 2004). Empirical evidence is scarce on the effectiveness of various policy 
measures that intend to stimulate R&D and innovation (Canton et al., 2005). 
2.3.4 Human capital  
The Lisbon strategy not only aims at the quantity but also at the quality of employment. The 
European Council has adopted a comprehensive set of education and training targets (European 
Commission, 2004b). In education, preventing drop-outs and increasing participation in upper 
secondary education occupy centre stage. Investments in training have to enhance lifelong 
learning, which increases flexibility of workers and enables elderly workers to retain to up-to-
date human capital. There is considerable diversity among European countries with respect to 
these targets. For instance, new member states excel in the number of graduates with upper 
secondary education (see Chapter 5 for more background).  
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As a factor of production, human capital investments directly contribute to productivity growth 
and thus to higher wages.9 The estimated private rate of return on investment in initial education 
equals 6 - 9%, in other words an extra year of education raises future wages by 6 to 9% 
(Harmon et al., 2003). Recent estimates of returns to on-the-job training are of the same 
magnitude (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2002). In the future, private rates of return on human 
capital investment will most likely increase, due to skill-biased technological change, 
internationalisation and capital-skill complementarity (Jacobs, 2004). 
 
Human capital might also affect productivity indirectly. Several mechanisms have been 
proposed in the theoretical literature. Firstly, increasing returns and positive external effects 
may raise social returns to education above private returns. However, empirical evidence does 
not support this conjecture: social returns to education roughly equal private returns. Secondly, 
investing in education might increase the productivity of R&D, because a larger share of the 
workforce will be engaged in R&D. But also in this case empirical support is absent: 
complementarity between skill levels and R&D cannot be found. Thirdly, human capital may 
facilitate technology adoption and catching up of countries towards the technological frontier 
(Griffith et al,. 2000). Empirical support for this mechanism is not very robust and for a range 
of European countries it has lost relevance, because these countries have largely caught up with 
the US (see section 2.3.1). An exception may be that not so much the level as the composition 
of human capital makes a difference. According to Krueger and Kumar (2002, 2004) people in 
the US have been able to adjust to ICT more easily, because education in the US is more 
general. Fourthly, education may increase the quality of institutions and of the political process, 
which encourages innovation and productivity growth. Empirical evidence is convincing for 
developing countries, but this factor does not seem decisive for developed countries. So all in 
all human capital directly promotes productivity, but evidence for indirect effects is lacking. 
 
The rising productivity gap with the US after 1995 does not seem to originate from lagging 
investment in human capital. Recent data are scarce, but comparing 1995 to 1975 the number of 
schooling years in Europe is catching up to US levels, while Europe increasingly outperforms 
the US in international comparable literacy tests (Ederveen, et al., 2005, p43). Taking into 
account the long lags involved in human capital formation, this evidence does not support the 
hypothesis that Europe is falling behind due to inferior investment in education. As indicated 
above, only the composition of human capital may have played a role, in the sense that specific 
education in Europe may have hindered adoption of ICT.  
 
In terms of policy intervention, evidence indicates that investment in early childhood is most 
effective to build human capital. Social returns to early childhood education exceed those of 
 
9 The remainder of this section draws heavily on Jacobs and Webbink (2004). 
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other policy interventions (Heckman, 2000). Still, early childhood education is not part of the 
Lisbon agenda on education. A survey of a broad range of interventions in compulsory and 
post-compulsory schooling yields a rather mixed picture (Canton et al., 2005). Effects depend 
on differences in type, design and implementation of specific interventions. 
2.3.5 Competition and the functioning of markets 
The impact of competition on productivity and economic growth operates via three channels: 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency (DG ECFIN, 2005). Via the first channel 
competition lowers rents, which improves the functioning of the price mechanism to allocate 
resources and output to their most productive use. Moreover, a more competitive environment 
due to product market reforms may increase entry of new competitors. The second channel 
entails more productive work organisation and less slack and agency costs in firms that operate 
in a competitive environment. Via the third channel competition generates incentives for 
innovation. However, not only too little competition but also too much competition may hamper 
innovation, because firms need rents to finance costly R&D.  
 
Empirical evidence points at an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and 
innovation (Aghion, et al., 2005). Also, various studies show that regulatory reform has positive 
effects on TFP (DG ECFIN, 2005, Canton et al., 2005), which would imply that the industries 
affected by these reforms were on the left side of the inverted U.  
 
According to Bartelsman et al. (2003) entry and exit rates of firms in the US and Europe are 
largely comparable. Yet, although the intensity of creative destruction may not differ 
considerably, the process of creative destruction does diverge. Relatively to incumbents, firms 
that enter markets in the US are smaller and less productive than firms in Europe. However 
successful firms in the US grow faster, which points at the possibility that market 
experimentation is larger in the US.  
The Lisbon strategy contains a range of measures to improve the functioning of markets in 
Europe. An important element is the completion of the internal market for goods and services, 
the liberalisation of net work industries and the financial services action plan (Kok, 2004). In 
addition, the strategy aims to stimulate entrepreneurship both by improving the quality of 
legislation and by reducing the administrative burden on firms.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The preceding brief review of the Lisbon strategy and the post 1995 performance of the 
European economy in comparison with the United States yield a number of observations:  
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• Labour utilisation explains most of the lag in GDP per capita in Europe. One third of the 
lag follows from the difference in the employment rate, two thirds from the difference in 
the number of working hours per worker.  
• The second half of the 1990s witnessed considerable employment growth in Europe, which 
slowed down after 2000. 
• The mirror image of this employment growth is less capital deepening, which explains part 
of the slowdown of labour productivity growth in Europe after 1995.  
• Less room for catching up led to a gradual decline of European productivity growth.  
• The acceleration of productivity growth in the US after 1995 was concentrated in ICT 
using services: retail, wholesale, business services and financial services. 
• Empirical research shows that R&D contributes to economic growth, both directly and 
indirectly through (international) knowledge spillovers.  
• The US invests more in R&D, but US R&D did not increase substantially after 1995.  
• Human capital directly contributes to productivity growth, but evidence on the indirect 
impact of human capital is lacking. Social returns to human capital equal private returns. 
• No support can be found for the hypothesis that Europe is falling behind the US after 1995 
due to low levels of investment in education, but the composition of human capital may 
have mattered.  
• Markets in the US entail more experimentation: successful entrants grow faster.  
 
These observations yield as a first general conclusion that there is no single cause for 
differences between the European and the American growth performance. Hence, strengthening 
employment and economic growth in Europe calls for a multifaceted strategy, which is exactly 
what the Lisbon strategy intends to be (compare Table 2.1). The many facets of the strategy at 
the same time require selectivity in analysing the economic consequences. Therefore, this paper 
focuses on highlights of Lisbon. The employment target is a natural candidate for inclusion, 
because it represents the jobs pillar of the strategy. On the productivity growth pillar, R&D 
comes to the fore, because it is an important input in innovation and it has high social returns. 
The third highlight, human capital, as a factor of production directly contributes to productivity 
growth. In the field of competition and the functioning of markets, the internal market for 
services and administrative costs are topics for further analysis, mainly because empirical 
research is available on the direct effects on trade and productivity, respectively.  
 
As to the second general conclusion, the analysis shows that promoting jobs and growth entails 
many complex interactions. Therefore, assessing the impact of the multifaceted Lisbon strategy 
on the complexities of employment and productivity growth puts specific demands on an 
analytical framework. This is the topic of the next chapter.  
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3 A framework for analysis: WorldScan 
3.1 Framework 
The policies on the Lisbon agenda are multifaceted. They cover a broad range of employment 
and productivity issues: the size of the labour force, the quality of labour, R&D and its 
diffusion, the functioning of markets and administrative barriers. This list is far from complete, 
but it covers at least the issues we address in this paper.  
 
The interactions between these Lisbon policies and the rest of the economy are complex. Take 
for example an increase in the employment rate. Labour becomes cheaper. This initially lowers 
the capital-labour ratio and thereby productivity per worker. By consequence, firms want to 
attract more capital. Scarcity for capital increases and the price of capital rises on the 
international markets, if member states demand more (foreign) capital. The benefit of cheaper 
labour and more expensive capital depends on the intensity of these two factor inputs in 
production. Labour-intensive industries would benefit most. 
 
Moreover, firms compete with firms of other EU and non-EU countries. In the other EU 
countries the labour force also expands. This favours the labour-intensive firms in these 
countries. So it remains unclear to what extent labour-intensive industries from specific 
countries can improve their competitiveness. That depends on the functioning of the internal 
market in the EU and the increase in the labour force of the various member states. 
 
Furthermore, these industries also compete with less labour-intensive industries on their 
home market to attract sufficient inputs for production. The expansion of labour-intensive firms 
could benefit those industries which deliver many intermediate goods or services to these firms. 
Other sectors could be negatively affected because input prices increase. However, this is also 
the case for the same industries in other EU countries. On balance, what do these effects imply 
for international competitiveness of industries? 
3.1.1 Models 
The example above illustrates the complex interactions between sectors nationally and 
internationally and between output and input markets. The effects of reaching a Lisbon target 
can only be meaningfully considered by taking account of these interactions. Some of these 
interactions will reduce the initial effects of Lisbon policies, others will enforce the effects. 
Hence, it is only feasible to take all these interactions into account within a formal analytical 
framework in the form of an economic model. In principle there are two types of economic 
models available: macro econometric models and general equilibrium models. 
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The advantage of macro econometric models is that the crucial behavioural equations are 
empirically underpinned. This comes however at a price. In general these models can only be 
estimated if several economic equations that represent various economic mechanisms are 
combined in one equation (a so called reduced form equation). Moreover, these models are not 
very capable to analyse national macroeconomic effects of the Lisbon goals and take 
international spillovers between member states into account at the same time. Another 
disadvantage is that most of these models do not incorporate much sectoral detail; they focus 
mainly on macroeconomic relations.  
 
These disadvantages do not play a role in global general equilibrium models. These models 
are based on microeconomic behaviour of all relevant agents. Producers maximise their profits 
and consumers maximise their utility. Production technologies relate output to inputs, so a 
potential increase in the output of a sector leads to extra demand for inputs. This links output to 
input markets. Moreover, trade flows between countries, and in particular two-way intra-
industry trade, are well modelled. The integration of national goods and services markets and of 
capital markets creates the possibility to analyse spillovers between countries.  
 
Another advantage is that these models distinguish several sectors in the economy. This is 
relevant for the Lisbon policies, because the sectoral effects can vary considerably. Increases in 
for example R&D spending affect the high-technology manufacturing sectors differently than 
the R&D-extensive service sectors. An other example is the implementation of the services 
directive which mainly affects the commercial services sector. The distinction of the economy 
in various sectors is necessary for a meaningful analysis of the various Lisbon goals. 
 
This plea for sectoral diversification in the model could be repeated at every level of sectoral 
desaggregation. For example, if we distinguish a commercial services sector it could be 
meaningful to disaggregate the various commercial services, because all these services may be 
differently affected by the services directive. Here, we face the limits of analytical tractability 
and data. National accounts only distinguish a certain number of economic sectors and, more 
importantly researchers can not meaningfully analyse the effects of many sectors in many 
countries or present these in a coherent and concise way. Although a sectoral classification is an 
asset of global general equilibrium models, the number of sectors that can be distinguished has 
its limits. 
 
A disadvantage of applied general equilibrium models is that these models sometimes lack an 
empirical underpinning. These models are calibrated on macroeconomic data and input-output 
data of a certain base year. The calibration determines a number of parameters in the model, but 
values of many other parameters have to be taken from the literature. Not all of these 
parameters are well estimated in the context of a CGE model. Moreover, the models are 
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calibrated only at one point in time. It remains unclear whether these models can explain trade 
developments very well. Another problem is that most applied general equilibrium models are 
static.  
 
Some of these disadvantages of CGE models apply to a less extent to our model: 
WorldScan. WorldScan is a dynamic model and able to analyse policy variants over long time 
periods. Moreover, we have spent much time to underpin the behavioural equations empirically. 
Examples of these equations are consumer behaviour, savings behaviour, international capital 
mobility, and the effect of R&D spillovers on productivity. This solves to some extent the first 
disadvantage mentioned above: WorldScan is better empirically underpinned than many other 
CGE models. But still not all parameters are estimated. So we have to interpret the outcomes 
with some care. The results mainly give an indication of the size of the effects and of the 
relative effects of one sector or county to another.  
3.1.2 Modelling Lisbon policies 
A complication concerns the implementation of Lisbon policies in WorldScan. Some of the 
targets are rather specific and difficult to link to the more general structure of WorldScan. For 
instance, WorldScan has no direct mechanism to analyse improvements in literacy, one of the 
Lisbon skills targets, or a reduction of the administrative burden on firms. This is a well-known 
feature of policy analysis with large models. 
 
In principle two approaches exist to deal with this. One is to expand WorldScan with more 
detailed formal sub models of specific policy fields. The other approach is to use off-model 
accounting schemes or satellite models to provide the linkages. The former option is 
theoretically more attractive, because it is easier to impose theoretical consistency. However, it 
is time consuming and can only be applied for a limited number of policy fields. Expanding a 
CGE model in many different directions quickly makes the model unmanageable. This option 
mainly comes in sight if sufficient theoretical insights and empirical evidence is available, if a 
range of future model applications is foreseen, or if the topic at hand has crucial interactions 
with other parts of the model. For example, in a range of climate change applications we use a 
separate version of WorldScan with a more elaborate energy sub model.10 The current 
application to the Lisbon policies entails a range of diverse applications for which often only 
limited theoretical studies and empirical evidence exist. Therefore our analytical method 
consists of the combination of the CGE model as a general working horse and more specific 
accounting schemes or satellite models to link specific Lisbon policies to the model.  
 
 
10 See Kets and Verweij (2005), and Lejour et al. (2006). 
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The present version of the model does not incorporate all costs to reach the Lisbon goals 
systematically. There are several reasons for abstracting from some of the costs. The first is that 
the member states did agree on the Lisbon goals itself but not on the instruments to reach these 
goals. Often these instruments are not specified. Second, WorldScan does not contain all proper 
policy instruments. We include the subsidy costs for stimulating R&D and the opportunity costs 
of time spent on learning. We do not include the costs of active labour-market policies, direct 
costs of schooling, costs of reducing red tape or of adapting the regulatory framework to 
implement the services directive. Therefore we present results of “what if” simulations. We 
analyse the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of reaching the various Lisbon goals without 
considering all the associated costs systematically. 
 
Finally, we do not carry out a systematic welfare analysis. In the model consumer utility 
depends on consumption, but does not include leisure, environmental quality or inequality. By 
consequence, the simulation outcomes do not represent a trade-off between GDP effects and 
leisure or environmental quality, or between efficiency and equity. These limitations of our 
quantitative analysis have to by taken in mind when we interpret the simulation outcomes. 
3.2 The World Scan model 
WorldScan is an applied general equilibrium model for the world economy. The model was 
developed in the nineties for CPB’s earlier scenario study Scanning the Future (1992). The 
model has thereafter often been used for scenario studies, analyses of climate-change policies 
and trade policies.11 WorldScan is well suited to simulate scenario developments on 
demography, technology, energy and globalisation. The model consists of several types of 
equations: behavioural equations which describe the behaviour of firms and consumers, 
identities and accounting relations. These accounting relations are necessary to represent the 
framework of the national accounts of an economy. A few years ago a previous version of the 
model has been documented (CPB, 1999). The current version of the model has been 
substantially revised and much better empirically underpinned. See Lejour et al. (2006) for an 
up-to-date publication. Below we describe the main mechanisms of the model. 
General Equilibrium 
General equilibrium models describe supply and demand relations in markets. In these models, 
prices of goods and factor inputs are flexible, such that demand and supply become equal at an 
equilibrium price. These models also describe the interactions between several markets. For 
example, firms must determine the factor inputs necessary to produce a final good, given the 
price and supply of that good. Supply, which depends on the equilibrium product price, 
 
11 See http://www.cpb.nl/eng/general/org/program/is/publicaties/. 
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determines the necessary inputs and therefore demand on the input markets. When consumers 
prefer more final goods, the price of these goods will increase. Firms want to produce more and 
will demand more inputs. As a result, the prices for the input factors will increase because of 
the increase in demand for the final good. These mechanisms are called general equilibrium 
effects.  
Producers 
The version of WorldScan used in this paper distinguishes 10 goods and services markets, a 
labour market, and a capital market for each of the 23 countries and regions. There are 10 types 
of producers, each of which produces one type of good or service. We call this a sector. All 
goods are produced by using labour, capital, R&D and intermediate inputs, albeit in different 
proportions. The relative demand for each of these inputs depends on the characteristics of the 
sectoral production function. The production structure is shown in Figure 3.1. In general, we 
assume that labour and capital are fairly good substitutes. We consider the various intermediate 
inputs as good substitutes, but there are hardly any substitution possibilities between the 
intermediate inputs, on the one hand, and capital, labour and R&D, on the other hand.  
Figure 3.1 Production structure in WorldScan 
production
other inputs fixed factor
value-added/energy
value-added energy
capital/labour research and development
low-skilled labour
high-skilled labour capital
intermediates
 
 Consumers 
Consumers demand the various goods and services, and provide labour and capital to the firms. 
They consume goods and services in different proportions, depending on their prices and the 
income elasticities of these goods and services. Some of these goods and services are luxury 
goods, of which consumption shares increase if income rises; others are necessary goods, of 
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which shares in consumption decrease if income goes up. We assume that the supply of labour 
is exogenous. Because consumers save part of their income, they are able to supply capital to 
firms in return for non-wage income. Savings depend on income growth and demographic 
characteristics. In the OECD countries, demography mainly concerns ageing within the 
population, which reduces savings. 
The government 
Most CGE models do not model the government in much detail. This goes back to the national 
accounts and input-output tables that are normally used as data sources. These data do not 
include government transfers and social security. The government collects taxes on imports and 
consumption. It spends tax income on (export) subsidies and public consumption. This is also 
the case in WorldScan. Government transfers and social security are not modelled. Our 
underlying database and the model contain various taxes on import, export, consumption, 
production, investment and intermediate goods. The revenues of these taxes are a source of 
income for consumers besides capital and labour income. We have also introduced a tax or 
subsidy on R&D investment in the model. These revenues or expenditures also accrue to the 
consumers in the same way as the other taxes.  
Labour markets 
Consumers supply labour and firms demand it. We assume that there are national markets for 
high-skilled and low-skilled labour in which the prices of labour (the wage rates) are flexible. 
We have modelled unemployment exogenously: a part of labour supply is unemployed. The 
supply of labour minus the unemployment level will be equal to labour demand in equilibrium.  
Capital markets 
Consumers supply capital and firms demand it. Equilibrium between demand and supply 
determines the price of capital.12 In contrast to the labour market, regional capital markets are 
assumed to be linked to each other. So if capital is abundant in one region (and thus is relatively 
inexpensive), it is invested in another region in which capital is scarce (capital is expensive). 
However, there are some barriers to investing abroad. Therefore, interregional capital mobility 
reduces, but does not eliminate, capital price differentials between regions. In the latter case we 
would have one global capital market.  
 
Capital used in production is built up from investment goods corrected for depreciation of 
these goods. Investment goods consist of several goods from various sectors, such as capital 
goods, services, and buildings (construction). The producers supply these goods.  
 
12 Actually, the price of capital is a function of the investment price times the sum of the real interest rate and depreciation 
rate. 
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The market for R&D 
The model distinguishes a separate R&D sector in each country. That sector produces R&D 
products which are demanded by the other sectors. The R&D expenditures of demanding 
sectors are interpreted as investments. These investments accumulate into the R&D stock, just 
as capital investments accumulate into the capital stock. The yearly investments depend upon 
the optimal R&D stock in a sector. The R&D stock is optimal if the marginal product of R&D 
equals the user costs of R&D. R&D income contributes to value added just as capital and labour 
income.  
 
The R&D stock in a sector has positive spillovers to productivity in other sectors and in other 
countries. The size of these spillovers depends on the importance of that sector as intermediate 
in other sectors and on the trade volume. We have estimated the relation between R&D 
spillovers and productivity and have implemented this relation in WorldScan. Chapter 6 
discusses this relation in more detail. 
Goods markets and trade 
The regional goods and services markets are linked to each other, except for the R&D sector. 
Not only the home market, but also foreign markets determine demand for a good. We assume 
that each region produces a different variety of that good. Because we distinguish 23 regions, 
there are 23 varieties for each of the 9 non-R&D sectors. In principle, consumers and producers 
demand all these varieties. The demand for each of the varieties depends on its relative price, 
the substitution possibilities between the varieties, transportation costs, trade barriers and 
preferences for the variety. If the price of a particular variety goes up, demand will decrease in 
favour of other varieties. Hence, total demand for each variety depends on the demand on the 
home and foreign markets. 
GDP growth 
So far, we have viewed the model only from a static perspective and have neglected the 
dynamics, particularly economic growth. Economic growth is measured by value added growth. 
Value added grows by the increase in labour productivity and labour. Labour growth is 
exogenous and is derived from population growth differentiated according to age cohort, age-
specific participation rates, and the unemployment rate. Labour productivity growth depends on 
the assumptions about technological progress. There is no one-to-one relation between 
technology and labour productivity, because productivity is also related to capital and R&D 
growth per unit of labour, which are endogenous. Over time, however, technological progress 
largely determines labour productivity growth. Hence, in a simulation the assumptions on 
technological progress and employment largely fix economic growth.  
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Regions and sectors 
We distinguish 23 regions and 10 sectors (see Table 3.1). All EU countries are modelled 
separately, except for Belgium and Luxembourg and the three Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta. 
Moreover, we distinguish the United States, Rest OECD, and Rest of the world. For each 
region, we distinguish 10 sectors. These consist of agriculture, energy (primary energy and 
electricity), four manufacturing sectors (high, high-medium, low-medium and low technology) 
and three services sectors (transport, other commercial and other). The last sector is the R&D 
sector. It deviates from the other sectors in the sense that we assume that there is no 
international trade in R&D goods.  
 
Table 3.1 Overview of regions, sectors and production inputs in WorldScan 
Germany Agriculture Value added 
France Low tech manufacturing High-skilled labour 
United kingdom Medium-low tech manufacturing Low-skilled labour 
Italy Medium-high tech manufacturing Capital 
Spain High tech manufacturing R&D stock 
The Netherlands Transport services Fixed factor 
Belgium-Luxembourg Other commercial services  
Denmark Other services (government) Intermediate goods 
Sweden Energy Agriculture 
Finland R&D Low tech manufacturing 
Ireland  Medium-low tech manufacturing 
Austria  Medium-high tech manufacturing 
Greece  High tech manufacturing 
Portugal  Transport services 
Poland  Other commercial services 
Czech Republic  Other services (government) 
Hungary   
Slovakia  Energy 
Slovenia   
Rest EU   
United States   
Rest OECD   
Non OECD   
 
3.3 Baseline characteristics 
This section describes the characteristics of our baseline. It provides a sketch of the economic 
background upon which we implement the various Lisbon policies. First, we describe the 
macroeconomic background. Second, we focus on some sectoral details, which are necessary to 
understand the sectoral impact of the policy variants. In the main text we only present the 
developments for the EU as a whole. Annex 1 provides more information for the various 
member states.  
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In order to being able to evaluate the impact of the various Lisbon policies, we have developed 
a baseline in which these goals are not implemented. The baseline describes a time path of 
economic development between now and the final year of our simulations, 2040. The 
differences between the policy variant simulation and the baseline represent the effects of 
implementing the Lisbon policy. 
 
The baseline has to fulfil certain conditions. First it has to comply with recent economic 
developments. The starting year of our simulations is 2001, because that is the latest year for 
which data are available to calibrate the model. The time path between 2001 and 2004 has to 
include the accession of the new member states to the internal market. Moreover, we expect 
some catching up of these countries towards the old ones. Second, the baseline has to be neutral 
with respect to the implementation of the policy variants. If we would incorporate a large 
increase in skills or increase in R&D expenditures in the baseline, it would become easier to 
reach the Lisbon targets. This means that we aim at moderate economic growth within the EU 
in the baseline.  
 
Taking in mind these considerations, our baseline is based upon one of our long-term 
scenarios for Europe. Recently, CPB has developed four long-term scenarios of the European 
economy.13 As a starting point for our baseline we chose the Strong Europe scenario.14 In this 
scenario economic growth in Europe is moderate and markets integrate further, regionally and 
globally. Below we describe some of the characteristics of the baseline. 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic characteristics 
Population grows hardly within the EU due to aging. Figure 3.2 shows that population growth 
declines in time from 0.35% per year to zero. In the Central and Eastern European countries 
population will diminish. The population projections are derived from Eurostat (2002) for the 
EU15 countries and the United Nations (2002) for the other countries.  
 
13 See De Mooij and Tang (2003) for a motivation, derivation, and qualitative description of the scenarios, and Lejour (2003) 
for the quantitative illustration. 
14 This does not imply that we consider the realisation of this scenario more likely than one of the others. We only selected 
this scenario because its characteristics fit into the conditions of the baseline in this analysis. We do not implement all 
characteristics of this scenario, so the baseline is not a copy of Strong Europe. 
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Figure 3.2 Annual growth rates for the EU as a whole 2001 and 2040 
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Source: WorldScan simulations 
GDP growth slightly decreases over time due to the decline in population growth. GDP growth 
per capita is more or less constant. Between 2001 and 2003 GDP growth is targeted on the 
actual numbers of the World Bank (2004). From 2004 onwards we assume a constant growth of 
total factor productivity. This leads to a GDP per capita growth rate within the EU of about 
1.9%.15 In most new EU member states on average growth is about 2% points higher. We 
expect that these countries gradually catch up to the welfare level of the older members states. 
In time participation rates decline, because people become older. We assume that participation 
of the various age cohorts remain constant in time. The increase in female labour market 
participation does not offset lower participation due to ageing. Therefore employment growth 
falls over time, on average by 0.3% in the EU (see Figure 3.2). This is mainly caused by the 
reduction in employment in Germany, Italy, Spain and the countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe.16 These countries are most affected by population aging. 
 
Exports grow faster than GDP. This in line with observed developments in trade, on average 
trade grows about twice as fast as GDP. Between 2010 and 2030, export growth is stimulated 
by reduced tariff and non-tariff trade barriers due to assumed successful WTO negotiations and 
a further integration of the internal market. After 2030 market integration is not further 
stimulated. Therefore exports grow less fast.  
 
15 2.0% GDP growth minus 0.1% population growth. 
16 Table in Annex 1 provides more information on the country-specific characteristics. 
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3.3.2 Sectoral characteristics 
Table 3.2 presents the sectoral structure for the EU economy in 2001. This gives a good 
indication of the general pattern, although the numbers will differ at the level of the member 
states. The other commercial services sector and the other services sector are the largest sectors 
in the economy in terms of value added and employment. Of the manufacturing sectors, low 
technology and medium-high technology sectors are the largest ones. The first one consists of 
food processing and textiles among others, the latter one consists of machinery and equipment 
and chemicals. 
 
The manufacturing sectors are much more open in terms of exports ratios (exports divided 
by production) than the other sectors. In other services, which are mainly government services, 
there is hardly any trade at all. Medium-high tech and high tech manufacturing are much more 
tradable than low tech manufacturing. Medium-high tech manufacturing also provides the 
largest part of total exports. Other important exporting sectors are low tech manufacturing and 
other commercial services. Transport services are by definition also tradable. Note that trade 
also includes intra-EU trade.  
 
The EU seems to specialise in the production of medium tech manufacturing and services. 
As a measure for specialisation we use the Balassa index. This index relates the share of a 
product or service in total exports of a country to that share for a reference group of countries. 
As a reference group we choose the whole world. A number larger than 100 indicates that 
Europe exports relatively more products of a sector than other countries do. Then Europe is 
specialised in the production of that particular good or service. The table also shows that in 
other services the European exports are relatively large compared to other countries. However, 
the volume of exports is low due to the non-tradability of a large part of these services. R&D is 
not exported by definition, so there is no specialisation index for the R&D sector. 
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Table 3.2 Sectoral characteristics for the EU as a whole in 2001 
Sectors Employment 
share
Value-added share Export ratio Specialisation Export share
Agriculture 4.2 2.5 17.6 41.0 2.3
Energy 1.3 2.1 10.7 66.0 1.7
Low tech manufacturing 8.5 8.1 24.4 99.6 16.5
Medium-low tech manufacturing 4.5 3.8 25.4 112.4 8.4
Medium-high tech manufacturing  9.0 9.4 50.5 116.9 42.1
High tech manufacturing 2.3 1.9 48.9 68.3 7.5
Transport services 4.9 4.1 19.3 106.7 5.5
Other commercial services 38.8 44.3 5.7 105.7 12.9
Research and development 2.0 1.4 0.0  
Other services 24.5 22.3 0.6 161.3 0.5
      
Source: own calculations based on GTAP data, 2001. 
All numbers are expressed as ratios. The sectoral shares in employment, value added and exports add up to 100. The export ratio is defined as the 
volume of exports divided by the volume of production. Specialisation is approximated by the Balassa index: a number larger than 100 indicates 
specialisation. 
 
Over time the structure of the EU economy changes. That is not only the case, because some 
countries grow faster than others, but also because the structures of national economies change. 
As countries become richer, people spend a larger part of their income on services. This is also 
reflected in Table 3.3. If we compare the outcome for the sectoral structure in 2040 with that in 
2001 (see Table 3.2), the contributions of agriculture and manufacturing have declined 
substantially. The other commercial services sector has boomed in that period. Note that also 
value added of the R&D sector has declined. The reason is that value added of medium-high 
tech and high tech manufacturing have declined rather dramatically. Although the R&D 
intensity in these sectors is more or less constant in time, the decline of these sectors at the 
benefit of R&D-extensive sectors reduces total R&D expenditures (as share of value added). 
 
In nearly all sectors trade-openness increases. This is indicated by the higher numbers for 
the export ratio in 2040. This is a characteristic of our baseline, which is also shown by the 
growth rate of total exports that exceeds the growth rate of GDP in Figure 3.2. Markets 
integrate further, because trade barriers and transport costs fall. The specialisation in services 
becomes more pronounced. 
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Table 3.3 Sectoral structure EU economy in 2040 
Sectors  Value-added share Export ratio Specialisation Export share
Agriculture  1.8 37.2 61.1 4.4
Energy  3.4 42.9 154.0 8.9
Low tech manufacturing  4.5 36.3 70.8 13.9
Medium-low tech manufacturing  2.4 38.9 120.5 10.3
Medium-high tech manufacturing   5.4 57.0 112.8 36.9
High tech manufacturing  0.8 64.8 54.7 5.8
Transport services  3.1 21.9 122.0 4.8
Other commercial services  49.8 7.1 130.0 13.4
Research and development  0.5 0.0  
Other services  28.1 0.6 170.7 0.5
      
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
All numbers are expressed as ratios. The sectoral shares in employment, value added and exports add up to 100. The export ratio is defined as the 
volume of exports divided by the volume of production. Specialisation is approximated by the Balassa index: A number larger than 100 indicates 
specialisation. 
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4 Employment 
One of the most important Lisbon policies is a better use of human capital in the economy. This 
priority becomes even more prominent considering the ageing population in the next decades. 
The better use of human capital can be disentangled in two directions: quantity and quality. This 
chapter focuses on the quantity of human capital, while Chapter 5 concentrates on quality.  
 
A very important goal of the “jobs and growth” strategy is increasing employment. The 
employment target is set at 70% in 2010, which implies that 70% of the population between 15 
and 64 aged should have at least a part-time job. Except for the overall employment rate, there 
are also a 60% employment goal for women and a 50% employment goal for the 55 to 64 aged. 
 
In this chapter we focus on the overall employment target. We analyse the economic effects 
of reaching this target for various situations. It is uncertain to what extent employment increases 
autonomously, because of higher labour-market participation of women. We handle this 
uncertainty by constructing a lower bound and an upper bound scenario. In our lower bound 
scenario we assume that the employment rate already increases to some extent until 2010 in the 
baseline due to an autonomous increase in female labour-market participation. In this scenario 
we also distinguish the case that the employment increase consists only of low-skilled people 
and the case that it consists of a mix of low and high-skilled people. In our upper bound 
scenario the female participation rates remain constant until 2010 in the baseline. The 
employment effect of reaching the target is larger in this scenario. Section 4.2 discusses the 
macroeconomic effects of these scenarios. Section 4.3 highlights some of the sectoral outcomes.  
 
Note that we do not conduct a full welfare analysis. First of all, we do not explicitly include 
the policy costs of reaching the employment targets. The direct costs of employment and 
labour-market participation policies are excluded, because these costs are not well-specified in 
the Lisbon strategy and in WorldScan. Second, we do not analyse any indirect costs in terms of 
welfare, such as the impact on equity of lowering replacement rates to reduce unemployment. 
Third, we do not consider the welfare effects of less leisure. Section 4.4 discusses some of these 
issues. For the EU as a whole that section gives a rough impression of the costs of labour-
market policies to raise participation and to reduce unemployment. 
4.1 Employment in Europe 
The European Council has agreed upon specific targets on employment. According to the 
official Lisbon criteria the employment rate should be 70% in 2010. The employment rate is 
defined as the number of people which are employed as a share of the population within the age 
category 15 to 64. The EU has made some progress in reaching these targets, although at a slow 
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pace in recent years compared to the second half of the 1990s (DG ECFIN, 2005). In 2003 the 
overall employment rate is 62.9%, one percentage point higher than in 2000.  
Table 4.1 Employment, unemployment and participation rates, 2003 
Countries  Employment rate EUa Calculated 
employment rateb
Unemployment 
ratea 
Participation rate ILO
Column  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria  69.2 69.5 4.3 72.6
Belgium-Luxembourg  59.6 59.7 7.8 64.7
Denmark  75.1 75.3 5.6 79.8
Finland  67.7 68.2 9.0 74.9
France  63.2 63.1 9.5 69.7
Germany  65.0 66.0 9.6 73.0
UK  71.8 70.6 4.9 74.3
Greece  57.8 58.9 9.7 65.2
Ireland  65.4 65.0 4.6 68.1
Italy  56.1 56.9 8.6 62.2
The Netherlands  73.5 73.5 3.8 76.4
Portugal  67.2 70.1 6.3 74.8
Spain  59.7 59.3 11.3 66.8
Sweden  72.9 73.8 5.6 78.2
Czech Republic  64.7 65.5 7.8 71.1
Hungary  57.0 57.4 5.8 61.0
Poland  51.2 52.0 19.2 64.4
Slovakia  57.7 58.0 17.5 70.3
Slovenia  62.6 63.0 6.5 67.4
Rest EU  . 64.6 10.5 72.2
EU25  62.9 63.2 9.1 69.6
 
aSource: Eurostat LFS (2004). 
bSource: Calculated employment rate in WorldScan is product of the participation rates (column (4), source ILO, 2002) and 1 minus the 
unemployment rate (column (3), source Eurostat, 2004). The participation rate of ILO is build up from a cohort and sex-specific population model. 
Data sources are: Eurostat (2002, 2004), UN (2002); and ILO (2002). 
 
The first column of Table 4.1 depicts the employment rates for all EU countries. According to 
Table 4.1, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden have already reached the 
employment target for 2010. Yet, note that these employment rates only measure the number of 
employed and neglect the number of working hours. For instance, the Netherlands has already 
reached the 70% target due to the large number of people who are part-time employed. If 
employment rates would be measured in numbers of hours worked, the Netherlands would be 
lagging behind (see OECD, 2004). In countries like, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia, the employment rate is even lower than 60%. These countries still have a long way to 
go to the 70% target. On average the employment level has to increase by 11% in the EU to 
reach the 70% target. 
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WorldScan computes employment rates in two steps. First, from the population projections of 
Eurostat (2002) and our projections on participation rates (Lejour and van Leeuwen, 2002), we 
derive the size of the labour force. The labour force projections are built up from sex-specific 
projections of five years age-cohorts and their labour-market participation rates. The resulting 
participation rates for 2003 are shown in the last column of Table 4.1. Over time the total 
participation rates will decline due to changes in the composition of the population even if the 
cohort and sex-specific participation rates do not change. 
 
From the participation rate and the exogenous unemployment rate we derive the 
employment rate. Between 2001 and 2003 we use the observed unemployment rates from 
Eurostat (2004) in our model. From 2004 onwards we assume in our baseline simulation that 
the unemployment rates remain constant. Note that our calculated employment rates for 2003 
deviate slightly from those reported by Eurostat.  
4.2 Macroeconomic effects of reaching the employment target 
As stated above we analyse two types of employment scenarios, a lower bound and an upper 
bound scenario. The economic effects of reaching the employment target are smaller in the 
lower bound scenario compared to the upper bound scenario. The reason is that in the lower 
bound scenario we apply a baseline with increasing participation rates for women until 2010.17 
The last decades we have seen an increase in labour-market participation of women. Nowadays 
more women in younger age cohorts participate in the labour market than say 20 years ago. 
Because these women are accustomed to be active at the formal labour market, they will 
probably remain employed at an older age. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
participation rates of these women will be higher when they are older than the current cohort of 
that older age. By consequence, in this lower bound scenario the overall employment rate in the 
baseline increases from 62.9% in 2003 to 63.8% in 2010. This implies that the difference with 
the 70% target is smaller than in the upper bound baseline, where we keep participation rates 
constant after 2003 for all age-cohorts. After 2010 we assume constant participation rates per 
age cohort in both scenarios, in order not to complicate the comparison any further. 
 
Besides this participation effect, we add a second component to the lower bound scenario. In 
contrast to the upper bound scenario we assume that the entire labour inflow is low skilled. By 
consequence, productivity growth will be negatively affected. This section presents the 
macroeconomic analysis of reaching the employment target in both scenarios. We start with the 
 
17 Technically, we assume that half of the increase in participation of a five year age-cohort compared to the same age-
cohort five years before - measured as an percent point increase -, spills over to the same cohort, five years later (and 
older).The participation rate of that cohort is then equal to the participation rate of the same age-cohort five years before 
plus 50% of the increase in participation of the same cohort five years earlier. 
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lower bound scenario in the two components: Section 4.2.1 analyses the effects of the 
assumptions on participation and unemployment reduction, Section 4.2.2 adds an assumption on 
the productivity distribution of the extra employment . Section 4.2.3 presents the results of the 
upper bound scenario.  
4.2.1 Lower bound employment scenario: participation 
The 70% employment target has to be reached on average in the EU. Some countries will have 
an employment rate of more than 70% while others will have a rate below 70% in 2010. To 
derive country-specific targets in this simulation we set an upper limit for the employment rate 
of 75%. Each country is assumed to reduce proportionally the gap between the maximum of 
75% and the 2003 rate. This implies that a country with a low employment rate, such as Poland, 
faces a very ambitious target, but it will be less than 70% (see Table 4.2). For the years after 
2010 we assume that the unemployment rates and the age-specific labour-market participation 
rates remain constant. The overall employment rate will decline due to ageing. 
 
Table 4.2 Employment, unemployment and participation rates, 2010 
Countries  Employment rate; 
baseline 
Employment rate: 
lower bound 
scenario 
Unemployment rate: 
lower bound 
scenario 
Participation rate: 
lower bound scenario
Column  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria  70.8 72.7 3.7 75.5
Belgium-Luxembourg  58.5 67.9 6.9 72.9
Denmark  74.4 74.7 4.5 78.2
Finland  66.4 71.4 4.7 74.9
France  62.3 69.5 4.9 73.0
Germany  67.4 71.5 7.0 77.0
UK  70.7 72.9 2.5 74.8
Greece  60.4 68.5 2.8 70.5
Ireland  67.2 71.1 1.1 71.9
Italy  58.2 67.4 4.4 70.5
The Netherlands  72.9 73.4 1.8 74.8
Portugal  71.0 72.9 3.1 75.2
Spain  61.3 68.6 5.9 72.9
Sweden  71.9 73.8 3.0 76.1
Czech Republic  64.7 70.7 4.2 73.7
Hungary  57.7 67.5 1.1 68.3
Poland  52.2 65.5 8.6 71.6
Slovakia  58.4 67.8 8.6 74.1
Slovenia  63.2 70.0 5.7 74.3
Rest EU  64.1 70.3 2.5 72.1
EU25  63.8 70.0 5.0 73.7
 
Source: WorldScan. The employment rate in column (2) is the products of the participation rate (column (4)) and 1 minus the unemployment rate 
(Column (3)) The participation rate is build up from a cohort and sex-specific population model. 
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Interpreting the 70% employment target as an EU average, countries that already have met the 
70% target also increase employment to some extent. Therefore employment increases in 
Denmark, Sweden, UK, Portugal and the Netherlands. Also the countries which are near the 
70% target in 2003 will have an employment target exceeding 70% in 2010. Examples are 
Germany, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Czech Republic and Rest EU (see Table 4.2). The increase 
in the employment rate has to be achieved through higher participation rates and or lower 
unemployment rates. The last two columns in Table 4.2 show the combination of 
unemployment rates and participation rates for which the employment rates in the scenario 
(second column) are met. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the long-term macroeconomic effects of reaching the 70% employment 
target for the lower bound scenario in 2010. It shows the effects of an increase in the 
employment rates on employment, GDP, consumption, exports and real wages. On average 
employment will increase by 10.3% in the EU in 2025. The GDP gain is 3% points lower 
because labour becomes less productive due to the substitution of capital to labour. This is also 
reflected in a fall of real wages of 3.1% compared to the baseline. Because of lower wages, 
consumption rises less than GDP. The terms-of-trade effect is negative: the EU has to lower 
export prices to expand on international markets. Investment will increase - but less than the 
increase in GDP -, because capital becomes more productive and the real interest rate will rise. 
Europe will attract more capital from abroad to finance extra investment. The volume of exports 
increases by about the same amount as GDP and imports increase by less.  
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Table 4.3 Macroeconomic effects of 70% employment target in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Countries GDP Consumption Exports Employment Real wages
EU 7.7 6.9 8.0 10.3 − 3.1
Germany 6.0 5.7 6.3 7.2 − 1.6
France 9.4 8.4 9.7 11.9 − 2.9
United Kingdom 2.9 2.8 3.6 3.2 − 0.5
Italy 15.1 13.3 13.9 19.6 − 5.4
Spain 10.6 9.1 11.0 12.8 − 3.0
The Netherlands 0.6 0.9 1.8 0.7 0.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 16.8 14.6 14.8 18.2 − 3.1
Denmark 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.3 0.4
Sweden 2.3 2.4 2.9 2.5 − 0.2
Finland 6.0 6.0 5.2 7.5 − 1.7
Ireland 5.1 4.8 4.8 6.0 − 1.2
Austria 3.1 2.9 4.4 3.1 − 0.1
Greece 12.6 10.4 10.7 15.0 − 3.1
Portugal 3.2 3.0 5.3 3.0 0.1
Poland 19.7 17.1 19.4 24.1 − 5.6
Czech Republic 7.7 7.0 8.6 8.7 − 1.7
Hungary 13.1 11.6 12.1 16.2 − 4.0
Slovakia 13.4 11.5 13.0 16.4 − 4.4
Slovenia 13.9 12.6 13.0 12.7 − 0.1
Rest EU 7.1 5.8 8.1 8.6 − 2.4
United States − 0.1 0.0 − 0.1 0.0 − 0.1
Rest OECD − 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.1
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes to the baseline in 2025. This is the alternative baseline with increasing labour-
market participation rates for women. 
 
The variation within the EU is large. In Austria, Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Portugal and the 
Netherlands employment changes moderately. In Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal wages 
will even increase slightly to offset the increasing costs of capital. Because of the scarcity of 
capital in the EU, these countries will export capital. These countries’ import prices are lower, 
because other countries reduce their export prices to conquer foreign markets. Hence, the terms-
of-trade effect for these countries is positive, leading to more consumption. The employment 
changes in Italy, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are large. These changes 
exceed 15 percentage points, while the GDP changes are at least 12%. In these countries real 
wages fall and there is a negative terms-of-trade effect.  
4.2.2 Lower bound employment scenario: productivity 
It is often said that extra employment is not as productive as existing employment. According to 
this view the unemployed and people who do not participate in the labour market are on average 
less productive. If this is true we overestimate the economic effects of the employment target. 
Extra employment comes from two sources in our model. First, unemployment is reduced. In 
the previous simulation we assume that about 80% of the people who find a job is low-skilled, 
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according to Eurostat data. Second, the participation rates increase. So far we have assumed that 
the supply of skills of the extra labour force is the same as for the existing labour force. This 
means we consider 65% of the labour force as low-skilled and 35% as high-skilled.  
 
Now we modify this assumption. Taking an extreme position we assume that all extra 
employment is low-skilled. We add the effects of this assumption to the lower bound scenario. 
The results are presented in Table 4.4. We compare these results with the ones in Table 4.3 
above, where extra employment consists of a combination of low and high-skilled workers. 
Measured as a head count, the employment effect is the same in both analyses, but in efficiency 
terms the outcome is different. The GDP and consumption effects are lower and the negative 
effect on real wages is higher in 4.4. Low-skilled labour is less productive; therefore the 
increase in employment contributes less to productivity and GDP.  
The GDP effect is about 15% lower compared to Table 4.3. In that simulation about 30% of the 
extra workers are high-skilled.18 The low-skilled workers are about 40% less productive than 
the high-skilled workers. This difference in productivity explains the differences in outcomes. 
The effect per country differs slightly. The variation in economic effects is the same as in the 
previous simulations.  
 
18 This number is a weighted average of extra workers who were initially unemployed, and who did not participate at all. 20% 
of those who were unemployed are high skilled, and 35% of those who did not participate are high skilled.   
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Table 4.4 Macroeconomic effects of 70% employment target in 2025: lower bound scenario with low-skilled 
employment 
Countries GDP Consumption Exports Employment Real wages
EU 6.3 5.6 6.7 10.3 − 4.3
Germany 4.9 4.7 5.3 7.2 − 2.5
France 7.9 6.9 8.3 11.9 − 4.2
United Kingdom 2.3 2.2 3.0 3.2 − 0.9
Italy 11.8 10.2 11.3 19.6 − 7.8
Spain 8.8 7.3 9.6 12.8 − 4.5
The Netherlands 0.6 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 12.3 10.3 12.3 18.2 − 6.6
Denmark 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.2
Sweden 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.5 − 0.5
Finland 5.1 5.0 4.4 7.5 − 2.5
Ireland 4.2 3.9 4.1 6.0 − 2.0
Austria 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.1 − 0.8
Greece 10.9 8.8 9.4 15.0 − 4.5
Portugal 2.5 2.4 4.5 3.0 − 0.5
Poland 17.2 14.7 17.6 24.1 − 7.4
Czech Republic 6.4 5.7 7.3 8.7 − 2.8
Hungary 10.4 9.1 10.0 16.2 − 6.1
Slovakia 11.9 10.0 11.5 16.4 − 5.6
Slovenia 9.9 8.9 10.3 12.7 − 3.3
Rest EU 6.5 5.3 7.3 8.6 − 2.9
United States − 0.1 0.0 − 0.2 0.0 − 0.1
Rest OECD − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.1
Non OECD − 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes to the baseline in 2025.  
 
 
Table 4.4 contains the results of the full lower bound scenario for employment. Of course the 
assumption that the entire increase of employment consists of low-skilled workers is somewhat 
extreme. Nonetheless, this puts some other rather optimistic aspects of this Lisbon target in 
perspective, such as the absence of costs of policies in the scenarios or the ambition that the 
targets will be reached in 2010. Recently, DG Employment (2004) has developed scenarios for 
unemployment and labour-market participation between 2003 and 2010. They estimate that the 
overall employment rates for the EU2019 will increase from 62.9% in 2003 to 66.5% in 2010 
according to their most optimistic scenario. This suggests that the targets are not feasible in 
2010. Hence, the full economic benefits of reaching the employment target will also not be 
attainable in 2010. This does not exclude the possibility that the employment target will be met 
at a later stage. For instance the results for 2040 in Annex 2 will not change substantially, if the 
 
19 The Baltic States, Malta and Luxembourg are excluded. 
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employment target will be reached say ten years later. A comparison with Table 4.5 shows that 
the differences between 2025 and 2040 for the EU as a whole are minor. For those countries 
that face the largest effects of the employment target, the differences are slightly larger.  
4.2.3 Upper bound employment scenario 
Table 4.5 shows the macroeconomic effects of the employment target for the upper bound 
scenario. Because participation rates for women are held constant the employment rate is lower 
in the baseline of this scenario than in the baseline of the lower bound scenario. Hence, the 
employment gain of reaching the target is larger: 11.9% instead of 10.3% in the lower bound 
scenario. The GDP gain is 9.2%. The abundance of extra labour depresses labour productivity, 
so real wages are 3.4% lower on average. Exports develop more or less in line with GDP. The 
increase in consumption is slightly lower due to the negative terms-of-trade effect: the price of 
imported goods and services rises relatively to the price of exported goods and services. 
 
Table 4.5 Macroeconomic effects of 70% employment target in 2025: upper bound scenario 
Countries GDP Consumption Exports Employment Real wages
EU 9.2 8.3 9.5 11.9 − 3.4
Germany 7.2 6.8 7.5 8.6 − 1.8
France 10.6 9.5 11.0 13.2 − 3.0
United Kingdom 3.8 3.6 4.6 4.2 − 0.5
Italy 18.2 16.1 16.7 23.5 − 6.1
Spain 14.0 11.9 14.1 16.5 − 3.5
The Netherlands 2.7 2.8 3.7 3.2 − 0.4
Belgium-Luxembourg 18.2 15.9 16.3 19.6 − 3.1
Denmark 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.6 0.4
Sweden 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.1 − 0.1
Finland 6.1 6.1 5.5 7.6 − 1.6
Ireland 7.6 7.0 6.7 8.8 − 1.7
Austria 5.1 4.7 6.5 5.3 − 0.5
Greece 14.6 12.1 12.4 17.1 − 3.4
Portugal 4.8 4.4 7.3 4.5 0.2
Poland 20.0 17.4 20.1 24.4 − 5.6
Czech Republic 8.1 7.4 9.4 9.1 − 1.5
Hungary 14.6 13.0 13.5 17.8 − 4.1
Slovakia 15.2 13.1 14.7 18.4 − 4.7
Slovenia 14.5 13.2 14.0 13.0 0.2
Rest EU 8.0 6.6 9.0 9.5 − 2.5
United States − 0.2 0.1 − 0.1 0.0 − 0.1
Rest OECD − 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.1
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are relative changes to the baseline in 2025.  
 
The variation in outcomes for the member states can be completely traced back to their efforts 
to reach the target. In Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Portugal 
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employment rates are already high in the baseline. The increase in employment is thus modest 
and so are the GDP and consumption effects. In Sweden and Denmark the consumption 
increase is even slightly larger than the GDP increase, because of a positive terms-of-trade 
effect. Export prices deteriorate mildly, while import prices fall more strongly because of the 
negative wage developments in other EU countries. In some EU countries employment rises by 
15% or more. Examples are Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. 
These countries will not meet the 70% employment rate in 2010, but the employment rate will 
exceed 65%. This is a substantial increase given the current low employment rates. GDP and 
consumption increase by at least 10% in these countries. 
4.3 Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
The employment target in Europe is above all a macroeconomic goal. Higher employment 
stimulates output and value added. Labour productivity will decrease because of the abundance 
of labour and output prices will decrease, because the fall in wages exceeds the fall in 
productivity. This leads to lower export prices, which stimulates exports but also causes a 
negative terms-of-trade effect. This economic mechanism works in principle in every sector of 
the economy. The precise effects may differ because labour and trade intensities differ over 
sectors (see for the latter Table 3.2).  
 
Most of the exports take place in manufacturing. The lower wages, induced by the 
employment impulse, improve competitiveness and stimulate foreign demand. In manufacturing 
sectors exports increase by about 8% (see Table 4.6). The increase in foreign demand above the 
extra demand from inside Europe stimulates production in manufacturing. The share of 
manufacturing in total exports increases slightly. The Balassa index of specialisation increases 
by 1% point in the manufacturing sectors. The increased share of manufacturing in total exports 
implies a lower share of services in exports. This is also shown by the drop in the index of 
export specialisation, the Balassa index. 
 
Because of the increase in output, manufacturing sectors also demand extra inputs. As a 
result inputs become scarcer at the expense of the other sectors. In energy and services output 
expands less than in manufacturing. 
 
The overall sectoral results are also affected by the employment changes at the country 
level. For example, the countries which already passed the employment target have a relatively 
larger services sector than most of the new member states. In the former countries the 
employment target has a relatively larger effect on the services sectors than on the 
manufacturing sectors. Most of the new member states have relatively small services sectors 
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and large manufacturing sectors. The employment increase is substantial in those countries 
which contributes to the large employment effects in manufacturing for the EU as a whole. 
Table 4.6 Sectoral EU-wide effects of employment target in 2025: lower bound scenario with low skilled 
Sectors 
 
Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
index
Agriculture 19.1 9.8 − 8.6 8.8 1.4
Energy 10.7 5.0 − 4.5 2.0 − 3.5
Low tech manufacturing 13.5 7.9 − 5.7 7.4 0.7
Medium-low tech manufacturing 14.1 9.0 − 5.5 8.6 1.0
Medium-high tech manufacturing 12.7 7.8 − 5.3 7.2 0.1
High tech manufacturing 16.4 10.5 − 6.3 8.8 1.6
Transport services 12.1 6.9 − 5.2 4.8 − 2.1
Other commercial services 9.9 5.8 − 3.5 3.3 − 3.5
Research and development 4.8 3.6 0.3  
Other services 8.2 5.0 − 2.8 1.9 − 6.6
Total 10.3 6.8 − 3.5 6.7 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations.  
The numbers on employment, production and labour productivity are relative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. The number on 
specialisation is an absolute change in the Balassa index in 2025. 
 
4.4 Employment and policy costs 
The ‘what if’ simulations in Table 4.3 to Table 4.5 abstract from policy measures to increase 
participation and reduce unemployment. WorldScan cannot simulate the effects of policies that 
will raise employment, because participation and unemployment are exogenous (see Section 0). 
However, it is possible to get a rough idea of policies that may be used to reach the targets. 
With that purpose in mind this section estimates which reduction in income tax rates and social 
security benefits might be needed to achieve the participation and unemployment effects in the 
simulations. It is not possible to differentiate these estimates by country, because that would 
require too much country specific institutional detail. Hence, we estimate the policy inputs 
needed to reach the targets for Europe as a whole, using average elasticities taken from the 
literature.  
 
In the lower bound simulation of Table 4.4 labour supply of women increases by 5.8% and 
labour supply of men by 5.4%. The tax elasticity of labour supply can be written as: 
 
t
t
i ls ∆−−= ε1
1  
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with t the rate of income taxes and social security contributions, lε the wage elasticity of labour 
supply and ls the volume of labour supply. The unweighted average of the income tax rate 
relevant for the labour supply decision of women (second earner, 100% Average Production 
Worker) equals 33.9% for the EU countries in table 6.1 of OECD (2005, p166). A meta-
analysis of labour supply elasticities yields an elasticity of 0.5 for women and 0.1 for men 
(Evers, 2005). Hence, to obtain the participation effect for women the income tax rate has to fall 
by (1 − 0.339) x 5.8 / 0.5 = 8 %-points, which is quite substantial. The relevant income tax rate 
thus has to be reduced from 33.9% to 26%. 
 
A much larger fall in tax rates would be required to account for the labour supply increase of 
men, because the wage elasticity for men is much smaller. However, the additional labour 
supply of men largely concerns elderly men and depends more strongly on (early) retirement 
arrangements than on taxes. Because retirement schemes vary substantially across Europe we 
are not able to estimate the additional policy impulse for men.  
 
Unemployment has to fall from 9.1% to 5% to meet the unemployment target according to 
Table 4.2. The long-term or equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the tax wedge and the 
replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of social security benefits to wages (see Nickell et al., 2005). 
Econometric estimates of wage equations imply a coefficient of 0.1 for the impact of the 
income tax rate on equilibrium unemployment (10 %-points lower tax rates reduce the 
employment rate by 1 %-point). Hence the above reduction in income tax rates by 8 %-points 
will reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment rate by 0.8 %-points.  
 
The econometric estimates also imply a coefficient of 0.15 for the influence of the 
replacement ratio (10 %-points lower replacement rate reduces the employment rate by 1.5 %-
point). In addition, a very large fall in the replacement ratio of 22 %-points would be required to 
reduce the unemployment rate by another 3.3 %-points. Applying the larger 0.32 tax coefficient 
from Planas et al. (2003), the fall in the replacement rate comes down to 10 % points. 
 
In the upper bound simulation participation of women increases by 9.3% and the unemployment 
rate also falls by 4.1 %-points. Analogously to the computations above, to reach these targets 
the income tax rate has to fall by 12 %-points and the replacement rate by 2%-points to 19 %-
points, depending on the tax elasticity.20  
 
All in all, GDP and consumption will surge if the 70% employment target is met in Europe. The 
GDP gain varies from 6.3% to 9.2%, but this is no free ride. The substantial costs of reaching 
 
20 The income tax rate has to fall by (1 − 0.339) x 9.3 / 0.5 = 12 %-points, leading to a 1.2% point to 3.8% point fall in the 
unemployment rate. 
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the employment target manifest themselves in the supply of public goods and in equity or social 
cohesion. In the lower bound scenario, financing an 8% reduction in tax rates requires a 
substantial cut in the provision of public goods, for instance in the fields of infrastructure or 
defence spending. Lower replacement rates in the order of 10 to 22 %-points imply that social 
security benefits have to fall considerably relative to wages.  
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5 Human capital  
Human capital directly contributes to productivity. Education and training raise workers’ 
productivity, which manifests itself in higher wages. A range of empirical studies on differences 
in wage profiles show that an extra year of schooling yields a private rate of return of 6 to 9% 
(Harmon et al., 2003). No robust empirical evidence can be found for additional indirect effects 
of human capital, for instance due to increasing returns or complementarity with R&D (see 
Section 2.3.4).  
 
Several trends increase scarcity of human capital. One of the most important trends is skill 
biased technical change, i.e. technology that enhances the productivity and wages of high-
skilled workers (Jacobs, 2004). In addition, relocation and international trade to a limited extent 
explain increased unemployment of low-skilled workers and rising wage differentials between 
low- and high skilled workers (Euroframe-EFN, 2005, chapter 3). Ageing increases labour 
scarcity and if ageing results from declining fertility rates, the labour inflow of educated school 
leavers diminishes. Therefore, on-the-job training gains importance. Changes in work 
organisation towards flexibility, job rotation, multitasking and worker autonomy add to the 
significance of on-the-job training. As a consequence of these trends private rates of return on 
human capital investment are expected to increase, which underscores the importance of human 
capital investments.  
5.1 Human capital in Europe 
As part of the Lisbon process, the Barcelona summit of 2002 endorsed common objectives for 
education and training in Europe. The May 2003 Council agreed on five targets (European 
Commission, 2004b) to be met by 2010:  
1. The percentage of early school leavers should be at most 10% on average. 
2. At least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper 
secondary education or higher. 
3. The percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European Union 
should have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000.  
4. The European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning should be at least 
12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group). 
5. The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) in the 
European Union should increase by at least 15% while at the same time the gender 
imbalance should decrease. 
  
 
68  
 
Implementation of these targets in the WorldScan model is far from straightforward. Currently, 
WorldScan uses production functions with two skill levels, which correspond with: 
 
• Low skilled: all up to and including completed secondary education (ISC 01+2+3),  
• High skilled: tertiary education (ISC 5+6). 
 
Effects on productivity and wages result from shifts between low and high skilled labour. 
However the above targets induce no shifts between skill levels in WorldScan. Targets 1 - 3 
concern shifts within the low skilled category, target 5 concerns a shift within the high skilled 
category and target 4 may relate to both categories but will hardly induce any shifts between 
categories. The main consequence of reaching these targets is that labour efficiency of the two 
skill levels improves. Targets 1 - 3 (5) will make low (high) skilled labour more productive and 
target 4 largely generates an increase in labour efficiency all over the board.  
 
To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and training Jacobs (2005) 
developed a small, independent ‘satellite model’ to WorldScan, which incorporates various 
aspects of skill-formation needed to simulate the targets. This extension allows for three 
disaggregated skill groups at the lower education level and for two types of higher educated 
workers: non-MS&T and MS&T workers. The disaggregated skills equations are calibrated, 
based on substitution elasticities and returns to education that are found in the literature. 
Furthermore, the satellite model captures on-the-job-training and the quality of education in a 
rudimentary, but consistent, fashion. 
 
Another aspect of implementation is the time lag between formal education and the skill 
structure of the labour force. It takes many years before the skill structure of the labour force 
has adjusted to the higher educated cohorts that leave formal education. To take this into 
account Jacobs’ satellite model contains a stylised cohort model to compute the impact of 
reaching the targets in 2010 on the skill structure of the labour force in the period 2010-2040. 
This cohort model is a crude approximation to reality because it assumes that all cohorts are 
equally sized. Although the simulations of the skills model are somewhat sensitive to the 
underlying demographic assumptions, this approximation affects the baseline time-paths and 
the Lisbon time-paths for the workforce equally. As such, the demographical assumptions will 
not create a systematic bias when comparing the Lisbon simulations with those of the baseline. 
 
Implementation also has a regional dimension. European Commission (2004b) shows that 
countries differ with respect to their position vis-à-vis the targets. At the same time European 
Commission (2004b) emphasises that the targets apply to the EU as a whole and not to 
individual countries. In accordance with the other Lisbon simulations we follow the rule to 
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compute country specific targets that has also been applied in other simulations (for instance see 
section 4.2). We set an upper limit above the target and above the highest base level value 
(sometimes countries already in the base data exceed the targets). We then set the target for a 
country proportional to the distance of the base level value of that country and the upper limit.21 
In this way countries that are at the largest distance from the target have to make the largest 
effort. At the same time, because the upper limit exceeds the target, countries that have reached 
or exceeded the target are still assumed to make some (although generally small) effort. The 
only exception to this rule is the target on mathematics, science and technology graduates. 
European Commission (2004b) specifies this target as a percentage change and we uniformly 
apply that change to all countries (see section 5.1.5 for further explanation).  
 
Combining disaggregated skill categories, on-the-job training and quality of education with 
a stylised cohort model, the satellite model calculates a time path of the increase of labour 
efficiency that originates from Europe reaching the skill targets in 2010. This increase in labour 
efficiency is subsequently inserted in the WorldScan model, which computes the general 
equilibrium effects of the education and training policies.  
 
The simulations capture the most important costs of achieving the skills targets, namely the 
opportunity costs of increasing levels of education and the opportunity costs of acquiring more 
skills on the job. In particular, raising the number of better skilled workers in the population 
automatically implies that there are less low skilled workers available. Moreover, if skills 
upgrading requires more time in education, less labour time is available and earnings are lower. 
Also, increasing training efforts will imply lower labour earnings in the short run as workers 
spend less time being productive when they spent their time accumulating human capital. 
However, we ignore the direct and institutional costs associated with larger levels of investment 
in formal schooling and training. In addition, the policy costs are not taken into account of 
increasing literacy levels and of shifting the composition of graduates from non-MS&T to 
MS&E fields. Hence, in the simulations the economic costs of reaching the skill-targets are 
likely to be underestimated. 
 
Furthermore, the satellite model contains many uncertain parameters. Wherever possible, we 
have chosen the most plausible values known from the economic literature. In several instances, 
parameters are not precisely known and we have set them at rather optimistic upper-bound 
values. Therefore, one can view our simulations as a rosy picture one can paint of reaching the 
Lisbon targets on skill formation because we to a certain extent underestimate the costs and in 
some cases use optimistic parameter values. 
 
 
21 For each of the relevant skills simulations the specific equations used in this procedure can be found in section 7 of 
Jacobs (2005). 
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Before turning to the WorldScan simulations, the remainder of this section explains for each of 
the targets the way it has been implemented. It focuses on the intuition and shows for each 
target the contribution to the increase in labour efficiency over time. Technical details can be 
found in Jacobs (2005).  
5.1.1 Early school leavers 
This target has not been analysed separately. The indicator for early school leavers is the share 
of the population aged 18-24 with only lower secondary education and not in education or 
training (European Commission, 2004b, p56). Hence, preventing early school leaving implies 
that students obtain upper secondary education. However, we cannot distinguish this outcome 
from that of the second target which states that a larger percentage of students should have 
completed upper secondary education. Although from a policy perspective it might be relevant 
to separate the two targets, in terms of outcomes the effects cannot be distinguished. Therefore, 
in our simulations the upper secondary education target (discussed in the next subsection) 
encompasses this target.  
 
5.1.2 Upper secondary education 
Many regard upper secondary education as a basic qualification that is required to function well 
in the knowledge economy and knowledge society (compare European Commission 2004b). 
The Councils’ objective states that 85% of 22 year olds should have completed at least upper 
secondary education in 2010. To fit in with the demographic data of the WorldScan model we 
use a slightly different benchmark, viz. the percentage of 24-29 year olds that have completed at 
least upper secondary education. Using this age group to derive education benchmarks, we also 
take into account that some of the people of younger ages may not have completed their initial 
education, in particular in tertiary education. All in all, in the base year our benchmark hardly 
differs from that in European Commission (2004b). 
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Figure 5.1 Skill distribution of the labour force in 2001 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Austria
Belgium-Lux.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Rest EU25
ISCED 0-1  ISCED 2 ISCED 3 other ISCED 5-6 math., science, eng.  
Many new member states excel in education. They already exceed the target of 85%. Hence, to 
arrive at country specific targets we set an upper limit of 96%, which lies somewhat above the 
94.6 value of Slovakia. Next, we interpolate between the base year data and this upper limit in 
such a way that the EU reaches the target of 85% upper secondary education (see Jacobs, 2005 
for details). Having set the target, we shift graduates from the lower secondary education 
category to the upper secondary education category. In addition we make an adjustment for 
countries with relatively many low-skilled graduates in the base year data, such as Portugal (see 
Figure 5.1). In these countries we also shift some students from primary to lower secondary 
education. In the satellite model the shifts towards higher skill categories generate an increase 
in labour efficiency.  
 
Figure 5.2 presents a concise overview of the labour efficiency inputs computed from the 
Jacobs (2005) skills model. For all countries the four bars show the increase in labour efficiency 
due to skills upgrading after 10, 20 30 and 40 years, respectively. The subdivision of each bar 
represents the contribution of the four targets that have been simulated. All bars start at negative 
numbers because the lifelong learning simulation entails an ex-ante loss in efficiency when 
labour time has to be used for training activities (see section 5.1.4).  
 
The upper bars in Figure 5.2 illustrate that after 10 years the shift towards upper secondary 
education increases labour efficiency by 0.1% in the Nordic countries and the new member 
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states to 1.3% in Portugal. All countries show some further increase in subsequent decades, for 
instance in Portugal the labour efficiency contribution rises to 1.7% after 40 years. These 
dynamics originate from two effects. Firstly, the skill composition of the labour force rises 
gradually because each year a new higher educated cohort enters the labour market. Secondly, 
wages of upper secondary educated workers fall relatively to the base line to absorb the larger 
cohorts on the labour market and wages of lower secondary skilled workers rise relatively.22 By 
consequence, the returns of additional investments in upper secondary education fall over time. 
The combined effect of these two developments is that the contribution of this target to labour 
efficiency levels off in the second half of the period.  
5.1.3 Literacy  
The indicator for the literacy target follows from the OECD PISA 2000 survey (European 
Commission 2004b, p28). It is defined as the percentage of pupils with reading literacy 
proficiency level 1 and lower in the Pisa reading scale. These pupils master only the least 
complex reading tasks, such as locating a single piece of information. The Ministers of 
Education adopted the target that the percentage of low achieving 15 years olds should have 
fallen by at least 20% in 2010 compared to 2000.  
 
22 Wage effects are relatively small because low skilled workers are relatively close substitutes. The elasticity of substitution 
between the low skilled labour categories has been set at 3 (Jacobs, 2005). 
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Figure 5.2 Labour efficiency effects of four types of skills targets after 10, 20, 30 and 40 years (in percents) 
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Per country the four bars show the increase in labour efficiency due to skills upgrading after 10, 20 30 and 40 years. The subdivision of 
each bar represents the contribution of the four targets that have been simulated. All bars start at negative numbers because the lifelong 
learning simulation entails an ex-ante loss in efficiency when labour time has to be used for training activities.  
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To implement the literacy target we assume that the distribution of PISA test scores shifts 
symmetrically in such a way that the fraction of low achieving students falls from 17.2% to 
13.7% for the EU. This implies that policies not only improve reading literacy at lower levels 
but also ‘trickle upward’ to higher reading proficiency levels. By consequence, no distributional 
effects occur. This was the most convenient technical assumption available. Using estimates of 
the returns to literacy from the literature, it follows that reaching the EU target comes down to a 
1.6% increase of quality of human capital (Jacobs, 2005). 
 
Some countries (Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Sweden, UK) perform very well 
on the literacy target; other countries (Portugal, Greece) have much scope to make up for the 
difference with the high-performers. Therefore we have differentiated the 1.6% human capital 
quality increase over countries. We set a lower limit of 5% pupils with reading literacy 
proficiency level 1 and lower. This value is slightly below the 7% of the best performing 
country, Finland. Country specific targets follow from interpolation between this limit and each 
country’s current literacy rate, taking account of the fact that the weighted average of country 
targets has to equal the target for the EU as a whole. 
 
The contributions of this component to the total increase in labour efficiency depicted in 
Figure 5.2 illustrate the dialectics of progress. Countries that already perform well on literacy of 
course benefit relatively less from reaching this target. In other words, the substantial 
contribution to labour efficiency for some countries constitute just as substantial challenges for 
these countries.  
5.1.4 Lifelong learning 
Lifelong learning gains importance in economies and societies that change quickly and 
increasingly become based on knowledge. The indicator selected by the European Commission 
(2004b, p51) consists of the percentage of the population aged 25-64 who participated in 
education and training 4 weeks prior to the European Commission Labour Force Survey. For 
the EU that percentage has to increase from a current 7.9% to 12.5% in 2010. We took account 
of differences among countries by setting an upper limit of 25%, which somewhat exceeds the 
highest value of 22.9% in the United Kingdom. Again, country specific targets follow from 
interpolating between the upper limit and the country’s current rate of participation in life long 
learning in such a way that the EU target is met.  
 
More training effort has two contrasting effects. Firstly, participation in training demands 
time that without training would have been used for working. Because working time has to be 
invested up front in training, the initial labour efficiency effects are negative, which explains the 
negative starting points of the bars in Figure 5.2. Secondly, increasing training time raises the 
growth rate of on-the-job training (see Jacobs, 2005). On-the-job training directly increases the 
  75 
growth rate of the stocks of human capital across all cohorts. These positive effects from human 
capital accumulation gradually build up and after a number of years dominate the results.  
5.1.5 Mathematics, science and technology graduates 
More scientific specialists and researchers are available in Europe if more students opt for 
mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) studies. The Council has set the target that the 
number of graduates in these studies should increase by at least 15% (European Commission, 
2004b, p34) and that gender imbalance should decrease. We lack instruments to address the 
latter target. We decided to implement the 15% increase in MS&T graduates uniformly over all 
countries, mainly because the effects of this simulation are relatively small, which hardly 
warrants the effort of differentiation. 
 
For several reasons the impact of reaching this target on labour efficiency is small (see 
Figure 5.2). The decision at hand involves opting for an MS&T study instead of another tertiary 
study. Opportunity costs of this choice are an extra year of study, whereas wages of MS&T 
graduates do not strongly exceed wages of people with other types of tertiary education. On the 
labour market substitution between MS&T graduates and graduates with other tertiary 
education is less elastic than substitution of low-skilled workers, which implies that the fall in 
MS&T wages is relatively large when the target has been reached. Moreover, no 
complementarity between MS&T graduates and R&D has been assumed. No strong empirical 
evidence for this complementarity can be found and in our R&D simulations we assume that the 
additional number of R&D workers required come out of the large pool of high skilled people.23  
 
Figure 5.2 also shows the combined impact of reaching the skills targets on labour efficiency. 
Differences between countries are considerable. As stated above, the main reason that several 
countries benefit little from skills upgrading, is that the level of skills in these countries already 
is (very) high. 
5.2 Macroeconomic effects of reaching the skills targets 
Table 5.1 presents the macroeconomic effects in 2025 of reaching the skills targets. This comes 
down to 0.5% increase in labour efficiency in the EU, which in WorldScan directly translates 
into wages, GDP and consumption per capita. Country specific effects mirror the inputs 
depicted in Figure 5.2. 
 
The 2025 outcomes depend on two main components, the level of skills in a particular 
country and the relative importance of the lifelong learning target. The level of skills determines 
the overall size of the skills effect. For instance, Portugal benefits most, because the initial skill 
 
23 See also Jacobs and Webbink (2004) for an analysis of the labour market for MS&T workers in the Netherlands.  
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level is low compared to the target. It even has to pay a small price in terms of trade to expand 
in international markets. Benefits for Finland are small because it already scores well on all of 
the skills targets (see Figure 5.2). The relative importance of the lifelong learning target 
determines the initial setback due to training investment which still has a relatively high weight 
in 2025. This relevance of this effect follows from comparing Austria to the United Kingdom 
and Denmark in Figure 5.2. For Austria lifelong learning yields a major contribution. By 
consequence, the effects of the initial setback in the first 10 to 20 years outweigh the positive 
effects of training. In Denmark and the United Kingdom the initial setback is smaller and the 
other targets add to relatively larger effects in 2025. Comparable differences exist between 
other countries, such as Sweden or the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. 
Table 5.1 Effects of skill upgrading in the EU-25 in 2025 
Countries 
Labour productivity 
shock Real average wage
Gross domestic 
product
Terms-of-trade 
 
Consumption per 
capita
Europe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4
Germany 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4
France 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 0.6 − 0.1 0.6
Italy 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4
Spain 0.7 0.6 0.7 − 0.1 0.6
The Netherlands 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5
Denmark 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.5
Sweden 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3
Finland 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Ireland 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
Austria 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
Greece 0.8 0.8 0.8 − 0.1 0.7
Portugal 2.3 2.2 2.4 − 0.3 1.9
Poland 0.5 0.4 0.5 − 0.1 0.4
Czech Republic 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2
Hungary 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3
Slovakia 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3
Slovenia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
Rest EU 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations, Cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
On the longer run the positive effects of lifelong learning dominate. Figure 5.3 presents the 
initial (negative) GDP effect in 2011, and GDP effects in 2025 and 2040 (taken from 
annex).The negative GDP effects of the schooling time investment in 2011 are depicted at the 
left side of the horizontal bars. The figure shows that in 2025 the negative effects from the time 
investment are more than offset. In 2040 the GDP gains are much larger than in 2025, because 
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it takes several decades before the skills targets have affected the human capital of all age 
cohorts of the labour force.  
 
In 2040 clearly the ‘level of skills’ effects dominate. Portugal and Greece are on top. 
Relatively large effects in the new member states mainly originate from the literacy and the 
lifelong learning target (compare Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). In 2040 the difference between 
Austria and Demark is small and Austria outperforms the United Kingdom. The GDP effects in 
the Czech Republic even exceed those in both Denmark and the United Kingdom. All together, 
GDP in Europe rises by 1.7% in 2040 if Europe reaches the skills targets in 2010. This 2040 
GDP effect is more than three times the effect in 2025, which illustrates the long lags involved 
in the process of skill upgrading. 
Figure 5.3 Cumulative effects on GDP over 2011-2025 and 2026-2040 due to Europe reaching the skills targets 
in 2010 
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Source: WorldScan simulations, cumulated differences in % compared to the baseline. 
 
5.3 Sectors and skills 
Skill upgrading benefits labour intensive and skill intensive sectors. Table 5.2 shows some 
shifts in the sectoral structure towards the R&D sector and the medium-high tech manufacturing 
sector. The R&D sector is most affected because it is very skilled labour intensive. Due to the 
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tradability of high and medium-high tech manufacturing it is easier for these sectors to sell extra 
production than it is for other sectors Yet, because skill upgrading takes place all over the 
labour force, sectoral shifts are not very pronounced.  
Table 5.2 Sectoral EU-wide effects of skill upgrading in 2025 
Sectors 
Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
Agriculture 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.0
Energy 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 − 0.3
Low tech manufacturing 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.0
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.0
Medium-high tech manufacturing 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.0
High tech manufacturing 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1
Transport services 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 − 0.2
Other commercial services 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 − 0.2
Research and development 0.5 1.1 0.5  
Other services − 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 − 0.1
Total 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Source: WorldScan simulations.  
The numbers on employment, production and labour productivity are relative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. The numbers on 
specialisation are an absolute change in the Balassa index in 2025. 
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6 Research and development 
Research and Development (R&D) is a key factor for technological changes, and consequently 
for economic growth. New technologies can boost productivity and raise incomes. Amounting 
to 2% of GDP in 2003, public and private R&D expenditures are lagging behind in Europe 
compared to the United States (2.8%) and the rest of the OECD (3.1%). The European Council 
agreed to raise these expenditures to 3% of GDP in 2010. 
 
 This chapter analyses the effects of reaching this target. It does not assess the probability of 
reaching this target, nor the effectiveness of this Lisbon goal. Increasing R&D expenditures 
from 2% to 3% of GDP is a 50% increase in R&D expenditures in less than a decade. At least 
for three reasons that will not be easy: to perform R&D firms need money, R&D scientists and 
good ideas. Increasing R&D expenditure takes a considerable amount of finance. R&D for a 
large extent consists of input by researchers. Sheenan and Wyckoff (2003) have estimated that 
to reach the R&D targets the EU15 needs 30% to 60% extra researchers. Although a large pool 
of high skilled people may be available (compare section 5.1.5), it takes time to train them or to 
educate them. Moreover, firms and the government have the tendency to exploit the most 
profitable R&D projects first. The extra projects financed by the increase in R&D expenditure 
are probably less effective in raising productivity. 
 
These caveats imply that the simulations have a strong ‘what if’ character. Although we use 
a government subsidy as an instrument to reach the 3% target, it underestimates the costs of 
reaching the target. Moreover, studies that estimate the impact of R&D on productivity 
probably overestimate the gains when applied to such large (out of sample) boosts in R&D 
expenditures as agreed upon in the Lisbon agenda. Therefore in a lower and an upper bound 
scenario we present a bandwidth of outcomes resulting from reaching the R&D target. 
 
R&D expenditures and in particular R&D decisions are not commonly modelled in AGE 
models. Section 6.1 is devoted to this issue. It discusses the R&D decision of firms, R&D 
spillovers in the economy and the data. Section 6.2 presents the design of the simulation and the 
macroeconomic outcomes. The sectoral outcomes are discussed in Section 6.3, and Section 6.4 
presents some sensitivity analysis. The last section concludes. 
6.1 R&D in Europe 
New technologies and better products boost productivity, not only in the innovating sector 
itself, but across all sectors. Since the influential paper by Coe and Helpman (1995) it is well 
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established that investment in R&D generates international spillovers: R&D in one country has 
an external effect on productivity in the country itself as well as for its trading partners.24  
 
Sectoral and international spillovers prove to be important for analysing the economic 
effects of R&D expenditures and policies. Recently, some researchers have introduced these 
spillovers in CGE models.25 However, in all these models the R&D decision is not based on 
optimisation behaviour of firms. In constrast, we have incorporated the R&D decision of firms 
in our model based on profit maximisation. We introduce this issue in Section 6.1.1. The 
following section discusses the data issues involved with the modelling of R&D in CGE 
models. Subsequently, Section 6.1.3 reviews our modelling of R&D spillovers and the 
underlying empirics, based on Lejour and Nahuis (2005), and Lejour and Tang (2005). 
6.1.1 The R&D decision 
Each period firms decide on their optimal R&D stock. Just as labour and capital, R&D 
generates value added for the firm. The R&D stock is treated as a capital stock. A firm invests 
each period in R&D and these investments contribute to the R&D stock, which also depreciates 
over time. Hence, R&D expenditures in period t, I, equal the R&D stock in period t, V, minus 
the stock in period t-1, corrected for depreciation: 
 
                                (1) 
 
The optimal R&D stock is derived from cost minimisation, which implies that the marginal 
product of the R&D stock equals the user costs of R&D. User costs, pV , equal the investment 
price for R&D, pRD , times the sum of the return on R&D, a risk premium, o, and the 
depreciation rate. We assume that the return on R&D is equal to the return on capital, the real 
interest rate, r.  
)( δο ++= rpp RDV  (2) 
Note that this expression is similar to the user costs of capital. Yet the values of the two 
variables may differ, because the risk premia and depreciation rates may differ. pvV is equal to 
the contribution of R&D to value added. We assume that the value added nest in the production 
 
24 Since then many researchers have studied R&D and R&D spillovers we do not replicate the literature here. For some 
recent overviews we refer to Jacobs et al. (2002) and Keller (2004).  
25 Examples are Diao et al. (1999), and Lejour and Nahuis (2005). Bayoumi et al. (1999) have incorporated R&D in the 
macroeconometric model of the IMF Multimod. Recently, Brécard et al. (2004) have modelled R&D in their sectoral 
econometric model Némésis. 
1)1( −−−= ttt VVI δ
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function is a CES construct of the R&D stock and the CES nesting of capital and labour, see  
Figure 3.1. The substitution elasticity between R&D and the capital-labour nest is 0.9.26  
 
R&D is produced by the R&D sector. This is a separate sector in the model. Its production 
structure is based on the input structure of the R&D sector in the US. This is one of the few 
countries that explicitly distinguishes a R&D sector in its national accounts. The main input of 
R&D is high-skilled labour. The R&D sector only produces for domestic firms, we neglect 
international trade in R&D.  
 
We are fully aware of the simplifications we have made in modelling R&D. We model one 
representative R&D sector while in practice R&D is performed by business enterprises, higher 
education and government research institutes. The inputs in these three sectors to produce R&D 
will differ, just as their productivity. Other publications, such as DG E&I (2004), analyse the 
differences between these sectors. WorldScan is not suited to deal with these differences. Yet, 
these simplifications fit in our general analysis of the main economic effects of five Lisbon 
goals. It is our purpose to present a broad overview of these effects, and not to conduct an in 
depth investigation of each specific Lisbon goal. 
6.1.2 Data issues 
We calibrate WorldScan on the GTAP database which separates many sectors, but no R&D 
sector: R&D forms a part of the other business sector. In addition national accounts often 
consider R&D as expenditures for intermediate goods. R&D is not seen as an investment, as 
most economists do, and does not contribute to value added. We do not wish to inflate value 
added by R&D income. Therefore we subtract R&D income from capital and labour income in 
the calibration year, so that we calibrate the total of R&D, capital and labour income on valued 
added in the GTAP database.  
 
The output of the R&D sector equals the R&D expenditures of firms in an economy. We 
subtract this output and the corresponding inputs from the GTAP data of the other business 
services sector in order to stay as close to the database as possible. The R&D depreciation rate 
is set at 11%, following Carson et al. (1994). An alternative would be a depreciation rate of 
15%, which according to Griliches (2000) is the number most often used. However, the 
empirical base is weak.27 
 
26 There are not many applied models which have incorporated the R&D stock, nor are there good estimates of the 
substitution between R&D and other inputs. Some examples are Den Butter and Wollmer (1996), and Van Bergeijk et al. 
(1997). Both papers assume complementarity between R&D and physical capital. However, the latter assumes substitution 
between R&D and human capital.  
27 We have done a sensitivity analyses with a depreciation rate of 15%. On average for the EU the effects of the policy 
variant are about 8% lower.  
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In 2003, the EU countries spent on average nearly 2% of their GDP on R&D.28 Table 6.1 
shows that the variation within the EU is large. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, 
France and Austria spend more than 2% in 2003, with the Scandinavian countries as the biggest 
R&D spenders. The new EU member states and the southern ones spend much less on R&D. 
These countries have some distance to meet the 3% Lisbon target on R&D. The current EU 
average is also far below R&D spending in the United States and the Rest of the OECD.  
Table 6.1 National R&D expenditures in 2003 
Country R&D expenditures          Country R&D expenditures 
EU 1.96          Austria 2.19 
Germany 2.50          Greece 0.64 
France 2.19          Portugal 0.80 
United Kingdom 1.87          Poland 0.59 
Italy 1.12          Czech Republic 1.35 
Spain 1.11          Hungary 1.02 
The Netherlands 1.89          Slovakia 0.58 
Belgium-Luxembourg 2.33          Slovenia 1.53 
Denmark 2.60          Rest EU 0.67 
Sweden 4.30          United States 2.80 
Finland 3.51          Rest OECD 3.12 
Ireland 1.09          Non OECD 0.76 
Source: Eurostat Cronos database. R&D expenditures are expressed as percentage of GDP. If 2003 data were not available, we have used 2002 or 
2001 data. 
 
The sectoral variation in R&D is also large. Keller (2002) shows that most of the R&D takes 
place within manufacturing (more than 80%), in particular in machinery and equipment and 
chemicals. Table 6.2 shows that 60% of all R&D expenditures in the EU takes place in 
medium-high technology manufacturing. This sector consists of machinery and equipment, 
excluding electronic equipment, and chemicals, rubber and plastics. High technology 
manufacturing, consisting of electronic equipment, is responsible for about 21% of all R&D 
expenditures. As a share of value added, this is the most R&D-intensive sector. R&D is also 
relatively intense in medium-high technology manufacturing. In the sector energy and medium-
low technology manufacturing the R&D intensity is about the macro average, while it is 
substantially lower in services.  
 
Over time it becomes more difficult to maintain the Lisbon target of 3% R&D spending. In the 
WorldScan baseline the overall R&D intensity in the EU falls from 2% in 2003 to 1.1% in 2040 
for three reasons. Firstly, the EU economy shifts towards a services economy between now and 
2040. This restructuring explains about half of the decline. Services sectors are less R&D 
intensive than manufacturing. The shares of high technology and medium-high technology 
 
28 We do not discriminate according to the source of finance. We refer to DG E&I (2004) for these numbers. 
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manufacturing in the economy are more or less halved (compare Table 3.3 and Table 3.2), 
thereby reducing the demand for R&D substantially. 
 
A second reason concerns the aggregation over EU member states. The new member states 
grow faster than the older ones. Because their R&D intensities are lower, the sectoral R&D 
intensity in the EU will fall over time even if the R&D intensities of the individual countries 
remain constant. 
Table 6.2 R&D expenditures in the EU per sector, 2003 
Sector 
R&D intensity (% of sectoral 
value added) 
Share of total R&D 
expenditures 
Agriculture 0.9 1.1 
Energy 1.8 1.8 
Low tech manufacturing 0.7 2.7 
Medium-low tech manufacturing 1.9 3.5 
Medium-high tech manufacturing 12.9 60.0 
High tech manufacturing 21.1 21.3 
Transport services 0.2 0.5 
Other commercial services 0.3 5.9 
Other services 0.3 3.2 
R&D 0.0 0.0 
Total 2.0 166.5 (billion) 
Sources: Eurostat Cronos database, and OECD ANBERD database 
 
Thirdly, the user costs of R&D rise over time due to a moderate increase of the interest rate in 
the base simulation, while the investment price of R&D remains nearly constant (compare 
equation (2) above). As a result, the volume of R&D investment falls because of substitution 
from R&D towards labour in production. Therefore, the R&D expenditure share (investment 
price times R&D volume divided by the value of GDP) declines, while the value added share 
(user costs times R&D investment volume divided by the value of value added) remains more 
or less constant. Quantitatively, the R&D intensity in high technology manufacturing decreases 
from 21.1% in 2003 to 17% in 2040 in our baseline and in medium-high technology from 
12.9% to 11%. This third effect is smaller for a lower elasticity of substitution between R&D on 
the one hand and capital and labour on the other hand.  
 
All in all, to a large extent the fall of the R&D rate over time is due to the restructuring of the 
economy towards R&D extensive sectors and towards the more important role of R&D-
extensive member states in the EU economy.  
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6.1.3 R&D spillovers 
Based on the innovative ideas of Coe and Helpman (1995) we incorporate an empirical relation 
between total factor productivity (TFP) growth and the growth of R&D stocks in the model. We 
distinguish three types of R&D stocks: the R&D stocks of the own sector, of other sectors in the 
economy to reflect domestic spillovers, and of foreign sectors to reflect international spillovers.  
 
We model the received spillovers from other domestic sectors analogously to Jacobs et al. 
(2002). The growth rate of the spillover stock (S) in sector j depends on the growth rate of the 
R&D stocks (V) in the other sectors weighted by the intermediate deliveries of these sectors to 
sector j:  
 
                        (3) 
 
Where a single dot above V represents the growth rate and Dijw  represents the share of domestic 
intermediate deliveries of sector i in production of sector j. Thus S is a weighted aggregate of 
various growth rates. S grows less fast than the R&D stocks because the weights do not add up 
to 1. Sector j not only receives spillovers from other sectors in its own country, but also from 
sectors abroad:  
 
∑∑
≠
=
kl i
il
F
ijlk
F
jk VwnS &&                        (4) 
The variable n represents the share of country l in total import of country k and wijF represents 
the share of intermediate deliveries of sector i from other countries in the production of sector j. 
 
The empirical relation between TFP growth and the R&D stocks is based on data of 14 OECD 
countries and 12 sectors for the period 1980 to 1999.29 The data are from the ANBERD 
database of the OECD for the R&D expenditures, and from the STAN data base of the OECD 
to construct total factor productivity (TFP) growth and value added. The growth of TFP is 
related to the growth of the own sectoral spillovers, the domestic R&D spillovers from other 
sectors and the foreign R&D spillovers. The estimated equation reads: 
 
             (5) 
 
 
 
29The 14 countries are Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.  
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Dr and Dt   are country and time dummies, and ε is the disturbance term. Table 6.3 presents the 
estimation results. We have estimated with dynamic OLS,30 because the OLS estimates can be 
biased due to the non-stationarity of the time series. As is usual for these estimates we introduce 
two lags and one lead of the differences of the explanatory variables in the equation.  
Table 6.3 R&D spillovers on TFP growth 
Coefficient Parameter estimate Standard error Elasticity (%)
    
Own sector R&D spillover 0.049** 0.022 4.9
Domestic sectoral R&D spillover 0.325*** 0.107 7.4
Foreign R&D spillover 0.868*** 0.233 5.6
Total elasticity   18.0
R2 is 0.183. The number of observations is 2250. The equation is estimated with dynamic OLS using two leads and one lead. **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. Country and time dummies are included but not presented. Data sources are OECD (2003), 
ANBERD and STAN database. Lejour and Tang (2005) provide more details. Note that we do not use the own sector R&D spillover in 
WorldScan because this effect is already captured by the R&D stock as production factor.  
 
The elasticity for the own sectoral R&D spillovers is low compared to other studies. In his 
overview of the estimates of the own R&D elasticity Nadiri (1993) concludes that these are in 
the range of 6% to 42%. Our domestic spillover elasticity equals 7.4% (the weighted average of 
the share of own intermediate deliveries is 0.226 times the parameter estimate).Our result is 
comparable to Verspagen (1997) who reports elasticities for the domestic spillovers of 2% to 
9%. This is relatively low compared to Jacobs et al. (2002) and Keller (1997) who find 
elasticities of about 15%, and Nadiri’s overview reports spillover elasticities between 10% and 
26%. The foreign spillover elasticity is 5.6% (the weighted average of the share of foreign 
intermediate deliveries is 0.065). This is comparable to the results of Coe and Helpman (1995). 
They find an elasticity of TFP to foreign R&D of 6-9%. Jacobs et al. (2002) report an elasticity 
of 12.9%, but that is only valid for the manufacturing sector. For the total economy it is 
probably much lower. 
 
As a result our total elasticity is about 18%. So a 1 percent change in the global R&D stock 
leads to a 0.18 percent increase in total factor productivity. The return on R&D is much higher: 
every euro spent on R&D world-wide instead of on GDP leads to nearly 0.9 euro extra GDP. 
This is a rate of return of about 90%.31 This is close to the upper range of the social rate of 
return on R&D found by other researchers. Canton et al. (2005) conclude that these estimates 
typically are in the range of 30% to 100%. Jones and Williams (1998) claim that these estimates 
are conservative because they do not take account of the full dynamic effects of R&D. Griffith 
 
30 see Funk (2001), and Kao et al. (1999). 
31 The return can easily be calculated from the elasticity, assuming that the effects on TFP and GDP are the same. 
Multiplying the elasticity by the GDP level and dividing it by the R&D stock one arrives a the return of R&D. 
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et al. (2000) estimate for most OECD countries social rates of return on R&D of about 50% or 
higher.32 
 
These estimations express the impact of a marginal increase in R&D. The 50% increase to meet 
the Lisbon target is not a marginal increase at all. Hence, we may doubt whether the extra R&D 
is as productive as current R&D. The estimated social return on R&D is in the top range of the 
results in the literature and the most interesting R&D projects may already have been 
conducted. Therefore we consider the estimated elasticities and the calculated returns on R&D 
as an upper bound. In the policy analysis below we start with an analysis with lower 
coefficients for the national and international R&D spillovers. These coefficients are about 25% 
of the estimates in Table 6.3. As a result, the social rate of return on R&D is 30%, the lower 
bound of the estimates in the literature. Subsequently we present the upper bound simulations 
with the estimated coefficients from Table 6.3.  
6.2 Macroeconomic effects of reaching the R&D targets 
This section describes the macroeconomic effects of two simulations to arrive at the 3% target 
of R&D expenditures as a share of GDP in 2010. These two simulations nearly cover the full 
range of estimated social returns to R&D of 30% to 100%. The Lisbon target includes private 
and public R&D spending. We assume that the targets are achieved in 2010. We do not claim 
that this assumption is realistic. In particular in the new member states, the R&D expenditures 
are less than 1% percent. It is very difficult to increase these expenditures substantially within a 
few years and to attract or train sufficient researchers in such a relatively short period of time. 
The simulations have thus to be interpreted as ‘what if’ analyses.  
 
We take account of some of the policy costs of achieving the R&D target by using a national 
R&D subsidy.33 This probably underestimates the costs for two reasons. First, we assume that 
the subsidy is spent effectively leading to more R&D expenditures. The literature suggests this 
is not the case, a part of the subsidies carry a deadweight loss. Second, the subsidy is paid by a 
lump-sum transfer from the domestic households. In practice, most taxes are proportional such 
as the income tax, so we abstract from the excess-burden of proportional taxes. 
 
32 Note that the estimates are based on a growth equation in which R&D only affects TFP. The R&D stock is no separate 
input in production as it in WorldScan. In WorldScan the own R&D stock already delivers a return on its investment. 
Therefore we assume that the spillover effect of own sectoral R&D on TFP growth is zero. The elasticity of R&D on TFP is 
still about 18%, because for most countries and sectors the elasticity on private R&D in the model is 4% to 5%. 
33 We introduce a country-specific subsidy, because the R&D target differs for each country. These targets have to be 
agreed upon jointly by the member states in order to achieve the 3% target. The choice for the subsidy and targets is a 
convenient one for our purposes here. In practice direct government support of R&D often takes the form of tax incentives or 
grants. Grants are often aimed at specific R&D projects while tax incentives have a more general nature, see DG E&I 
(2004). The effectiveness of both instruments differs. We do not want to make a choice between these two instruments here. 
We have chosen for a subsidy for the sake of modelling and the generality of our modelling approach.  
  87 
The simulation is designed by: 
• Covering proportionally the gap between current R&D spending and an artificial target by 
increasing R&D expenditure between 2005 and 2010. The artificial target is set at 4.5%. 
For each country the gap between current spending and the limit of 4.5% is proportionally 
decreased, in such a way that the 3% level for the EU is reached in 2010. Countries with 
initially less spending on R&D have to increase their R&D effort substantially, while 
countries with initially high R&D spending face less ambitious targets. Their R&D 
spending will exceed the target of 3%. We assume that the member states want to maintain 
the 2010 target between 2010 and 2020. 
• Introducing a country-specific subsidy to reduce the investment price for R&D. For every 
year until 2020 the subsidy is optimised, such that the target is met. From 2020 onwards we 
assume that this subsidy rate remains constant. 
• Increasing R&D spending in all sectors proportionally: the subsidy is not sector-specific. 
• Reducing disposable income of domestic consumers by a lump-sum transfer equal to the 
R&D subsidy. 
• Reducing our empirical estimates of the R&D spillovers such that the social return on R&D 
is about 30% in the lower bound scenario. In the upper bound scenario the estimates are 
used implying that the social rate of return is about 90%. In this way we cover the full 
range of return on R&D found in the literature.  
• Assuming a lower elasticity of substitution between the R&D stock and the capital-labour 
nest in production equal to 0.5 in our sensitivity analysis. Empirical estimates of the 
elasticity of substitution are lacking. In most theoretical models, an elasticity of 1 is 
assumed. Most economists think that R&D and capital are complementary, which implies a 
low elasticity. We handle this uncertainty by simulating a variant of the lower bound 
scenario with a lower elasticity of substitution. The results are reported in Section 6.4.  
 
The design of the simulations has some implications for the economic effects of reaching the 
target. Between 2005 and 2010 R&D spending in the EU increases by more than 50%. The 
R&D stocks will not increase proportionally because 3% spending only takes place in 2010 and 
the deprecation rate of R&D is considered to be 11%. One would need at least 9 years of 3% 
spending to increase the R&D stocks by about 50% and therefore we assume that the 
governments stick to the 3% target between 2011 and 2020. After that we assume that the 
subsidy rate is constant,34 however this assumption is not sufficient to hold on to the 3% target. 
After 2020, even with a constant subsidy rate, R&D investment (and thus spending) will return 
to a level of replacement investment that belongs to the R&D stock. That level will be much 
higher than in the baseline because the R&D stock is higher now, but less than 3% of GDP.  
 
34 In principle it is also possible to assume that the 3% target has to be reached after 2020. However, as explained above it 
becomes more and more difficult to reach the target due to the restructuring towards R&D extensive sectors.  
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6.2.1 Lower bound R&D scenario 
Table 6.4 presents the macroeconomic effects of the scenario where the R&D spillovers are 
modest. The R&D stock in the EU is increased by about 66%, causing a GDP gain of about 
3.2%,35 which corresponds by and large to a R&D elasticity of 5%. The social rate of return is 
about 30% for the EU as a whole. The increase in productivity leads to lower producer and 
export prices. This causes a negative terms-of-trade effect. Consumption will increase about 2% 
less than GDP and exports will increase more than GDP. 
Table 6.4 Macroeconomic effect of 3% R&D target in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Country GDP Consumption Exports Real wages R&D stock 
EU 3.2 1.2 5.9 3.1 66.1 
Germany 2.9 1.0 5.4 2.6 44.5 
France 2.9 1.0 5.7 3.0 58.7 
United Kingdom 2.7 0.8 5.9 2.5 63.2 
Italy 4.0 1.3 6.8 3.9 158.6 
Spain 4.2 1.6 8.0 4.1 165.8 
The Netherlands 3.4 1.2 5.6 3.0 79.2 
Belgium-Luxembourg 3.4 1.4 5.8 2.9 51.8 
Denmark 2.2 0.8 4.0 2.2 32.1 
Sweden 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.8 − 2.5 
Finland 1.9 0.8 5.0 1.7 19.9 
Ireland 4.3 1.2 6.3 3.4 149.7 
Austria 3.3 1.3 6.2 3.2 52.8 
Greece 3.8 1.7 4.1 4.7 239.1 
Portugal 4.2 1.9 7.1 4.5 166.7 
Poland 4.7 2.1 7.0 4.8 249.5 
Czech Republic 4.7 2.3 6.9 4.9 113.2 
Hungary 5.2 2.3 7.3 5.0 190.2 
Slovakia 7.0 4.2 7.9 6.9 219.9 
Slovenia 4.6 2.3 6.9 4.1 71.8 
Rest EU 5.7 2.6 8.8 5.4 302.3 
United States − 0.1 0.1 − 0.6 0.0 − 1.0 
Rest OECD 0.0 0.1 − 0.2 0.1 − 1.5 
Non OECD 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 − 1.4 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
The country effects depend to a large extent on the distance between 3% and their current levels 
of R&D spending, see Table 6.1. For the Scandinavian countries the GDP effects are the 
smallest because they have already reached the 3% level (except Denmark). Productivity in 
Sweden increases slightly because it benefits from the spillovers of higher R&D stocks in other 
countries.36 Note that this country has high import ratios, so international spillovers are 
relatively large. For Germany and France the effects are relatively small. Although they have to 
increase their R&D spending, the gap to the target is not as large as for other countries. 
 
35 The annex presents the long-term results in 2040. These effects are slightly larger than the ones presented in Table 6.4 
for the year 2025. 
36 Because employment is exogenous, the GDP effects equal the productivity effects. 
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For other large countries, such as Italy and Spain, the effects are much larger. Their R&D 
stocks increase by about 160%, leading to GDP gains of about 4%. For most new member states 
and Greece the effects are even larger. GDP and exports gains are 5% or higher in these 
countries. Their R&D stocks double at least. The regions outside the EU benefit slightly from 
Europe’s productivity increases. Due to lower import prices, these regions improve their terms-
of-trade and consumption rises somewhat. 
 
In 2020, the EU spends 152 billion US dollars on R&D subsidies to reach the target, see Table 
6.5. This is an extra R&D subsidy above all existing R&D subsidies and tax breaks. The 
subsidy is about a percent of the Union’s GDP.37 In Germany, France and the UK the subsidy 
rate is in the same order of magnitude. For Italy and Spain it is much higher. These countries 
need a subsidy rate of 64% to stimulate their R&D activities. For countries like Greece, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Rest EU the R&D subsidy is even 2% of GDP.  
Table 6.5 R&D subsidy in 2020: lower bound scenario 
Country 
Subsidy 
rate 
 
Subsidy 
(billion US$) 
 
R&D stock 
(%) 
 
R&D price 
(%) 
 
R&D investment 
volume (%) 
 
Private R&D 
expenditure  
(billion US$)a 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EU  152.3 66   21.3 
Germany 0.33 26.5 43.2 2.4 63.2 5.5 
France 0.39 21.8 56.9 2.5 83.4 4.5 
United Kingdom 0.40 27.0 62.4 2.2 79.8 3.5 
Italy 0.64 23.1 155.4 2.8 221.1 2.1 
Spain 0.64 15.4 164.3 2.4 214.8 1.1 
The Netherlands 0.45 7.0 78.5 2.4 114.5 1.4 
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.33 3.9 50.4 2.3 68.4 1.0 
Denmark 0.24 2.1 31.4 1.7 40.5 0.5 
Sweden 0.00 0.0 -2.9 0.3 − 3.2 − 0.4 
Finland 0.15 1.1 19.2 1.8 27.1 0.7 
Ireland 0.63 2.5 147.9 1.8 188.8 0.1 
Austria 0.35 3.1 51.9 2.3 71.1 0.7 
Greece 0.72 3.3 236.2 2.0 282.0 0.1 
Portugal 0.66 2.8 164.9 2.1 211.6 0.1 
Poland 0.75 6.7 247.4 1.9 319.6 0.2 
Czech Republic 0.56 1.7 112.0 2.7 140.9 0.1 
Hungary 0.69 1.7 188.7 2.2 244.8 0.1 
Slovakia 0.72 0.5 217.8 2.7 218.2 0.0 
Slovenia 0.45 0.5 71.4 2.4 90.0 0.0 
Rest EU 0.77 1.5 302.7 2.0 372.7 0.0 
aThis is extra private R&D expenditure above the subsidy. The total extra private R&D expenditures are 175 billion US$ for the EU.  
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
 
37 The subsidy in terms of GDP is more or less equal to the subsidy rate times the 3% target. 
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The subsidy rate has hardly any impact on the price of R&D investment. This effect is 
sometimes disputed in the literature. Critics of R&D subsidies argue that it will raise the price 
for R&D researchers, and thereby increase the before-tax price of R&D investment. We do not 
distinguish R&D researchers from other high-skilled workers (compare section 5.1.5) and 
wages are determined nationally and not per sector. These assumptions reduce the price 
increase of R&D investment, and eliminate the possible effect of crowding out of private R&D 
expenditures due to a price increase induced by the subsidy.38  
 
Hence, the R&D subsidy has mainly a volume effect on R&D investment. The increase in 
investment is fully determined by the subsidy rate. In Poland, and the Rest EU the subsidy rate 
is 75% leading to an increase in investment of about 300% or even higher in 2020. In the UK 
the subsidy is 40%, leading to an 80% increase in R&D investment. 
 
The volume changes of the R&D stocks are smaller. This is due to the fact that the increase in 
R&D investment accelerates over time. It becomes harder to meet the 3% R&D expenditures 
target, due to the structural move towards R&D extensive sectors. In response the national 
governments increase the R&D subsidy between 2010 and 2020, and investment accelerates. It 
takes time to build up the R&D stock and therefore the proportional increase in the stocks 
always lags that in investment.39 
 
The last column in Table 6.5 shows that the R&D subsidy also leads to extra private R&D 
expenditures. The gap between the expenditure target and R&D expenditure in the baseline is 
not fully covered by public expenditures, that is to say the subsidy. However, the extra private 
expenditures are relatively small: in 2020 it amounts to about 21 billion US$ for the EU as a 
whole which is about 15% of the extra public expenditures. So in the short term the R&D 
subsidy has a positive leverage effect on private R&D expenditures. 
 
In the long term this leverage effect vanishes, however. The increase in private R&D 
expenditures compared to the baseline is fully covered by public spending. The amount of 
subsidies thus leads to a same amount of extra private R&D spending. This corresponds more or 
less to the conclusion of Hall and van Reenen (2000). Although the evidence is mixed, and the 
methodologies to analyse the impact of R&D policy are questioned, they claim that on average 
one extra dollar tax credit on R&D (or subsidy) leads to one extra dollar R&D.  
 
38 See e.g. Guellec et al. (2003), Hall and van Reenen (2000), and David et al. (2000). 
39 After 2020, the subsidy rate is constant. Then the volume increase in investment will return to that of replacement 
investment, belonging to the increased R&D stock. This will take about 10 years. Subsequently the volume increases in 
investment and the stock are similar. 
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6.2.2 Upper bound R&D scenario  
Table 6.6 presents the effects of the 3% R&D target if the return on R&D is much higher. Here 
we use the estimated coefficients for the R&D spillovers on total factor productivity in the 
model instead of the much lower coefficients in lower bound scenario. R&D spending in all EU 
countries is increased in such a way that the gap between current spending and maximal 
spending of 4.5% is reduced proportionally.  
Table 6.6 Macroeconomic effects of 3% R&D target in 2025: upper bound scenario 
GDP Consumption Exports Real wages R&D stock
EU 10.1 7.0 16.0 9.5 74.1
Germany 8.5 6.0 13.1 8.0 49.8
France 8.9 6.4 14.2 9.0 65.0
United Kingdom 7.3 4.7 12.9 6.9 69.6
Italy 12.7 8.4 18.9 12.0 177.0
Spain 14.3 9.7 22.9 13.6 187.0
The Netherlands 9.2 6.3 13.3 8.6 87.7
Belgium-Luxembourg 11.0 7.1 17.3 9.2 59.4
Denmark 6.8 4.9 10.4 6.5 36.6
Sweden 3.5 3.5 5.6 3.5 − 1.7
Finland 5.4 4.1 11.0 5.1 22.4
Ireland 15.7 9.7 20.9 12.5 167.2
Austria 9.9 6.8 16.0 9.5 59.4
Greece 14.6 10.4 16.1 15.0 274.0
Portugal 15.9 11.2 23.6 15.7 190.8
Poland 18.4 13.4 24.4 17.4 288.4
Czech Republic 17.3 12.9 22.7 16.8 129.3
Hungary 20.8 14.7 26.6 19.1 218.5
Slovakia 29.2 21.9 31.4 26.8 257.3
Slovenia 16.8 12.5 22.7 15.1 83.5
Rest EU 22.1 14.8 28.9 19.6 350.3
United States 0.0 0.3 − 0.2 0.2 − 1.7
Rest OECD 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 − 2.5
Non OECD 1.0 1.3 2.3 1.2 − 1.4
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
The increase in R&D for the EU is on average slightly larger now: 75% instead of 66% in Table 
6.4. The GDP effects are much higher. The social rate of return is now about 90%. This leads to 
a GDP effect of about 10% in 2025 and consumption increases by 7%. The negative terms-of-
trade effects limit the extra consumption possibilities induced by extra income. The variation 
between the member states is the same as in Table 6.4, but the variation is more pronounced. In 
Poland and the Rest EU R&D stocks increase by more than 300%. GDP effects for these 
countries are incredibly high: 20% or even more. These GDP gains will not be realised, because 
the expansion of the R&D stocks is far from realistic between now and 2020. 
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6.3 Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
Increases in R&D spending and R&D stocks do not have a neutral effect on the various sectors 
in the economy. First of all the stimulus of R&D benefits the R&D sector. Demand for its 
output rises substantially; on average R&D production increases by 68% in the EU (see Table 
6.7). Labour productivity in the R&D sector hardly increases, because we assume that the R&D 
sector itself does not use R&D as input.  
 
Employment in R&D increases by 75%. This is about the upper range of the OECD estimates 
by Sheehan and Wyckoff (2003). They estimate that the number of researchers for the EU15 
has to increase by 30% to 60% to reach the 3% target in 2010.40 Given a number of about 1 
million researchers in 2000 this means about 600 thousand scientists extra. In our framework it 
is possible to attract that amount of researchers, because all high-skilled workers are equal and 
do not differ in qualifications.  
 
From Table 6.2 we know that medium-high technology and high technology manufacturing 
are the most R&D intensive sectors. Because we have introduced a subsidy that does not 
distinguish R&D activities per sector, the most R&D intensive sectors benefit most from lower 
input prices for R&D. Labour productivity increases most in these sectors. In the other sectors 
this effect is smaller. Table 6.7 shows that the volume of production in high technology 
manufacturing increases by about 20% in the EU. The EU countries will also export relatively 
more high technology goods. The Balassa index of specialisation shows an increase of 6% 
points. Production expansion in the medium-high tech manufacturing sector does also exceed 
the macro average. This sector also exports more products and its international competitiveness 
will increase.  
 
The other sectors will benefit less from the boost in R&D. First of all these sectors are less 
R&D intensive. Secondly, the demand for labour in the R&D sectors attracts employees from 
the other sectors. In particular in the services industries Europe looses competitiveness. Europe 
exports relatively less services, because manufacturing has regained competitiveness. 
Employment in other commercial services increases, because its inputs are heavily demanded 
by the expansionary R&D sector. Therefore production in other commercial services expands 
more than for other services.  
 
 
40 Note that for the EU15, the employment increase will be lower than 75%, because the current R&D expenditures of the 
EU15 are higher than those of the new member states. 
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Table 6.7 Sectoral effects EU of 3% R&D target in 2025: lower bound scenario 
Sectors Employment Production Labour productivity Specialisation
Agriculture − 2.4 1.2 3.8 − 1.8
Energy − 2.3 2.5 4.4 − 3.3
Low tech manufacturing − 2.4 1.9 3.7 − 2.1
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.2 5.0 3.9 − 2.4
Medium-high tech manufacturing − 0.6 10.2 5.1 3.3
High tech manufacturing 4.7 19.7 5.5 6.1
Transport services − 1.0 2.5 3.5 − 4.2
Other commercial services − 0.1 1.9 2.3 − 7.0
Research and development 72.4 67.8 −2.1 
Other services − 0.8 1.0 2.1 − 11.3
Total 0.0 4.9 4.0 
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
The numbers on employment, production and labour productivity are relative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. The number on 
specialisation is an absolute change in the Balassa index in 2025.  
 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
We have modelled the R&D stock in the value added nest. Value added has a CES nesting with 
the R&D stock and a CES capital-labour nest, see Figure 3.1. From the literature we know that 
R&D and capital are complementary. We have, however, no precise estimate of the substitution 
between R&D and capital and labour. So far we have assumed that the substitution elasticity is 
0.9. Now we conduct a sensitivity analysis with a substitution elasticity of 0.5. We also 
included that elasticity in our calibration procedure and the baseline in order to compare the 
effects of the R&D Lisbon policy with the baseline.  
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Table 6.8 Macroeconomic effects of lower bound scenario: less substitution between R&D and capital-labour 
GDP Consumption Exports Real wages R&D stock
EU 2.9 0.6 6.5 3.3 55.2
Germany 2.6 0.5 5.9 2.9 34.4
France 2.6 0.4 6.3 3.3 47.3
United Kingdom 2.6 0.3 7.3 2.9 53.8
Italy 3.6 0.6 7.3 4.0 134.9
Spain 3.8 1.0 8.7 4.3 144.7
The Netherlands 3.2 0.8 6.2 3.1 71.4
Belgium-Luxembourg 3.1 0.9 6.0 3.0 44.2
Denmark 2.0 0.4 4.6 2.4 29.2
Sweden 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.7 − 3.2
Finland 1.6 0.5 5.1 1.6 15.4
Ireland 3.8 0.3 7.2 3.4 120.6
Austria 3.0 0.8 6.9 3.5 45.2
Greece 3.2 1.0 3.8 5.0 211.1
Portugal 3.7 1.3 7.3 4.4 152.8
Poland 4.1 1.3 7.4 4.9 197.3
Czech Republic 4.0 1.3 7.5 5.0 85.9
Hungary 4.3 1.2 7.8 4.9 142.8
Slovakia 6.1 3.1 7.9 6.7 184.5
Slovenia 3.9 1.3 7.5 4.0 55.8
Rest EU 5.1 1.8 9.9 5.6 238.8
United States − 0.1 0.0 − 0.6 0.0 − 1.2
Rest OECD 0.0 0.1 − 0.3 0.1 − 1.8
Non OECD 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 − 1.7
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared tot the baseline in 2025. The outcomes have to be compared with 
Table 6.4. 
 
The results are presented in Table 6.8 and can be compared with the ones in Table 6.4.  If 
the substitution elasticity is lower, the macro effects will be about half a percentage point lower. 
For the EU as a whole, GDP and consumption increase 0.3% points and 0.6% less, respectively. 
Export increase by 0.4% points more. The reason is that the level of R&D expenditures is on 
average higher in the baseline now. In section 6.1 we have explained that in time sectoral R&D 
expenditures decrease in the baseline because R&D becomes more expensive than labour. 
Firms want to substitute R&D for labour. Due to the low elasticity of substitution firms have 
less substitution possibilities. Thus the R&D stock is higher in the new baseline as well as the 
expenditures. For all countries the subsidy and the increase in the R&D stock will be lower.  
 
Other substitution possibilities between R&D and capital-labour do not change our analysis 
of the R&D target substantially: the quantitative differences are minor. We have also conducted 
this sensitivity analysis in case the returns on R&D are much larger, as in Table 6.6. The 
conclusions are the same: although we have no precise information on the substitution between 
R&D and capital and labour, this hardly affects the outcomes of our quantitative analysis. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This section has analysed the economic effects of an increase in R&D expenditures to 3% of 
GDP in the EU. We introduced a government subsidy as an instrument to stimulate private 
R&D, because R&D decisions are endogenous in our model. In spite of this instrument the 
analysis does not take account of all the costs of increasing R&D expenditures nor of the 
effectiveness of subsidies as instrument to promote R&D. We have used simulations to quantify 
the impact of the R&D target. These simulations are “what if simulations” describing the 
economic effects if the targets are reached, however they do not describe the plausibility that 
the targets are met. Because we do not analyse all costs of achieving the target and there is no 
consensus on the social returns to R&D for such large changes in R&D expenditures, we 
present a bandwidth of outcomes. 
 
According to the lower and upper bound scenarios GDP could increase by 3.2% to 10.1% 
for the EU on average in 2025. Consumption increases slightly less, because of a negative 
terms-of-trade effect. The R&D stock increases by about 70%. The effects for the member 
states vary widely depending on their target and current level of R&D spending. The effects for 
most of the Scandinavian countries are minor because these countries spend already many 
resources on R&D. Most Mediterranean countries and the new member states do not spend 
much on R&D. Their efforts to meet the Lisbon targets have to be very ambitious. Their R&D 
stocks have to increase by 160% to 300% depending on the specific country. If these countries 
do meet these targets, the economic gains are subsequently large: at least a 4% GDP gain if the 
return on R&D is at the lower end of the estimated spectrum, and at least 13% if the return on 
R&D is at the higher end of the estimated spectrum. 
 
The high and medium-high technology sectors benefit most of the extra R&D efforts. Most 
of the R&D is conducted in these sectors, so the productivity gains are also large. Because the 
products from these sectors are also very tradable, this also stimulates trade and leads to 
increased specialisation in these sectors. 
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7 The internal market for services 
7.1 The services directive: reducing heterogeneity in regulation 
A cornerstone of the European Union (EU) is the principle that goods, services, capital and 
labour can move freely between the member states. The internal market for goods seems to 
function well, after the implementation of the Single Market programme in 1992. That is 
however not the case for the internal market for services. Service providers often experience 
obstacles if they want to export their services to other EU member states, or when they want to 
start a subsidiary company in other EU member states. The EC (2002) has concluded that these 
impediments are to a considerable degree caused by national regulations for service exporters, 
foreign investors in services, and for the service product itself. Such regulations are mostly 
made for domestic purposes without much regard for the interests of foreign service providers. 
 
The EC has proposed a directive to reduce the impediments for trade in commercial 
services.41 A key element of this directive is the ‘country of origin’ principle. A service provider 
who complied with the national regulation of the country of origin should no longer −save for a 
few explicitly named derogatory issues− be hampered by regulation in the destination country. 
The establishment of foreign subsidiaries by service firms has to be facilitated by introducing a 
single point of contact in each member state, i.e. a single "desk" where the foreign service 
providers can fulfil all their administrative and regulatory obligations. The directive also aims to 
eliminate unnecessary and discriminatory regulation such as nationality and residence 
restrictions. The proposed EU directive takes a “horizontal” approach. The same principles 
apply to a wide range of different EU service sectors, ranging from retail trade to business 
services, from courier services to construction, from tourism services to commercial medical 
services.. The proposed measures could have a large impact on the European service economy, 
boosting bilateral service trade between EU member states as well as the intra-EU direct 
investment in the service sector. 
 
Completing the internal market for goods and services is an essential part of the Lisbon 
strategy. Substantial productivity increases are hardly possible if the service sector, representing 
some 70 per cent of the European economy, remains hampered by national regulatory 
differences. In most service sectors, still less than 5 per cent of production is exported to other 
EU member states.42 In a study commissioned by the European Commission, O’Mahony and 
 
41See EC (2004a). The proposals were preceded by a report that took stock of the intra-European regulation barriers for 
trade and investment in service markets EC (2002).  
42 Cf. Kox et al. (2004a). 
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Van Ark (2003) conclude that the widening gap between the EU and the US in economic 
growth per capita is to an important extent caused by the fact that the USA succeeds better than 
the EU in raising the productivity of services industries (see Table 2.3). It might be very 
difficult to strengthen the competitiveness and efficiency of European service industries without 
alleviating the effects of national regulatory barriers to the cross-border provision of services.  
 
Kox et al. (2004a) have dealt with the economic impact of recent EU proposals on trade and 
direct investment in the Internal Market for services. Their work builds upon recent empirical 
OECD work on the relations between national regulation intensity and trade patterns. The 
OECD researchers have established that regulation may affect trade and direct investment.43 
Kox et al. (2004a) have refined the OECD method of analysis. Instead of only looking at the 
level of regulation they have focused on the heterogeneity in the forms and contents of national 
regulations for service markets in the European Union. They concluded that it is largely the 
heterogeneity in regulation that hampers trade and not the level of regulation as such. 
Heterogeneity in regulation causes additional transaction and qualification costs when service 
providers do business in other EU member states. The report also finds strong empirical 
evidence that regulation heterogeneity has a negative impact on intra-EU trade and foreign 
direct investment in service markets.  
 
The main economic implication of the proposed EU directive is that it will substantially 
reduce regulation heterogeneity, in particular by the ‘country of origin’ principle, by the ‘single 
point of contact’ and by the elimination of discriminatory elements against foreign service 
providers. Taking into account the empirical uncertainties of the impact of the EU directive on 
regulation heterogeneity and of the heterogeneity indicators on trade and investment, Kox et al. 
(2004a) estimate that commercial services trade (excluding transport services) could increase by 
30 to 60 per cent in the EU, while foreign direct investment stocks in services might increase by 
20 to 35 per cent.  
 
Following up on Kox et al. (2004a) we estimate the welfare effects of the increase in 
commercial services trade using WorldScan. This is not a complete welfare analysis of the 
services directive for two reasons. The first is that the model does not include FDI flows, so we 
are not able to analyse the welfare effects of the increase in FDI stocks in the commercial 
services sector. The second reason is that in the current version of the WorldScan model all 
sectors inhibit constant returns to scale in production. However, several manufacturing and 
 
43 In particular, Nicoletti et al. (2003). The OECD researchers conclude that the level of regulation hampers trade in services 
and foreign direct investment significantly in the OECD countries. They find that a reduction in national regulation levels to 
that of the least-regulated country (unrelated to the EU directive) − i.e. the United Kingdom− could increase bilateral trade in 
services by about 20%, while the foreign capital stock could increase by 10% to 20%. They do not discriminate the level of 
and heterogeneity in regulation as Kox et al. (2004a) do. It could be possible that their result with respect to the level of 
regulation also picks up some heterogeneity.  
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services sectors are characterised by economies to scale. Economies of scale can trigger 
additional welfare effects of more open services markets in the EU because more open markets 
increase the opportunities to exploit economies to scale and could lead to lower prices. By 
consequence, the outcomes of the present welfare analysis of extra trade due to the services 
directive have to be considered as a lower bound.  
 
We have simulated the increase of commercial services trade in the EU associated with the 
lower bound of about 30% from Kox et al. (2004a). They have estimated the potential trade 
increase for every bilateral commercial services trade flow in the EU. Given our baseline we 
incorporate this in the model by reducing the bilateral non-tariff barriers (NTB’s) in other 
commercial services in such a way that every trade flow increases by the amount estimated ex 
ante. Then the simulations show the welfare effects of the trade increase. Hence, in order to 
induce the estimated trade increases we have to calibrate the NTB’s. Lejour et al. (2004) have 
developed a method to calibrate NTB’s. In essence, they translate the potential trade increase 
into a (Samuelson iceberg) trade-cost equivalent of the barriers. If they abolish the NTB’s in the 
model, they arrive at the (ex-ante) trade levels that correspond to the predictions from the 
empirical model. This procedure is explained more extensively in Lejour et al. (2004, 2006). 
 
Table 7.1 presents the level of the NTB’s after calibration in percentages of the import 
value. The bilateral NTB’s are averages over the destinations. The NTB’s are low for the 
exporting countries Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. For Austria, Denmark, and the new 
accession countries the NTB’s are relatively high. High barriers represent relatively large 
regulatory heterogeneity that hampers trade. The elimination of these barriers according to the 
proposals in the directive should have the largest trade effects in these countries. 
Table 7.1 Non-tariff barriers due to differences in regulation, 2001 
Country NTB Country NTB 
Austria 0.153 Hungary 0.143 
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.097 Ireland 0.117 
Czech Rep. 0.140 Italy 0.130 
Germany 0.122 The Netherlands 0.090 
Denmark 0.154 Poland 0.150 
Spain 0.123 Portugal 0.108 
Finland 0.120 Rest EU 0.150 
France 0.084 Slovakia 0.146 
UK 0.113 Slovenia 0.145 
Greece 0.134 Sweden 0.108 
Source : WorldScan and Kox et al. (2004a). Numbers are expressed as percentages of import value. The bilateral NTB’s are averages over the 
destination countries of the exporting country. 
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7.2 Trade effects of the services directive 
Ex ante the services directive will increase other commercial services trade by about 30%. This 
is substantial for the sector itself; however at a macroeconomic level this increase is modest. 
Kox et al. (2004b) show that other commercial services trade makes up only about 10% of total 
EU trade. Moreover, about half of other commercial services trade is directed to countries 
outside the EU. So, only about 5% of EU trade is affected by the services directive. By 
consequence, the 30% increase in other commercial services trade would lead to a total trade 
increase in the EU of about 1.5%. The results in Table 7.2 confirm this. Overall, the trade 
effects are slightly larger than according to this rule of thumb calculation. 
Table 7.2 Macroeconomic effects of the trade increase due to services directive in 2025 
Country GDP Consumption Exports Real wages 
European Union 0.2 0.4 1.7 0.5 
Germany 0.2 0.5 1.7 0.5 
France 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.3 
United Kingdom 0.0 0.3 1.6 0.4 
Italy 0.2 0.4 1.9 0.4 
Spain 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.3 
The Netherlands 0.2 0.7 2.3 0.9 
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.2 1.2 1.8 1.4 
Denmark 0.4 0.7 2.7 0.6 
Sweden 0.3 0.6 2.2 0.7 
Finland 0.4 0.5 1.9 0.4 
Ireland 0.2 1.5 1.2 1.7 
Austria 0.4 0.9 3.1 1.0 
Greece 0.1 0.3 2.3 0.3 
Portugal 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.3 
Poland 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.3 
Czech Republic 0.4 0.6 1.5 0.6 
Hungary 0.6 0.9 2.4 0.7 
Slovakia 0.8 1.0 2.4 1.0 
Slovenia 0.3 0.6 1.7 0.6 
Rest EU 0.3 0.7 1.9 0.8 
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
The country-specific effects on exports and imports differ depending on the reduction in 
regulatory heterogeneity between the countries and their most important trading partners in 
other commercial services trade. E.g. the trade effects for France, Spain and Portugal are 
modest. From the data we know that these countries trade relatively much with each other and 
that the regulatory heterogeneity between these countries is small. The level of the NTB’s is 
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low for these countries (see Table 7.1). For countries like Austria, Denmark, Hungary and 
Slovakia, the regulatory heterogeneity with their most important trading partners is much larger 
and so is the effect of less heterogeneity.  
 
Given the small effects on total trade and the assumption of constant returns to scale in 
production, it is not surprising that the GDP effects are modest, on average 0.2% in the EU (in 
2025).44 They vary between 0.4% to 0.8% for the countries with the largest trade increases and 
about 0.1% for countries with the lowest trade increases. The consumption effects are slightly 
larger. The reason is that lowering the NTB’s reduces consumer prices without lowering export 
prices. So consumption possibilities expand. This is also reflected in the terms-of-trade effect. 
Note that because the terms-of-trade effect also includes the NTB’s in the import prices, there is 
an overall positive terms-of-trade effect.  
 
As stated in section 7.1, the macroeconomic effects do not reflect a full-scale analysis of the 
services directive. Simulations of other CGE models suggest that on average the overall GDP 
and welfare effects are twice as large with increasing returns to scale as with constant returns to 
scale in production.45 Furthermore, the upper bound of the estimated trade effects by Kox et al. 
(2004b) is twice as high as the lower bound, suggesting that the welfare effects could double 
using the upper bound with constant returns to scale in production. Moreover the services 
directive will stimulate foreign direct investment, which is also not taken into account.  
7.3 Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
The changes in total exports are mainly due to the exports in other commercial services. These 
exports increase by 16%, see Table 7.3. Notice that these exports include intra-EU and extra-
EU exports. Because intra-EU exports form about half of total exports in other commercial 
services, the 30% increase in intra-EU trade leads to a 15% increase for the total exports in 
these sectors. Exports in other sectors also increase slightly: their producer prices decrease 
slightly, because intermediate inputs of other commercial services become cheaper within the 
EU. Also the others sectors become slightly more competitive. Production increases across all 
sectors. Employment in other commercial services is reduced due to the restructuring of that 
sector in response to increased market entry. Because of market integration, the most 
competitive countries will specialise in the production of other commercial services. In these 
countries labour productivity rises and other commercial services produce demanded output 
using less inputs, including labour. Other sectors will attract more labour.  
 
44 In 2040, the effect is slightly larger. The GDP increase of the EU is about 0.4%, and the consumption increase 0.6% see 
the annex.  
45 Francois et al. (2005) simulate the effects for the Doha round using constant returns to scale and increasing returns. On a 
global level the effects are twice as large using increasing returns instead of constant returns. For individual countries the 
differences can be much larger or smaller.  
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The other commercial services sector thus develops differently in the various member states. 
Table 7.4 shows that the sectoral effects are modest, value added and production will increase 
by about 0.3% and 0.2% in 2025, respectively.46 Labour productivity increases by about the 
same number. The value added effect for other commercial services is not larger than the 
increase in GDP (see Table 7.2), because value added increases in all other sectors by about the 
same extent . 
Table 7.3 Sectoral effects of the services directive in 2025 
Sector Employment Production Labour productivity Exports Specialisation
Agriculture 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 − 0.7
Energy 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 − 1.5
Low tech manufacturing 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 − 1.1
Medium-low tech 
manufacturing 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 − 1.6
Medium-high tech 
manufacturing 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 − 1.5
High tech manufacturing 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 − 0.8
Transport services 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 − 1.7
Other commercial services − 0.1 0.2 0.4 15.7 8.4
Research and development 0.2 0.3 0.3  
Other services 0.1 0.2 0.2 − 0.6 − 3.2
Total 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.7 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
 
46 In 2040 the effects are slightly larger.  
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Table 7.4 Volume changes in other commercial services sector in 2025 
Country  Production Value added Exports Specialisation
Europe 0.2 0.3 15.5 8.4
Germany 0.3 0.4 18.7 10.0
France − 0.1 0.0 8.9 1.4
United Kingdom 0.4 0.6 14.1 10.1
Italy 0.2 0.3 16.9 9.6
Spain − 0.1 0.0 16.3 6.1
The Netherlands 0.6 1.0 15.2 11.9
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.2 1.7 15.8 12.0
Denmark − 0.4 − 0.1 22.6 11.5
Sweden 0.1 0.3 13.7 6.7
Finland − 0.7 − 0.5 19.8 4.6
Ireland 1.1 1.7 11.6 6.4
Austria 0.4 0.7 20.7 16.1
Greece − 0.2 − 0.1 15.3 6.9
Portugal 0.3 0.5 17.1 9.6
Poland − 0.3 − 0.2 19.0 4.0
Czech Republic − 0.4 − 0.1 28.1 5.2
Hungary − 0.8 − 0.6 17.5 3.1
Slovakia − 0.6 − 0.3 25.4 6.5
Slovenia − 0.9 − 0.7 24.8 3.9
Rest EU − 0.4 − 0.2 25.2 8.7
United States 0.0 0.0 − 0.6 − 6.7
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 − 0.5 − 5.8
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 − 0.7 − 4.1
Source: WorldScan simulations. All numbers are relative volume changes in 2025 compared to the baseline. 
 
The country specific results differ, depending on the competitiveness of the commercial 
services sector across Europe. In particular the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK are relatively 
specialised in that sector (see Kox et al. (2004b)). Their imports do not increase much. For 
other countries, such as the new member states, Denmark and Finland, exports increase 
substantially, but that is also the case for their imports. Although other commercial services will 
contribute to a larger extent to their exports, these countries do not specialise much in this 
sector. They become more specialised in this sector compared to the rest of the world, but not 
compared to the EU average. In these countries value added in commercial services decreases 
somewhat, because specialisation patterns shift to the more specialised countries. 
 
Although the services directive does not expand the other commercial services sector in 
these countries, the implementation of that directive is still beneficial. These countries shift 
some to their resources to other sectors in which they are more productive. Moreover, other 
commercial services become relatively cheaper. 
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8 Less red tape in Europe 
8.1 Administrative costs 
Firms often complain about the time and costs involved to deal with administrative activities. 
One of the problems is that the mandatory information that private companies have to supply to 
public authorities is always institutionalised, and hence, subject to hysteresis. A regular re-
evaluation process of mandatory information flows can therefore be useful, since this 
administrative burden affects the overall cost efficiency and the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms.  
 
In recent years policymakers have become more focussed on this issue. For example, the 
Netherlands wants to reduce the administrative burden for businesses between 2004 and 2007 
with 25%. With the aid of the so called Standard Cost Model (IPAL, 2003) the costs of 
providing information by the business sector to the government were estimated to amount to 
16.4 billion euro in 2002 (IPAL, 2004). This is about 3.7 % of Dutch GDP, which is quite 
considerable.  
 
Although these numbers only apply to the Netherlands, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the costs of administrative barriers are substantial throughout Europe. Indeed, a significant part, 
approximately 40%, of the administrative burden is the result of international (mainly 
European) legislation. Hence, reducing the administrative burden not only is an issue for the 
governments of the member states but for the European Union as well.  
 
To implement the reduction of administrative cost in WorldScan, we assume that these costs 
largely consist of wages for workers that firms need to hire to comply with government 
regulations and to provide the government with information. Reducing the administrative 
burden implies that some of these workers can contribute directly to production. The reduction 
therefore takes the form of an increase in labour efficiency: fewer workers are needed, while 
production is not affected directly. Furthermore, we assume that the cost reduction is achieved 
by making the administrative process more efficient; it does not undermine government 
regulations. 
The Netherlands is one of the very few countries, which currently has detailed information on 
the administrative burden of government regulations. Therefore, we use the key figures for the 
Netherlands as a benchmark for the other member states of the European Union. For 2002, the 
administrative burden in the Netherlands is equivalent to 3.7% of GDP and is projected to fall 
with 25%, e.g. with 0.9% of GDP. According to the base year data for the Dutch labour income 
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share, this amounts to a labour-efficiency increase of 1.6% in the Netherlands (compare Tang 
and Verweij, 2004). This effect on labour efficiency has been allocated to other EU countries in 
two ways whose outcomes are presented in the subsequent sections: 
 
• Country differentiation: Scant information on differences in the costs of starting a new firm 
among countries is used for the distribution of labour efficiency over countries.  
• Sectoral differentiation: Information on the impact of administrative costs on sectors is 
added to the country specific distribution of labour efficiency. 
 
8.2 Macro economic effects of less administrative costs 
8.2.1 Country differentiation 
Internationally comparative studies on the costs of the administrative burden on companies are 
very scarce. One of the problems is that information requirements by governments can be quite 
heterogeneous over countries. The most straightforward way to arrive at a meaningful 
international comparison is to study the administrative burden that arises when a firm performs 
a standardised activity that requires mandatory information provision to the government. For 
this purpose Kox (2005) has used a well-documented internationally comparative study by a 
team of World Bank researchers, dealing with the costs associated with the start-up of a new 
firm. Djankov et al. (2002) assessed the administrative costs of firm start-ups in 85 countries, 
including most EU countries. They track all officially required administrative procedures and 
costs that are normally required for setting up an identical standard firm: taxes, screening of the 
entrepreneur, safety and health, environmental and labour-related requirements. For their 
research they used official information and information by country experts. 
 
Kox (2005) combined the Dutch data on the total administrative burden with the Djankov 
data on inter-country differences in firm-start-up costs. The inter-country differences in firm 
start-up costs are rather large according to the Djankov data. This does not only hold for 
differences between 'old' and 'new' EU member states, but also for more or less comparable 
countries such as for instance the UK and the Netherlands. Even though the differences may 
hold for this specific type of activity (firm start-up), country disparities are probably less 
extreme when averaged across all activities. That is why the inter-country distribution in the 
Djankov data has been truncated, preserving most of the inter-country information (see Kox, 
2005 for more details).  
 
Table 8.1 Presents the distribution of the administrative burden over countries according to 
the method of Kox (2005). The total administrative burden ranges between 2.4% of GDP in the 
UK, Sweden, Finland and Denmark to 4.4% of GDP in Hungary, Greece, Poland and Slovenia. 
In the WorldScan simulation presented in Table 8.2 one additional adjustment has been made 
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on the inputs from Table 8.1. Dutch data show that 42% of the administrative burden stems 
from European legislation. It may be expected that this part of the burden (as percentage of 
GDP) falls rather uniformly on all EU countries. Hence, in the simulation we applied the 
distribution from Table 8.1 for 58% of the labour efficiency shock and added for 42% a uniform 
shock due to EU legislation. 
Table 8.1 Estimated administrative burden for EU countries, percentage of 
GDP (market prices), 2003a 
 as % of GDP in billion US dollars 
Austria 3.0 11.2 
Belgium 2.7 8.1 
Czech 3.7 2.7 
Denmark 2.4 3.8 
Finland 2.4 2.3 
France 2.9 61.6 
Germany 3.2 85.5 
Greece 4.4 10.6 
Hungary 4.4 4.4 
Ireland 2.4 3.2 
Italy 2.4 61.9 
The Netherlands 3.7 167.0 
Poland 4.4 10.0 
Portugal 2.4 6.0 
Slovak 2.4 1.3 
Slovenia 4.4 . 
Spain 2.9 3.4 
Sweden 2.4 4.2 
UK 2.4 24.3 
aUsing the compressed 1999 distribution of market-entry costs by country (Djankov / OECD data). 
Source: Kox (2005). 
 
8.2.2 Macroeconomic results 
All countries experience a reduction in the administrative costs as a percentage of GDP by a 
quarter. Using country specific labour income shares we translate these into an increase in 
labour efficiency. On average, labour efficiency rises by 1.3% in Europe in 2025 (see Table 
8.2).47 Initially this will raise the volume of GDP in Europe by about 1.3 * 0.638 = 0.8%, where 
0.638 is the mean labour-income share for the EU-25. In the long run the capital stock adjusts to 
the higher level of labour productivity. By consequence, the long term change in GDP volume 
will equal the initial shock of 1.3%. In the long run, the additional demand for capital is 
supplied without a substantial rise in the price of capital, because extra savings bring the capital 
market back to equilibrium. 
 
47 In the annex we present the long-term results in 2040. Compared to 2025, the long-term term effects of relative changes 
in production and consumption differ slightly, see Table Annex 6. 
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For two reasons the outcomes of the simulation in Table 8.2 diverge from the initial 
productivity impulse of about 1.3. Firstly, R&D spillovers magnify the outcomes of the 
administrative burden reduction (see the column Total factor productivity in Table 8.2; section 
6.1.3 contains more background on R&D spillovers). The rise in GDP induces more spending 
on R&D by industry. More R&D improves production processes and products. This stimulates 
productivity, not only in the innovating sector itself, but also in the sectors using the improved 
products as intermediates in their own production process (R&D spillovers). The productivity 
increase generates an additional increase in GDP of about 0.2 %. Secondly, domestic and 
foreign products are imperfect substitutes. Extra production has to be exported and traded 
against imports. To conquer foreign markets export prices have to fall compared to import 
prices, resulting in a loss of 0.1% in the terms-of-trade. This loss is quite modest. The R&D 
spillover effect and the terms-of-trade effect partly offset each other. On balance, welfare 
measured by consumption per capita hardly differs from the initial productivity impulse. 
Table 8.2 Macroeconomic effects of a 25% country specific reduction in the administrative burden in the EU-25 
 
Labour productivity 
shock 
Gross domestic 
product
Total factor 
productivity
Terms-of-trade 
 
Consumption per 
capita
Europe 1.3 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Germany 1.4 1.5 0.2 − 0.1 1.4
France 1.4 1.5 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
United Kingdom 1.1 1.1 0.1 − 0.1 1.0
Italy 1.2 1.3 0.1 − 0.1 1.2
Spain 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
The Netherlands 1.5 1.5 0.1 − 0.1 1.4
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.3 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
Denmark 1.2 1.2 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
Sweden 1.2 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Finland 1.4 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.4
Ireland 1.2 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
Austria 1.5 1.5 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Greece 1.5 1.6 0.2 − 0.2 1.3
Portugal 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.1
Poland 1.8 1.8 0.3 − 0.2 1.6
Czech Republic 1.6 1.7 0.3 − 0.1 1.5
Hungary 1.8 1.9 0.3 − 0.1 1.7
Slovakia 1.6 1.7 0.4 − 0.1 1.5
Slovenia 1.7 1.8 0.4 − 0.1 1.6
Rest EU 1.7 1.9 0.3 − 0.2 1.5
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations, Cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2025. 
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8.3 Impact on sectoral competitiveness 
The distribution of the administrative burden is not uniform over sectors (see Jansen and Tom, 
2003 and the survey by Kox, 2005). A relatively large burden falls on agriculture and private 
services. Therefore in this simulation we applied the 25% reduction to the sector specific 
distribution of the administrative burden. This has been done in such a way that for each 
country the weighted average of the sector specific labour productivity shocks equals the macro 
country specific shock from section 8.2. By consequence, the macro outcomes of this 
simulation in Table 8.3 hardly differ from those in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.3 Effects of a 25% country and sector specific reduction in the administrative burden in the EU-25 
 
Labour productivity 
shock 
Gross domestic 
product
Total factor 
productivity
Terms-of-trade 
 
Consumption per 
capita
      
Europe 1.3 1.2 0.0 − 0.1 1.1
Germany 1.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.2
France 1.5 1.4 0.1 − 0.1 1.2
United Kingdom 1.1 1.0 0.0 − 0.1 0.9
Italy 1.2 1.1 0.0 − 0.1 1.0
Spain 1.3 1.2 0.0 − 0.1 1.0
The Netherlands 1.5 1.4 0.0 − 0.1 1.2
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.3 1.2 0.0 − 0.1 1.0
Denmark 1.2 1.1 0.0 − 0.1 0.9
Sweden 1.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1
Finland 1.4 1.2 0.0 − 0.1 1.2
Ireland 1.1 1.1 0.0 − 0.1 1.0
Austria 1.3 1.3 0.1 − 0.1 1.1
Greece 1.3 1.3 0.0 − 0.2 1.1
Portugal 1.3 1.2 0.1 − 0.1 0.9
Poland 1.6 1.5 0.0 − 0.1 1.3
Czech Republic 1.4 1.4 0.0 − 0.1 1.1
Hungary 1.5 1.5 0.0 − 0.1 1.3
Slovakia 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.0 1.1
Slovenia 1.5 1.4 0.1 − 0.1 1.2
Rest EU 1.5 1.5 0.0 − 0.2 1.2
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations, cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2025. 
 
Table 8.4 contains the ex-ante increase in labour productivity per sector. It shows that due to the 
reduction in administrative burden relatively more labour can be used for productive activities 
in the sectors Agriculture, Transport and Commercial Services. We would expect that for these 
sectors the production volume rises compared to the other sectors. However, in order to sell this 
extra production these sectors experience some terms of trade losses with respect to non-EU 
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suppliers and with respect to other sectors. For firms in manufacturing sectors and agriculture it 
is easier to sell the extra production abroad due to the tradability of these products compared to 
in commercial services in particular.  
Table 8.4 Effects on sectoral labour efficiency of a 25% country and sector specific reduction in the administrative 
burden in the EU-25 
 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Transport 
services
Other commercial 
services 
Other services
   
Germany 5.7 0.2 1.1 2.0 2.2 0.4
France 5.7 2.4 1.3 2.2 1.9 0.7
United Kingdom 8.5 0.2 1.0 1.9 1.4 0.5
Italy 4.4 0.1 1.2 2.0 2.0 0.3
Spain 5.5 0.3 1.2 2.2 1.8 0.5
The Netherlands 7.0 0.6 1.6 2.6 2.0 0.7
Belgium-Luxembourg 6.1 0.2 1.2 2.8 1.9 0.5
Denmark 11.6 0.2 1.1 2.2 1.4 0.5
Sweden 8.2 0.4 1.0 1.9 1.7 0.4
Finland 8.9 0.2 1.3 2.4 1.5 0.5
Ireland 5.2 0.1 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.5
Austria 5.6 0.1 1.1 2.0 1.7 0.8
Greece 6.2 0.2 1.0 1.8 1.6 0.4
Portugal 6.5 0.2 1.1 2.0 1.6 0.4
Poland 8.0 0.2 1.5 2.2 2.5 0.5
Czech Republic 7.0 0.3 1.6 2.7 1.9 0.5
Hungary 7.3 0.2 1.7 2.8 2.3 0.5
Slovakia 6.0 0.3 1.5 2.8 2.2 0.4
Slovenia 8.2 0.2 1.3 2.6 2.1 0.5
Rest EU 7.1 0.2 1.7 3.0 2.4 0.6
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
Table 8.5 shows the sectoral effects of the 25% reduction in administrative burden for the EU as 
a whole. Production increases most in agriculture, because agricultural firms experience the 
greatest relief of the administrative burden. Exports in agriculture also increase by about 4%. In 
the manufacturing sectors the changes in production and labour productivity are about equal to 
those in transport and other commercial services. Due to the production increases in 
manufacturing, demand for research and development expands. 
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Table 8.5 Sectoral effects of 25% country and sector specific reduction in the administrative burden in the EU-25 in 
2025 
 
Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
Agriculture − 0.2 3.5 2.8 4.4 1.4
Energy 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.2 − 0.7
Low tech manufacturing 0.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.0
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.1 − 0.1
Medium-high tech manufacturing 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 − 0.2
High tech manufacturing 0.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.0
Transport services − 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.0
Other commercial services − 0.1 1.4 1.5 1.2 − 0.2
Research and development 0.5 0.5 0.6  
Other services 0.2 0.8 0.7 − 0.9 − 2.3
Total 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Source: WorldScan simulations, Cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2025. 
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Annex 1 Background tables on baseline characteristics 
Baseline characteristics between 2001 and 2040 
Country Populationa GDPa Consumptiona Exportsa Employmenta Savingsb Participationb
EU 0.1 2.0 1.9 3.5 − 0.3 23.2 43.4
Germany 0.2 1.6 1.6 2.9 − 0.3 23.2 45.1
France 0.4 1.9 1.8 3.4 0.0 24.0 41.7
United Kingdom 0.4 2.1 2.0 3.6 0.1 19.4 46.0
Italy − 0.1 1.3 1.2 2.9 − 0.7 22.7 37.4
Spain 0.1 2.3 2.2 4.3 − 0.5 26.3 42.1
The Netherlands 0.5 1.7 1.8 2.5 0.1 26.4 47.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.3 1.8 1.9 2.7 − 0.2 24.5 38.5
Denmark 0.4 2.3 2.2 3.5 0.0 25.0 49.4
Sweden 0.4 2.3 2.2 3.3 0.1 23.4 48.5
Finland 0.2 2.2 2.2 3.4 − 0.2 24.8 45.5
Ireland 0.8 2.9 2.5 3.8 0.6 28.9 44.2
Austria 0.2 2.2 2.2 3.2 − 0.2 26.1 45.3
Greece 0.2 2.3 2.4 3.7 − 0.1 24.2 40.6
Portugal 0.4 2.2 2.3 3.5 0.0 29.7 47.6
Poland − 0.3 3.7 3.3 6.6 − 0.7 18.9 43.6
Czech Republic − 0.3 3.6 3.6 5.7 − 0.9 24.9 47.0
Hungary − 0.5 3.4 3.2 5.6 − 0.9 24.1 40.4
Slovakia − 0.1 3.9 3.7 5.5 − 0.5 28.4 47.5
Slovenia − 0.4 3.5 3.5 6.4 − 1.2 20.3 43.0
Rest EU − 0.7 3.5 3.2 6.0 − 1.0 17.0 47.8
United States 0.7 2.4 2.2 4.6 0.5 22.1 48.6
Rest OECD 0.4 2.0 2.1 3.8 0.3 24.6 47.3
Non OECD 0.9 4.5 4.3 5.5 1.1 27.1 49.5
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
a The numbers are average annual growth rates between 2001 and 2040. 
b The numbers are average ratios between 2001 and 2040. Savings is defined as share of national income, and participation as labour supply as share of 
total population. 
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Annex 2 Long-term effects of employment target 
Macroeconomic effects of employment target in 2040, lower bound scenario 
Country GDP Consumption Exports Employment Real wages
EU 6.8 6.1 7.2 10.1 − 3.7
Germany 5.1 5.0 5.5 6.8 − 1.9
France 8.3 7.5 7.9 11.6 − 3.5
United Kingdom 2.5 2.4 3.0 3.2 − 0.8
Italy 11.9 10.6 10.8 17.9 − 6.3
Spain 9.3 8.0 8.9 12.7 − 4.0
The Netherlands 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.2
Belgium-Luxembourg 11.9 10.1 11.7 16.6 − 5.6
Denmark 0.6 0.7 1.5 0.5 0.2
Sweden 2.3 2.4 3.1 2.7 − 0.5
Finland 5.4 5.4 4.7 7.4 − 2.0
Ireland 5.1 4.6 4.9 6.9 − 2.2
Austria 2.7 2.6 3.9 3.1 − 0.4
Greece 11.7 9.6 10.3 15.5 − 4.5
Portugal 2.7 2.6 4.3 3.0 − 0.3
Poland 21.6 18.8 21.0 29.5 − 8.4
Czech Republic 8.0 7.2 8.9 10.4 − 2.9
Hungary 13.2 11.9 11.7 20.3 − 7.1
Slovakia 14.2 12.5 13.2 18.8 − 5.6
Slovenia 12.4 11.1 11.7 16.1 − 4.3
Rest EU 7.3 6.1 7.6 9.1 − 2.7
United States − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest OECD − 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.1
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative differences with the baseline in 2040. The effects have to be compared with Table 4.4.  
 
Sectoral EU-wide effects of employment target in 2040, lower bound scenario 
Sector Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
Agriculture 17.6 9.3 − 7.8 8.3 1.2
Energy 9.2 4.2 − 4.0 2.1 − 4.7
Low tech manufacturing 14.7 9.8 − 5.5 8.6 1.1
Medium-low tech manufacturing 14.1 9.9 − 5.2 9.3 1.3
Medium-high tech manufacturing 12.2 8.7 − 4.6 7.6 0.4
High tech manufacturing 15.9 11.1 − 5.8 9.2 1.5
Transport services 12.1 7.7 − 4.7 5.0 − 2.1
Other commercial services 9.9 6.4 − 3.0 3.7 − 3.7
Research and development 5.0 3.8 0.7  
Other services 8.3 5.3 − 2.7 1.5 − 7.5
Total 10.1 7.5 − 2.8 7.2 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers have to be compared with Table 4.6. 
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Annex 3 Long-term effects of skills upgrading 
Effects of a skill upgrading in the EU-25 in 2040 
Country Labour productivity 
shock
Real average 
wage
Gross domestic 
product
Terms-of-trade 
 
Consumption per 
capita
Europe 1.7 1.6 1.7 − 0.1 1.6
Germany 2.0 1.8 2.0 − 0.2 1.8
France 1.8 1.6 1.7 − 0.2 1.5
United Kingdom 1.2 1.1 1.2 − 0.1 1.1
Italy 1.8 1.7 1.9 − 0.2 1.9
Spain 2.2 2.0 2.2 − 0.2 2.0
The Netherlands 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.9
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.9 1.8 2.0 − 0.2 1.8
Denmark 1.5 1.4 1.5 − 0.1 1.4
Sweden 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.1
Finland 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5
Ireland 1.5 1.4 1.6 − 0.1 1.4
Austria 1.4 1.2 1.3 − 0.1 1.2
Greece 2.9 2.6 2.9 − 0.4 2.4
Portugal 4.8 4.4 4.9 − 0.5 4.2
Poland 2.0 1.9 2.1 − 0.2 1.9
Czech Republic 1.6 1.5 1.7 − 0.1 1.5
Hungary 1.8 1.8 2.0 − 0.1 1.7
Slovakia 1.6 1.5 1.6 0.0 1.5
Slovenia 1.8 1.7 1.9 − 0.1 1.7
Rest EU 1.5 1.4 1.6 − 0.1 1.4
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations, Cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2025. The effects have to be compared with Table 5.1. 
Sectoral EU-wide effects of skill upgrading in 2040 
Sector Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
Agriculture − 0.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 0.0
Energy − 0.3 1.0 1.4 0.3 − 1.3
Low tech manufacturing 0.2 2.1 1.7 1.9 0.2
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.4 2.3 1.7 2.1 0.2
Medium-high tech manufacturing 0.3 2.2 1.6 2.1 0.2
High tech manufacturing 0.9 2.6 1.5 2.3 0.4
Transport services 0.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 − 0.5
Other commercial services 0.1 1.7 1.6 1.2 − 0.7
Research and development 0.3 2.3 1.7  
Other services − 0.2 1.7 1.8 2.3 0.0
Total 0.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers have to be compared with Table 5.2 
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Annex 4 Long-term effects of R&D target 
Macroeconomic effect of 3% R&D target in 2040: the case of low social return on R&D 
Country GDP Consumption Exports Real wages R&D stock
EU 3.6 1.6 5.8 3.0 67.6
Germany 3.3 1.5 5.4 2.7 45.3
France 3.5 1.5 5.3 3.0 59.7
United Kingdom 3.1 1.1 5.9 2.5 62.8
Italy 4.5 1.9 6.7 3.7 159.6
Spain 4.6 2.0 7.2 3.9 162.8
The Netherlands 3.7 1.5 5.2 2.7 78.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 3.9 1.7 6.2 2.8 52.6
Denmark 2.4 1.0 4.3 2.1 32.3
Sweden 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.9 − 1.6
Finland 2.1 1.0 5.0 1.7 20.1
Ireland 4.8 1.6 6.5 3.4 149.7
Austria 3.8 1.7 6.1 3.1 52.3
Greece 3.8 1.5 5.3 4.7 238.8
Portugal 4.4 2.2 6.4 4.0 165.8
Poland 5.4 2.8 6.4 4.4 248.0
Czech Republic 5.0 2.7 6.5 4.4 111.6
Hungary 5.5 2.9 6.0 4.5 189.5
Slovakia 7.4 4.8 8.0 6.7 220.8
Slovenia 4.8 2.7 5.6 3.5 69.4
Rest EU 6.3 3.3 7.9 4.9 291.4
United States 0.0 0.1 − 0.3 0.1 − 0.7
Rest OECD 0.0 0.2 − 0.1 0.2 − 1.0
Non OECD 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 − 0.8
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. The numbers have to be compared with Table 
6.4. 
 
Sectoral effects EU of Lisbon targets given EU targets of 3% 
Sector Employment Production Labour productivity Specialisation
Agriculture − 2.2 1.7 3.7 − 1.7
Energy − 2.4 2.4 4.3 − 3.3
Low tech manufacturing − 2.2 2.3 3.8 − 1.7
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.1 5.0 3.9 − 2.0
Medium-high tech manufacturing − 0.8 9.9 4.9 3.2
High tech manufacturing 4.3 18.9 5.2 5.6
Transport services − 0.9 2.7 3.5 − 3.9
Other commercial services 0.0 2.0 2.3 − 6.5
Research and development 70.2 67.9 − 1.0 
Other services − 0.7 1.1 2.1 − 10.9
Total 0.0 4.9 4.1 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers on employment and labour productivity are relative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. The 
number on specialisation is an absolute change in the Balassa index in 2040. The number have to be compared with Table 6.7. 
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Annex 5 Long-term effects of the services directive 
Macroeconomic effects of the services directive in 2040 
Country GDP Consumption Exports Real wages
European Union 0.3 0.6 1.5 0.6
Germany 0.4 0.6 1.4 0.7
France 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.4
United Kingdom 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.5
Italy 0.3 0.5 1.6 0.5
Spain 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.3
The Netherlands 0.4 0.8 1.9 1.1
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.3 1.3 1.6 1.5
Denmark 0.7 0.9 2.7 0.8
Sweden 0.5 0.8 2.1 0.8
Finland 0.6 0.7 2.1 0.5
Ireland 0.2 1.7 1.0 1.8
Austria 0.6 1.2 2.8 1.3
Greece 0.3 0.4 2.0 0.4
Portugal 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.4
Poland 0.5 0.5 1.6 0.5
Czech Republic 0.9 0.9 2.0 0.8
Hungary 1.3 1.2 3.2 1.0
Slovakia 1.4 1.4 2.9 1.3
Slovenia 1.1 0.8 2.8 0.8
Rest EU 0.9 1.1 2.5 1.0
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040.  
 
Sectoral effects of the services directive in 2040 
Sector Employment Production Labour 
productivity
Exports 
 
Specialisation
Agriculture − 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 − 0.9
Energy − 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2 − 2.2
Low tech manufacturing 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 − 0.9
Medium-low tech manufacturing 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 − 1.5
Medium-high tech manufacturing 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.5 − 1.4
High tech manufacturing 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.9 − 0.5
Transport services 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 − 1.8
Other commercial services − 0.1 0.3 0.6 14.9 8.4
Research and development 0.0 0.3 0.6  
Other services 0.1 0.3 0.3 − 1.2 − 3.8
Total 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.5 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The numbers are cumulative changes compared to the baseline in 2040. 
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Annex 6: Long-term effects of less red tape 
Effects of a 25% uniform reduction in the administrative burden in the EU-25 in 2040 
Country Labour productivity 
shock
Gross domestic 
product
Total factor 
productivity
Terms-of-trade 
 
Consumption per 
capita
Europe 1.4 1.5 0.2 − 0.1 1.4
Germany 1.5 1.6 0.2 − 0.1 1.5
France 1.5 1.5 0.2 − 0.2 1.4
United Kingdom 1.2 1.2 0.1 − 0.1 1.1
Italy 1.3 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Spain 1.4 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
The Netherlands 1.5 1.6 0.1 − 0.1 1.5
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.4 1.4 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Denmark 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
Sweden 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Finland 1.4 1.5 0.1 − 0.1 1.5
Ireland 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.3
Austria 1.6 1.6 0.2 − 0.1 1.4
Greece 1.6 1.6 0.2 − 0.2 1.4
Portugal 1.3 1.3 0.2 − 0.1 1.2
Poland 1.8 2.0 0.3 − 0.2 1.8
Czech Republic 1.7 1.8 0.4 − 0.1 1.7
Hungary 1.8 2.0 0.2 − 0.1 1.8
Slovakia 1.7 1.9 0.4 − 0.1 1.7
Slovenia 1.7 1.8 0.4 − 0.1 1.7
Rest EU 1.8 2.0 0.3 − 0.2 1.7
United States 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Non OECD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Source: WorldScan simulations, Cumulated difference in % compared to the baseline in 2040. 
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